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IntroductionWHAT FUTURE FOR TAXATION IN THE EU?
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE, Sciences Po
The 11th EUROFRAME1 Conference on economic policy issues in 
the European Union was held in Paris on 6 June 2014. The aim of the 
conference is to provide an economic forum for debate on economic 
policy issues relevant in the European context. In June 2014 the 
Conference topic was: “What future for taxation in the EU?”. The 
programme and conference papers are available at the EUROFRAME 
Conference webpage: www.euroframe.org. Six of the papers given at 
the Conference are released in this issue of the Revue de l’OFCE. 
European economies have high taxation levels, which allow 
financing the European Social Model, characterised by a high level of 
public and social spending. In 2012, the tax-to-GDP ratio was 39.4% 
for the whole EU, 40.4% for the euro area, as compared to 39.4% for 
Japan and 24.5% for the US. There are however wide disparities within 
the area. The tax-to-GDP ratio is higher than 45% in Denmark, 
Belgium and France, and ranges between 45% and 40% in Sweden, 
Finland, Italy and Austria. But it is below 35% in Greece, Spain, 
Poland, and Portugal; 30% in Slovakia, Ireland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria. There was no trend in the tax-to-GDP ratio developments at 
the EU level over the last 20 years. 
Taxation issues are especially important in Europe, and have gener-
ated a huge number of analyses, reports and debates. Three elements 
of debate seem crucial to us. The first one lays in the tax reforms 
needed at domestic level. Some advocate a less heavy and a more 
neutral taxation. Others wish to keep and even strengthen the redis-
1. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: WIFO (Austria), 
ETLA (Finland), OFCE (France), DIW and IFW (Germany), ESRI (Ireland), PROMETEIA (Italy), 
CPB (Netherlands), CASE (Poland), NIESR (United Kingdom).Revue de l’OFCE, 141 (2015)
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 6tributive and incentive role of taxation. There seems to be some 
consensus on the need to increase progressively environmental taxa-
tion and to reduce the tax burden on labour (but is this consistent 
with social protection financing?). The second element of debate deals 
with tax harmonisation and tax coordination at the EU level. Some 
wish to combat tax evasion (which leads Member States to deprive 
themselves of tax revenues in order to cut taxes on the wealthiest and 
on large companies; to combat ‘tax tourism’ (which allows the wealth-
iest and large companies to choose their tax residence in order to 
avoid taxation). On the contrary, others wish to let competition play 
in order to oblige countries to cut their public spending levels. Many 
are in favour of European taxation, to accompany a rise in the EU 
budget, either to combat tax evasion, or to favour environmental tran-
sition or to reduce the size of finance. Last, a third element of debate 
deals with the role that tax reforms could play in the resorption of 
euro area current imbalances. Some advocate substituting fiscal deval-
uations to monetary devaluations, which can no more be 
implemented in a monetary union, but fiscal devaluations should be 
coordinated at the euro area level. Should economic activity be 
supported by large tax cuts (at the risk of widening public deficits), 
offset by public spending cuts (at the risk of being detrimental to 
output and to the European social model)? Should wealth taxation be 
increased to reduce public debts and deficits?
Structural taxation issues
The paper given by Leon Bettendorf – Study on the impacts of fiscal 
devaluation2 – analyses the consequences of fiscal devaluation, i.e. of 
employers’ social contributions cuts offset by rises in VAT. The 
country implementing such a policy will benefit from competitiveness 
gains, which will be all the more large and long-lasting than wages and 
social contributions are not price-indexed. This measure can also be 
analysed as a once for all tax on capital in place. However, as VAT and 
social contributions have more or less the same tax base (value added 
minus investments versus value added minus profits), the total impact 
on output, employment or trade balance is small in the medium-term.
2. Not released in this issue. The paper is available as a European Commission taxation papers, 
Working paper No. 36, 2013. 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_ 
analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_36_en.pdf.
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compartmentalization of expertise,3 Emmanuel Combet and Jean-
Charles Hourcade argue that analyses on social spending trends linked 
to population ageing and policies to combat climate change are inter-
twined. The authors advocate to finance the rise in pensions spending 
through a rise in environmental taxation accompanied by employers 
social contributions cuts and higher income tax, so as to generate a 
triple dividend: financing social protection, reducing CO2 emissions, 
and rising employment. One may fear however that the paper overes-
timates the positive effects of the carbon tax.   
The Financial Transactions Tax
The paper by Stephan Schulmeister – The struggle over the Financial 
Transactions Tax – A politico-economic farce –, shows that financial 
markets speculation induces a strong volatility detrimental to growth. 
The Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) would allow to reduce this vola-
tility. The proponents of this tax succeeded to have it advocated by the 
European Commission in September 2011. But under the counter-
attack of liberal economists and of the financial lobby, the FTT lost a 
substantial part of its content and its implementation was delayed.
In A step too far? The European financial transactions tax on the repo 
market4, Daniela Gabor also addresses the EU debate on the FTT. The 
author analyses the strong opposition of financial and banking lobbies 
to repo-FTT. Transactions in the repo market contributed to the 
expansion of shadow banking which increases the fragility, opacity 
and interconnection of the European banking system; taxing repos 
would have reduced the size of shadow banking, but governments 
abandoned this project under the pressure of the banking lobby, 
which put forward the threat of a rise in government borrowing costs.
The paper by Gunther Capelle-Blancard: Securities Transaction Tax 
in Europe: First impact assessments5 analyses the impact of the securities 
transaction tax which was introduced in France and Italy. The paper 
shows that this tax reduces somewhat traded volumes, without 
increasing market liquidity or volatility.
3. Not released in this issue. The paper can be downloaded from: http://www.euroframe.org/
conferences.html?aid=1#june2014
4. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
5. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
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and Italy’s financial transactions taxes6 shows that market operators 
were able to reduce substantially the weight of these taxes, mainly 
through modifying the frequency and locations of their activities; 
market volatility was not significantly affected. 
Country experiences
The paper by Sarah Godar, Christoph Paetz and Achim Truger, The 
Scope for Progressive Tax Reform in the OECD Countries: A macroeconomic 
perspective with a case study for Germany, shows that tax progressivity 
was clearly reduced in many OECD countries before 2007. The paper 
shows that there is very limited empirical evidence that high taxation 
rates reduces labour supply from the wealthiest and investment from 
large companies. But the rise in incomes inequality induced by tax 
cuts on high incomes and wealth, social benefits cuts, have negative 
impacts on demand and finally lead to a rise in the government 
deficit, which entails public spending cuts. The paper suggests coordi-
nating at the international level taxes on high incomes and wealth, on 
domestic companies, and domestic policies to increase income redis-
tribution, which would enhance growth and make it easier to meet 
fiscal targets. 
The paper by Katharina Jenderny, Tax progression and the German 
dual income tax7, provides an analysis of the impact of the introduc-
tion of a dual tax system in Germany in 2009. Capital incomes are no 
more taxed according to the progressive tax schedule, but at a flat 
withholding tax. The reform benefited higher incomes, reduced 
strongly the progressivity of the German income tax, especially for 
higher-earnings.
The paper by Henri Sterdyniak, The Great tax reform: a French myth, 
analyses the specificities of the French tax system: relatively low levels 
of income taxation and employers’ social contributions; high taxation 
of capital incomes and higher incomes. The paper analyses, for each 
kind of tax, the reforms which could be introduced and discusses their 
relevance. In particular, the paper shows that replacing employers’ 
social contributions by VAT is useless; it is desirable but difficult to 
raise environmental taxation. It is often recommended that France 
could be brought in line with the EU average thanks to fiscal devalua-
6. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
7. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.ecineq.org/ecineq_bari13/FILESxBari13/
CR2/p216.pdf
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corporate taxation, financed by a rise in CSG; but this should be 
implemented only in a European context. 
The paper by John FitzGerald, Tax policy issues in Ireland8 shows 
that prior to the crisis, tax revenues in Ireland were relying heavily on 
property related activity and corporate taxation. Social contributions 
are very low. Since the beginning of the crisis, a third of the fiscal 
effort was done through taxation. A housing property tax was intro-
duced, replacing transactions taxes on property. The author considers 
that raising the corporate tax rate (currently at 12.5%) would be detri-
mental to jobs in Ireland. However, corporate tax rate cuts in Ireland’s 
neighbour countries reduces the advantage of Ireland, such that 
Ireland will have to adapt. The marginal income tax rate, at close to 
50% should be cut and its base widened. 
European taxation issues
In What future for VAT in the EU? Key challenges and strategies for 
reform9, Stephen Smith recalls the drawbacks of the current VAT 
system for intra-EU trade, in particular the risks of fraud and the prob-
lems which arise with the development of trade in services and e-
commerce. But can the system be improved? No system combines all 
needed qualities: destination principle, freedom for EU members to set 
their VAT rates, equal treatment for domestic and intra-EU trade. An 
alternative system would be to set a uniform rate in the EU for all trade 
within companies; some fraud possibilities would be reduced, but it 
sometimes difficult to disentangle intra-company trade and final sales. 
The paper by Sebastian Kessing, Vilen Lipatov and Malte Zoubek, 
Optimal taxation under regional inequality,10 assumes that workers from 
poor regions (or countries) may increase their productivity in working 
in richer regions (or countries). From that perspective, redistribution 
between rich and poor regions (countries) through taxation and social 
benefits may restrain migration flows and hence be detrimental to 
total productivity. Accounting for this effect, reduces optimal redistri-
bution at the domestic (or EU) level. The objective of European 
construction however remains to be set: increasing migration flows 
8. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
9. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
10. Not released in this issue. Available as a CESIFO Working Paper No. 5152.
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poor countries.  
The paper by Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest, Dirk Neumann and 
Andreas Peichl, An unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area: 
Evidence at the micro level11 proposes an empirical analysis of the 
impact of the introduction of an unemployment insurance scheme at 
the euro area level. Such a scheme will depend on the characteristics of 
the system. As countries with low unemployment rates would oppose 
a system entailing permanent transfers, EU benefits would be entitled 
to recently unemployed people only (i.e. between 3 to 15 months) and 
the gross replacement ratio would be 35% only. During the crisis, the 
system would have entailed transfers from Germany, Austria, and the 
Netherlands to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. But the stabilisa-
tion effect would be limited and would vanish over time. In our view, 
a system of this type cannot be a substitute for a satisfactory fiscal 
coordination in Europe, allowing each country to run a fiscal policy 
relevant in the domestic macroeconomic context. 
The paper by Marcio de Andreis and Mauro Marè, Why and how the 
EU budget should be reformed?12, makes a proposal for a comprehensive 
reform of the European budget, currently too small, rigid and with an 
outdated composition. The paper suggests the European budget 
should be financed by a EU VAT on intermediate consumption. The 
paper suggests to reorient expenditure from agriculture and social 
cohesion to public goods such as defence, border control, external 
affairs and security, R&D. In our view, the paper underestimates the 
role that the EU budget should play in redistribution between regions 
(and countries)
Labour income taxation
The paper by Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla, The interaction 
between labor tax wedge and structural reforms in Italy, uses a DSGE 
model to analyse the impact of structural reforms (lower margin ratios 
for companies and lower wages) and various tax reforms (cuts in 
employers’ contributions, income tax, IRAP, property taxation), or 
fiscal (cuts in public expenditure, public investment, social benefits). 
Prices are assumed to balance supply and demand for goods. Public 
expenditure has no specific usefulness. The most favourable to jobs 
11. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
12. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
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cuts in social benefits, but neither the impact on households’ welfare 
nor on partners’ countries is analysed. Introducing structural reforms 
would allow for higher public investment, which would increase the 
initial positive impact of the reform. 
The paper by Flavia Coda Moscarola, Ugo Colombino, Francesco 
Figari and Marilena Locatelli, Shifting taxes from labour to property. A 
simulation under market equilibrium,13 suggests to increase the property 
tax in order to increase the tax credit on low incomes and make it 
refundable. This reform would reduce income inequalities and 
increase labour supply from the low-skilled, especially women.
The paper by Etienne Lehmann, Claudio Lucifora, Simone 
Moriconi and Bruno Van der Linden, Beyond the labour income tax 
wedge: The unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity14 shows in 
theory and empirically that labour taxation progressivity has in the 
end a positive impact on employment and decreases unemployment. 
Of course, the willingness to work, and productivity may be affected, 
but tax progressivity plays a wage moderation role and increases total 
labour demand, which is more sensitive to wage costs for low-skilled 
people. 
Corporate taxation
The paper by Manuel Bonucchi, Monica Ferrari, Stefania Tomasini 
and Tsvetomira Tsenova, Tax policy, investment decisions and economic 
growth, gives a detailed analysis of labour costs and capital costs in 
Italy, accounting for changes in taxation. The paper provides an 
econometric analysis of the impact of demand and of the relative 
capital/labour cost on investment. The paper advocates active demand 
and public investment policies. Temporary measures of cuts in capital 
costs have had a strong impact and may be used for their counter-
cyclical role. Last, cutting IRAP would have a more positive impact on 
jobs than corporate tax cuts.
The paper by Hendrik Vrijburg, Do small and medium-sized enter-
prises respond to the corporate tax system?15, provides an econometric 
analysis on individual data of the impact of corporate taxation on 
Dutch companies. The paper makes a distinction between young and 
mature companies, between financially and non-financially 
13. Not released in this issue. Available as IZA Discussion Paper No. 8832.
14. Not released in this issue. Available as CESIFO Working Paper No. 4348. 
15. Not released in this issue. Available at: http://www.euroframe.org/conferences.html?aid=1# 
june2014
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impact on investment, but a large impact on financing.
The paper by Arjan Lejour, The foreign investment effects of tax trea-
ties16, shows that international, bilateral or multilateral treaties on 
dividend transfers or parent-subsidiaries relationships increase 
strongly foreign direct investment flows and stocks.
Tax reforms
The paper by Gaëlle Garnier, Aleksandra Gburzynska, Endre 
György, Milena Mathé, Doris Prammer, Savino Ruà and Agnieszka 
Skonieczna (European Commission), Recent reforms of tax systems in the 
EU: good and bad news,17 recall the tax reforms recommended by the 
Commission: reducing labour taxation, not increasing tax rates but 
widening tax bases, abolishing tax expenditures which are not very 
useful ; improving tax revenues collection (combating fraud and tax 
evasion), reducing the corporate tax bias towards indebtedness, 
increasing housing property taxation. In all these areas, progresses 
have been made, but they remain limited. We may regret that the 
European Commission does not mention the fight against income and 
wealth inequalities, the fight against financial instability and green 
taxation as a main objective.
The paper by Florian Wöhlbier, Caterina Astarita, and Gilles 
Mourre (European Commission), Consolidation on the revenue side and 
growth-friendly tax structures: an indicator based approach,18 sets two 
objectives to tax reforms in Europe: lowering labour taxation (espe-
cially for low-skilled workers and for married women); contributing to 
public finance sustainability. The paper assesses which countries tax 
labour more heavily, which countries need to raise their tax revenues 
in the medium term, which countries have room for manoeuvre in 
terms of taxation not harmful to growth and jobs: property taxation, 
consumption taxes and environmental taxes. However, the paper does 
not account for macroeconomic considerations (the depressive impact 
of higher taxes); fairness (no tax on high wealth is considered); the 
effect of shifting taxation from labour to consumption is probably 
overestimated. 
16. Not released in this issue. Available as a CPB Discussion Paper, No. 265.
17. Not released in this issue. Available as: European Commission taxation papers, Working 
paper No. 34, 2013. 
18. Not released in this issue. Available as: European Economy Economic Paper 513, February 
2014.
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and indicators beyond tax ratios, gives a critical view on the current 
trend of international organisations, and of the Commision in 
particular, to assess tax reforms from the only perspective of economic 
growth. Equity and social cohesion considerations, as well as environ-
mental sustainability are as much important and should be taken into 
consideration at the same level. The paper is in favour of broad indica-
tors, accounting for these three aspects in an in-depth way. Thus, one 
should be cautious with too simple indicators, and build relevant indi-
cators. For instance, one should account for gender inequalities, for 
the role of public expenditure in reducing inequalities, for the risk that 
environmental taxation weighs more heavily on the poorer than on 
the rest of the population.
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THE STRUGGLE OVER THE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS TAX 
A POLITICO-ECONOMIC FARCE1
Stephan Schulmeister
WIFO
The struggle over the FTT has developed in three phases. In the first phase
(2009 to 2011) the supporters of the tax went on the offensive, supported by the
“shock effects” of the financial crisis. This phase ended with the (preliminary)
“victory” in the form of the FTT proposal of the European Commission (EC) in
September 2011.
The second phase was shaped by the search for ways how to implement the
FTT within the EU. It ended with the publication of a modified FTT proposal by
the EC in February 2013 as basis for the implementation in 11 Member States.
The last phase has been marked by a strong counter-offensive of the finan-
cial lobby which succeeded in playing off FTT supporting countries against each
other, in particular Germany and France. This phase ended with a defeat of the
FTT supporters. Not even in a group of EU Member States will a general FTT be
implemented in the foreseeable future.
The struggle over the FTT was mainly carried out in two “battlefields”, the
intellectual disputes between economists at universities, research institutes and
international organizations, and the political controversies between NGOs,
political parties, governments and pressure groups, in particular the finance
industry.
Keywords: boom and bust of asset prices, speculation, Financial Transactions Tax.
1. I dedicate this essay to Jernej Omahen, Chris Turner, Jean-Francois Neuez and Luca
De Angelis from Goldman Sachs Research representative for all economists who sell their
intelligence in the market for interest justifications.
e-mail: stephan.schulmeister@wifo.ac.atRevue de l’OFCE, 141 (2015)
Stephan Schulmeister 161. Introduction
The conflict between recognition and interest, explanation and
justification, analytical and normative thinking shapes the work of
economists to a much larger extent than the work of any other
types of intellectuals. The reason is given by Keynes at the end of
his “General Theory”: “... the ideas of economists and political
philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong,
are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 383). If economic
theories “rule the world” then the distribution of power, income
and wealth depends on which economic theory becomes a “para-
digm”. This is so because economists then derive from this
“Weltanschauung” the “navigation map” for policy.
The thinking of economists is therefore driven by the interac-
tion of three forces/motives/activities: Analysis and recognition of
“true” relationships (science), justification of interests (ideology),
and elaboration of concepts for “improving the world” (ethics).
Any output of economists’ reasoning is a “mixture” resulting from
the interaction of these three activities. Even though one cannot
exactly quantify the contribution of each of these activities (as
they are closely interlinked), the following rule of thumb helps to
gauge the importance of the ideological component of an
economic theory or proposal: The higher is the degree of abstrac-
tion of their model, and the less its basic assumptions are derived
from empirical research/experience, the more plausible is the
suspicion that assumptions as well as methods were chosen to
arrive at certain conclusions.
Classical economists, notably Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
Karl Marx, were well aware of the conflicting economic and polit-
ical interests of different classes in society. As a consequence, they
embedded their theories in the context of the interaction of these
interests. Conceiving themselves as members of the society, those
economists took clear positions in favour of certain classes and
against other classes. Their economics was devoted to analysing
the “political economy” and to formulate proposals for its
improvement – the idea of a “value-free” economic science would
have seemed absurd to the classics. Related to this understanding is
The struggle over the Financial Transactions Tax: A politico-economic farce 17their methodological approach: As they try to explain the most
important economic developments like economic growth, speciali-
zation and trade, the distribution of income and wealth, the role of
government in a market economy, etc., they try to base their
assumptions on observations and to reach general conclusions
carefully in an inductive way (taking into account the historical
and regional context).
Even though the content of the – genuinely macroeconomic –
theory of Keynes is very different from the – market-oriented – clas-
sical theories, Keynes shared the attitude of the classics in many
respects: Also Keynes thought concretely and problem-oriented,
based his reasoning rather on experience than on abstract models,
and as a “political philosopher” he put his theory in the context of
the conflict of interests of entrepreneurs, workers and (financial)
rentiers. Last but not least, Keynes elaborated many concrete
proposals for a better organization of the domestic and of the
global economy.
In complete contrast to this attitude, neoclassical economics,
which has become the predominant school since the late
19th century, assumes that there exist “eternal truths” about the
functioning of a capitalistic market economy. Economics is
conceived as a value-free science, which aims at finding out these
“economic laws” (they are assumed to be valid beyond time and
space). Establishing economics as a value-free and, hence, non-
ideological science is itself the most important ideological compo-
nent of the neoclassical school of thought. Such a self-image
enables economists to “sell” their conclusions as objective truths
and to repress the simple question: Which groups/classes are
favoured or put at a disadvantage by the neoclassical “truths”.
The denial of the interaction between economic theory and
economic reality calls for a specific methodological approach: One
sets assumptions about the agents (“homo oeconomicus”), ideal
market conditions, permanent market clearing, etc., all of which
are not supported by the empirical evidence. Based on these
assumptions, one constructs highly abstract models from which
those results are (tauto)logically deducted which are already
contained in the assumptions: All markets should be “liberalized”,
governments should refrain from an active economic policy, irre-
spective whether it regards business cycle fluctuations, social
Stephan Schulmeister 18security, income distribution or the regulations of the financial
sector, etc. All these prescriptions favour certain groups in society
over others.
I term the first – classical and original Keynesian – approach to
analysing economic relationships “realistic economics” (RE) and
the neoclassical approach “idealistic economics” (IE). The key
differences between both approaches concerns the way of
thinking:
— “Realistic economics” (RE) addresses concrete economic
problems, collects empirical observations and tries to arrive
at general conclusions about the relevant relationships in a
predominantly – yet not exclusively – inductive manner. RE
acknowledges the importance of contradictions in the
economy, which should therefore be incorporated in
economic theory. Policy recommendations are problem-
oriented, pragmatic and, hence, embedded in the context of
historical time.
— “Idealistic economics” (IE) aims at modelling the universe of
economic relationships in an ideal world – free of contradic-
tions. To this end, IE has to make assumptions which
“abstract away” essential properties of human beings and of
their interaction in society like the role of emotions or of
uncertainty. From the general equilibrium models based on
these assumptions, one deducts a “navigation map” for
economic policy – again valid beyond time and space.
The two different approaches to economics do not only shape
the activities of economists at the academic level, but also
economic policy. E.g., the New Deal of Roosevelt or the full
employment policy of the 1950s and 1960s are typical examples of
the RE approach, strict rules for monetary and fiscal policies like
the fiscal compact of the EU or deregulation as a general guideline
are typical for the IE approach.
The sequence of prosperity and depressions is interconnected
with the sequence of RE and IE paradigms. One specific reason for
that lies in the influence of economic paradigms on the incentive
conditions of the overall system. IE paradigms favour deregulation
in general and of financial markets in particular so that striving for
profits shifts gradually from the real to the financial economy. The
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valued assets, in particular the government debt, leads inevitably
into a deep crisis. After a long lasting learning period (the bottom
phase of the “long cycle”), an RE paradigm leads to changes in the
incentive structure and in economic policy: Striving for profits is
again focused on activities in the real economy, leading to
prosperity.
The long cycle since the 1920s is a good example for this inter-
action: The finance-capitalistic framework conditions and the
related stock market boom led to the crash of 1929, the subsequent
recession was transformed into a depression due to the austerity
policy prescribed by the IE paradigm. The learning from the crisis,
in particular in the form of a new RE theory provided by Keynes,
laid the ground for the real-capitalistic system of the 1950s and
1960s. Since then, the restoration of the neoclassic paradigm,
completed by the most unrealistic assumptions ever made in the
history of economic thought (rational expectations, financial
market efficiency, real business cycle, etc.), served as the scientific
legitimation of the interest of finance capital in a complete deregu-
lation of asset markets. The related change in the incentive
conditions paved the long way into the current crisis.
At present, the European economy is in a state of depression
(external demand is the only growth component), typical for the
bottom phase of the long cycle: The IE recipes continue to weaken
domestic demand, yet, the elites remain stuck in the neoliberal
paradigm which has been dominating longer than ever before. In
such a situation where a new RE paradigm is not in sight, single RE
proposals are put forward which could/should change the course
of events (e.g., the Glass-Steagall act of 1933 to restrict – as
Roosevelt put it – “speculation with other people’s money”). In the
present situation in Europe, the proposal of a general Financial
Transactions Tax (FTT) has become the most important proposal of
this kind.
The struggle over the usefulness of a FTT on the academic level,
in the media and in politics, between EU member states as well as
within each country, reflects the fundamental differences between
the “realistic” and “idealistic” approach to economics. As the crisis
deepens, this struggle will extend to other problem fields like unem-
ployment or the public debt. These struggles are part of the process
Stephan Schulmeister 20of destructing the old paradigm and developing a new one (in part
by trying new ways in practice as done by the New Deal). Such a
process is most typical for the trough phase of the “long cycle”.
In this essay I shall elaborate upon the most important argu-
ments/weapons of the proponents of and the opponents to a FTT.
I’ll try to show that the arguments of the proponents are typical for
RE reasoning, whereas the arguments of opponents are derived
from the “idealistic” economic paradigm. I shall further document
how the arguments against a FTT, derived from extremely abstract
axioms, legitimate the extremely concrete interests of banks and
hedge funds which have been specializing in “finance alchemy”
for so long.
2. “Finance alchemy” and a general transactions tax: 
A personal remark
In 1982, the debt crisis of developing countries broke out which
hit Latin America most. The standard explanation attributed the
crisis to mismanagement, corruption and political instability in
these countries – but these (“structural”) factors had already been
in effect over the 1970s when Mexico, Brazil and Argentina were
considered the “tiger economies” of that time. Hence, I started to
look for other, more concrete explanations.
First, I looked at the currency structure of the foreign debt – it
was almost exclusively held in US-dollars. The global key currency
had appreciated by almost 30% since 1980 (mainly due to a policy
change in the US). As a consequence, the dollar debts were drasti-
cally revalued – unsustainable for debtor countries. But why had
they accumulated high dollar debts in the first place? The main
reason was: Between 1971 and 1980, the dollar had lost 50% of its
value, incurring dollar debts seemed rational (the real interest on
an international dollar debt was markedly negative over the 1970s
due to strongly rising world trade prices in dollar terms). And why
had the dollar so strongly depreciated? First, because the US
government under president Nixon broke away with the gold
convertibility of the dollar in 1971, causing the Bretton Woods
system to collapse (this decision was “scientifically” legitimated by
the monetarists’ call for moving to a system of “flexible” exchange
rates). Second, currency speculation caused the subsequent dollar
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tion in the first half of the 1980s).
I arrived at the following (hypothetical) conclusion: From their
respective point of view and interest, each group of actors had
acted rationally, the monetarists, the US government, the
currency traders, the developing (debtor) countries, the lending
countries and intermediating institutions (in particular London
banks “recycling petrodollars”), yet, the interaction of their behav-
iour led into a rather “irrational” event, the debt crisis of 1982 (the
subsequent “lost decade” of Latin America can be conceived as a
“silent catastrophe” – if only 1% of the population died earlier
than they would have otherwise then roughly 3 million people
were concerned). 
Could it be that striving for profits through financial specula-
tion causes systematically sequences of “bull markets” and “bear
markets” which in turn dampen entrepreneurial activities in the
real economy, in particular through the asset valuation effects of
overshooting? How are “bulls” and “bears” brought about? In
more general terms: Does the “invisible hand” in financial markets
produce systematically disorder instead of order? Through which
channels do asset price fluctuations impact upon the real
economy?
Over the subsequent 30 years, my research program was shaped
by the attempt to find concrete answers to these questions.
I began with an analysis of the DM/dollar exchange rate move-
ments since the early 1970s. As conventional exchange rate theory
could not explain the persistence of the overshooting process
downward (1971/80) as well as upward (1980/85), I turned to an
inductive/exploratory approach. First, I tried to find out which
types of trading behaviour could – in the aggregate – bring about
the pattern of daily exchange rate movements as a sequence of
(underlying) short-term trends, interrupted – comparatively rarely
– by non-directional movements, called “whipsaws” in the traders’
jargon (Figure 1 displays daily movements of the dollar/euro
exchange rate – their “Gestalt” is the same as in the case of the DM/
dollar rate and – as it turned out later – of all asset prices traded in
financial markets). Second, I started with some field research in
trading rooms.
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got to know the importance of trading systems, be it qualitative
(“chartism”) or quantitative (“trend-following” as well as
“contrarian”) systems of technical analysis. Until today, these
systems are omnipresent in trading rooms (traders have to watch so
many screens because trading systems are applied to different data
frequencies). As one trader told me: “You have to take into account
the trading signals of technical models even if you don’t subscribe
to them – too many traders are using them” – unconsciously
alluding to Keynes’ “beauty contest” – Keynes, 1936, p. 156).
During my Frankfurt field research, the chief currency trader of
“Citibank” (then the most active bank in the foreign exchange
market) proudly showed me the profitable sequence of one of their
trading systems. I was shocked: Technical models use exclusively
the information contained in past prices, if they were profitable
then the forex market would not even be weakly efficient!
All trading systems aim at exploiting the phenomenon of
“trending” of asset prices (“the trend is your friend”): Trend-
following systems produce a buy (sell) signal in the early stage of an
upward (downward) trend, contrarian systems produce a sell (buy)
signal in the late stage of an upward (downward) trend. The (under-
lying) trends are filtered out by simple statistical transformations of
Figure 1. Trading system for the daily dollar/euro exchange rate
Source: Federal Reserve System, WIFO.
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first differences). Figure 1 shows the functioning of the simplest
form of a MA-model (it uses only one MA): Buy whenever the price
series (i.e., the dollar/euro exchange rate) crosses the MA-line from
below, and sell, when the opposite occurs. Figure 1 demonstrates
that even such a simple model would have exploited profitably the
downward and upward exchange rate trends (the euro depreciation
– bear market 1999/2002 – as well as the tremendous euro apprecia-
tion – bull market 2002/2008 – were the result of the accumulation
of several downward and upward trends, respectively).
Figure 2. “Bulls” and “bears” in the US stock market and technical trading signals
     S&P 500
Source: Yahoo Finance.
Figure 3. Intraday asset price dynamics
                          
Source: Fed, Olson.
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Stephan Schulmeister 24On the academic level, the 1980s were the heydays of “idealistic
economics”, it became common sense to believe that under any
circumstances would “the market” stabilize the economy –
provided it is kept free. Confronting the simple fact of the wide-
spread use of technical model in practice would have meant
confronting an unsolvable dilemma: Either these models are not
profitable, then the assumption of rationality of market agents has
to be dismissed, or they are profitable, then the “freest” markets
would not even be weakly efficient. As a consequence, academic
research completely ignored technical trading or declared it as irra-
tional “noise trading”.  
To clarify this issue, I devoted much of my research efforts over
the subsequent 20 years to analysing the profitability and price
effects of technical trading systems in the foreign exchange
markets (DM/dollar, yen/dollar, dollar/euro – Figure 1), the stock
markets (DAX, S&P 500 – Figure 2) and in the commodity futures
markets (corn, rice, WTI crude oil and wheat – Figures 4 and 5),
using not only daily but also intraday data (Figure 3). I analysed
some thousands models, which were selected ex ante according to
objective criteria (in order to dismiss the suspicion of “model
mining”). The results are qualitatively the same for all markets and
data frequencies (Schulmeister, 2002, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a,
Figure 4. Trading system for the daily oil futures price
 Dollars per barrel
Source: NYMEX.
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meister, 2010):
— The great majority of the models would have produced
profits over the entire sample as well as over sub-periods (not
only ex post but also ex ante, i.e. when selecting the best
performing models of sub-period A and following them over
sub-period B).
— The number of single losses is always greater than the
number of single profits. The overall profitability is exclu-
sively due to the exploitation of relatively few, yet persistent
price trends (“cut losses short and let profits run”).
— There operates an interaction between the trending of asset
prices and the use of technical models in practice. On the
one hand, many different models are used by individual
traders aiming at a profitable exploitation of asset price
trends, on the other hand the aggregate behaviour of all
models strengthen and lengthen price trends.
In order to explore the relationship between (very) short-term
trends (“runs”) and (very) long-term trends (“bulls” and “bears”), I
analysed the slope and the duration of monotonic price move-
ments in the foreign exchange markets, the stock markets and the
Figure 5. Trading system for the daily rough rice futures price
Cents per  hundredweights
Source: CBOT.
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Stephan Schulmeister 26commodity futures markets (for the main results see Schulmeister,
2010; see also figures 1 to 5):
— Over the short run, asset prices fluctuate almost always
around “underlying” trends which can be filtered out
through calculating simple moving averages.
— The phenomenon of “trending” repeats itself across different
time scales, e.g., there occur trends based on tick data or 1-
minute-data as well as trends based on daily data.
— During bull (bear) markets upward (downward) runs last on
average longer than counter-movements, the accumulation
of the runs brings about the long-term trend in a stepwise
manner (the average slopes do not differ significantly during
“bulls” and “bears”).
— There prevails a self-similarity pattern: Several runs based on
minutes or five minutes data add up to one trend based on
hourly data, many hourly trends add up to one trend based
on daily data, several daily trends result in one trend based
on monthly data, etc.
Combining these results with the analysis of technical trading
systems led me to the following hypothesis about trading behav-
iour and asset price dynamics (“Bull-Bear-Hypothesis”):
Figure 6. Commodity futures prices
 02/01/2005 = 100
Sources: WTI, NYMEX, CBOT.
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market fundamentals. Traders will then have to gauge
within seconds how the majority of other traders might react
to the new information (Keynes’ “beauty contest”).
— In order to reduce the complexity of trading under extreme
time pressure, traders form only qualitative expectations in
reaction to news, i.e., expectations about the direction of the
imminent price move (but not to which level the price might
rise or fall). 
— Subsequent to an initial upward (downward) price move-
ment triggered by news follows a “cascade” of buy (sell)
signals stemming from trend-following technical trading
systems. As a consequence, this feed-back-mechanism will
often transform the news-induced price change into a trend.
— In many cases the price trends continue after (almost) all
technical models have already opened a position congruent
with the trend. This trend prolongation is mainly due to a
bandwagon effect on behalf of amateur traders (hence, as a
group, amateurs end up as the losers in this zero-sum game).
— When the trend finally loses momentum, contrarian models
together with news cause the trend to tilt into a counter-
trend.
— Most of the time there prevails either an optimistic or pessi-
mistic “market sentiment”, called “bullishness” or
“bearishness”. These “regimes of biased expectations” influ-
ence the traders’ behaviour in three ways: First, they react
much stronger to news, which confirm the prevailing senti-
ment than to news, which contradict it. Second, traders put
more money into a position congruent with the prevailing
sentiment, and, thirdly, they hold these positions longer
than “counter-positions” (traders do not follow blindly a
technical model, this is only the case in “automated” trading
like high frequency trading).
— This behaviour causes in the aggregate short-term upward
(downward) trends (runs) to last longer when the market is
bullish (bearish) than counter-movements. Over several
months or even years, the accumulation of the short-term
trends results in an over-appreciation (over-depreciation) of
the respective asset.
Stephan Schulmeister 28— The more the asset becomes over(under)valued, the greater
becomes the probability of a tilt in the market mood and,
hence, in the direction of the long-term asset price trend.
First, because market participants know from experience that
any bull/bear market comes to an end (in contrast to a
“rational bubble” in “idealistic economics”), second, because
there operate long-term “contrarians” in the market who sell
(buy) in an “overbought” (“oversold”) market (like George
Soros – see his “Alchemy of Finance”, 1987), third, the effects
of an over(under)valuation on the real economy progres-
sively strengthen corrective forces (e.g., the deterioration of
the current account and the related decline in economic
growth in the case of an persistently overvalued currency).
— “Overshooting” is not an exception due to some “shock” (as
IE assumes) but the most characteristic property of long-term
asset price dynamics. Exchange rates, stock prices and
commodity prices fluctuate in a sequence of “bulls” and
“bears” around their fundamental equilibrium without any
tendency of convergence towards this level (Figures 6 to 8).
The analysis of trading systems and of the dynamics of asset
prices as well as its interpretation (in part based on interviews with
traders) contradict completely the assumptions of “idealistic
economics“, in particular about perfect information, market effi-
ciency and rational expectations.
At the same time, the “Bull-Bear-Hypothesis” (BBH) is to a
much higher extent in line with the empirical evidence then the
“Efficient Market Hypothesis”. In particular, the BBH can explain
the following puzzle: On the one hand, asset trading has become
progressively more short-term oriented (“faster“), on the other
hand, also the phenomenon of long-term trends (“bulls” and
“bears”) has become more pronounced. This coincidence can be
explained by the fact that long-term trends are the result of the
accumulation of very short-term price runs which are exploited
and strengthened by the use of ever “faster” trading systems.
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confirmed by the spectacular rise of transaction volumes. Between
1990 and 2007, the overall volume of financial transactions rose
from 15.5 to 72.4 times world GDP. As short-term speculation is
concentrated on exchange-traded derivatives, trading volumes in
these instruments expanded by far most strongly (Figure 10).
Figure 7. Dollar exchange rate and oil price dynamics
 1986 = 100                                                                                                                              In dollars
Source: IMF, OECD.
Figure 8. Stock prices
  1995 = 100
Source: Yahoo Finance.
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Stephan Schulmeister 30Based on the results of my research, but also motivated by the
rather precarious fiscal stance of almost all EU member states, I
started in 2007 to work on a comprehensive concept of a general
financial transactions tax (FTT). In contrast to a Tobin tax which
covers only (spot) currency trading (accounting for only 14% of all
transactions – Figure 10), the FTT should be levied on all transac-
tions with any type of financial asset. The essential features of the
WIFO proposal were as follows2):
— The FTT is levied on all transactions involving buying/selling
of spot and derivative assets. These instruments are traded
either on organized exchanges or over the counter. 
— The tax base is the value of the underlying asset, in the case
of derivatives their notional/contract value. 
— The tax rate should be low so that only very “fast” trading
with high leverage ratios will become more costly due to the
FTT (in the original study a rate of 0.05% was used as bench-
mark). 
2. The WIFO concept was not the first one, which would propose a general FTT (Pollin,Baker
and Schaberg, 2003, proposed a “securities transaction taxes” for the US markets; Summers and
Summers, 1989, had made “a cautious case” for such taxes). However, the WIFO concept was
the most detailed concept as regards the reasoning of the usefulness of a general FTT, the
revenue potential as well as the implementation issues.
Figure 9. Three bulls, three bears and the crisis
 1995 = 100                                                                                                                       1995 = 100
Source: Yahoo Finance, S&P, Case-Shiller.
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The struggle over the Financial Transactions Tax: A politico-economic farce 31This concept ensures the following: The “faster” an asset is
traded and the riskier it is (the higher the leverage ratio is), the
more will the FTT increase transactions costs. At the same time,
holding a financial asset (including hedging) will not be burdened
by the FTT. Hence, a FTT with a uniform rate will specifically
dampen very short-term speculation in derivatives because the
effective tax burden relative to the cash (margin) requirement rises
with the leverage factor. 
Figure 10. Financial transactions in the global economy
World-GDP = 1
World-GDP = 1
Source: BIS, WFE, WIFO
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Stephan Schulmeister 32“High frequency trading” would become unprofitable even at a
tax rate of 0.01%. Other forms of short-term speculation, in
particular in derivatives, would be dampened. As a consequence,
asset price runs would occur less frequent and would become less
persistent. Since long-term trends are the result of the accumula-
tion of short-term runs, a FTT would also dampen the “long
swings” of exchange rates, commodity prices and stick prices.
3. The struggle over the introduction of a FTT
The WIFO concept was published in February 2008 in Schul-
meister, Schratzenstaller, and Picek (2008). At that time I did not
expect that a general FTT would become a major topic in European
politics, I only hoped that the proposal might draw (a little) more
attention to asset trading in practice and their destabilizing effects
on the most important prices in the global economy. As a matter of
fact, it was the shock triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers
and the sharp deepening of the crisis in the financial and in the
real economy which drew the attention to the instability of asset
markets.
The financial crisis was directly related to the pattern of asset
price dynamics as sketched by the BBH. Between 2003 and 2007,
the simultaneous bull market of stock prices, commodity prices
and house prices built up the potential for their simultaneous
collapse, causing the US mortgage crisis to develop into a global
economic crisis in 2008/2009 (Figure 9). Even though the impor-
tance of “bulls” and “bears” for the valuation of wealth and its
impact on final demand and the real economy was (and still is) not
fully understood yet, the deepest crisis since the 1930s caused the
political elites to call for a comprehensive regulation of financial
markets. In this atmosphere, the concept of a general FTT got more
attention than ever before.
The struggle over the FTT has developed in three phases:
— In the first phase (2009 to 2011) the supporters of the tax
went on the offensive, supported by the “shock effects” of
the financial crisis. This phase ended with the (preliminary)
“victory” in the form of the FTT proposal of the European
Commission (EC) in September 2011.
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implement the FTT within the EU. It ended with the publica-
tion of a modified FTT proposal by the EC in February 2013
as basis for the implementation in 11 Member States joining
an “enhanced cooperation procedure” (EU11).
— The last phase has been marked by a strong and well organ-
ized counter-offensive of big “finance alchemy banks” like
Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley and the subsequently
deepening conflicts among the EU11 group, in particular
between Germany and France. This phase will end with a
defeat of the FTT supporters. Not even in a group of EU
Member States will a general FTT be implemented in the
foreseeable future.
The struggle over the FTT was mainly carried out in two “battle-
fields”, the intellectual disputes between economists at
universities, research institutes and international organizations
(IMF, OECD, EC), and the political controversies between NGOs,
political parties, governments and pressure groups, in particular
the finance industry.
3.1. Fight for public opinion 2009 to 2011: Grassroot movements 
against mainstream economics
Practically all NGOs active in the field of development aid and of
fighting poverty – including the respective organizations of
churches – had for many years called for the Tobin Tax. The same is
true for NGOs engaged in proposing new ways of organizing the
economy, in particular the network ATTAC. In some countries,
special campaigns in favour of the Tobin Tax had been successfully
organized (e.g., “Stamp-out-Poverty” in the UK). All these NGOs
and currency tax movements switched from calling for a Tobin Tax
to demanding a general FTT. In the aftermath of the financial crisis,
these civil society organizations strongly intensified their
campaigns for a fundamental change in the financial system and for
the implementation of a FTT as the first and most important step.
Until 2009, there was no strong Pro-FTT-movement in Germany
(in contrast to France and the UK). At the same time, Germany is
the biggest economy in the EU and should enlarge its political
power during the euro crisis. It was therefore crucially important
for the offensive of the FTT supporters, that Jörg Alt, a Jesuit,
Stephan Schulmeister 34founded the campaign “Steuer-gegen-Armut” (“tax against
poverty”) in fall 2009. This campaign expanded very fast,
comprising a broad spectrum of civil society organisations – almost
100 organizations support the campaign, including the most
important catholic, protestant, humanitarian and political NGOs. 
The campaigning for the FTT was so successful that already in
November 2010 61% of the respondents of a “Eurobarometer” poll
supported the introduction of a FTT (European Commission,
2011a).
The political elites did not remain unimpressed by the success
of the campaigns for the FTT. In particular the leaders of the two
(politically) most important EU Member States, Germany and
France, began to endorse such a tax. President Sarkozy proposed
(unsuccessfully) the introduction of a global FTT to the G20 leaders
in 2011. Chancellor Merkel had already in 2010 declared her
support for the tax which she previously had rejected. This change
in her mind was certainly influenced by the fact that Jörg Alt (as a
priest) was able to carry the FTT campaign into the ranks and files
of the Christian-Democratic Party.
In 2010, the most important counter-attacks against the FTT
were carried out by economists of the IMF and the EC (IMF, 2010;
EC, 2010a and 2010a). Instead of a FTT, they proposed a bank levy
on certain balance sheet positions and/or a “financial activities
tax” (FAT) on (certain components of) the value added of financial
institutions. Their reasoning was motivated by the purpose to
discredit the FTT. At the same time, this “recognition interest” was
hidden in the usual way of “idealistic economics”: One presup-
poses the empirical validity of a certain theoretical model and
derives then the (desired) conclusions in a logical manner. By
contrast, the counter-arguments are derived from the empirical
evidence in an inductive manner, typical for “realistic economics”.
In the following, I shortly summarize the main objections against
the FTT and the respective counter-arguments as examples for the
two approaches.
Objection 1: An FTT reduces liquidity and therefore hampers the
price discovery process. 
This reasoning assumes that financial markets are efficient:
Rational traders drive the asset price to its fundamental equilib-
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more transactions are carried out, the faster is the market equilib-
rium reached after a short deviation due to some shock. Hence,
liquidity is per se positive.
In reality, the widespread use of ever “faster” trading systems,
the related explosion of trading volumes, the “abnormal”
frequency of persistent asset price runs, their accumulation to
long-term trends, the “long swings” of asset prices as sequences of
bull and bear markets, all that is enough circumstantial evidence
for the inefficiency of asset markets. 
Objection 2: It is impossible to distinguish between harmful specu-
lation and beneficial transactions.
This argument is a good example for how a strong interest in
specific conclusions hampers coherent reasoning. According to
mainstream “efficient market theory” the distinction is clear-cut:
Beneficial transactions are based on market fundamentals, transac-
tions based only on the information contained in past prices, are
harmful. One has therefore to distinguish between “good”
liquidity (i. e., fundamentals-based trading) and “bad” liquidity (i.
e., technical trading in a broad sense, including high-frequency
trading).
Objection 3: The FTT does not specifically increase the costs of
harmful trading.
By construction, a FTT with the notional value as tax base
increases the tax burden the more the faster transactions are
carried out and the higher their leverage is.
Objection 4: The distortive effects of an FTT will be higher than
those of other kinds of taxes, in particular of a VAT because the FTT
is a turnover tax which burdens transactions between businesses
several times. 
This reasoning suggests that financial transactions between
financial institutions and non-financial corporations can be
perceived as intermediate inputs and outputs. This analogy is
misleading. Buying an asset does not represent an (intermediate)
input and selling an asset does not represent an (intermediate)
output. A more precise analogy to an FTT would be taxes on
gambling where usually any bet/transaction is taxed. 
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same effect as taxes on future dividends. As a consequence, the
present (discounted) value of an asset will decline in reaction to
the introduction of an FTT.
The assumption that an FTT has the same effect as a tax on divi-
dends is misleading because the latter would affect any stock,
whereas the FTT would affect only those stocks which are
(frequently) traded.
Objection 6: Most financial transactions are not driven by (destabi-
lizing) speculation but stem from managing and distributing risk.
Before something can be distributed, it has to be produced. The
production of risk and uncertainty in financial markets has risen
due to the increasing use of (automated) trading systems. All these
systems disregard market fundamentals and are therefore “by
construction” destabilizing. 
Objection 7: Derivatives should not be taxed, in particular because
this would increase hedging costs.
If a “Standard Classification of Financial Transactions” (SCFT) is
introduced in connection with the FTT implementation so that
any transaction is assigned a specific code, it would be easy to
exempt from the FTT the hedging of counter-positions in the real
economy. 
In addition, since a hedger is holding a (counter-)position in a
derivative, only two transactions are involved. At a FTT rate of
0.01% (as proposed by the EC for derivatives), the additional
hedging costs would be 0.02%.
Objection 8: Ultimately, the burden of an FTT will largely fall on
consumers.
The tax incidence issue is at least clearer in the case of an FTT
than in the case of a bank levy or a financial activities tax. As the
latter two tax certain balance sheet positions or (components of)
the value added, banks could/would easily shift the tax burden on
their clients. By contrast, the FTT would levy certain activities irre-
spectively of who carries them out. Banks, which do not engage in
proprietary trading, would pay no FTT at all. Hedge funds, would
shift the tax burden on their (wealthy) clients. Amateur speculators
would pay the tax, their (internet) brokers would not (they also
would shift the tax burden on their clients).
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relocation of trading activities to tax-free jurisdictions, in
particular to offshore markets.
This is already the case today. Many funds operate from
offshore places since these jurisdictions serve as tax havens. Many
of them engage in short-term trading which is largely done on
organized derivatives exchanges. To the extent that they (have to)
trade on exchanges in FTT countries, they will have to pay the FTT.
Finally, if an FTT would be implemented according to the “resi-
dence principle” as (later) proposed by the European Commission
all financial transactions carried out in a non-FTT-country (e.g.,
the UK) the orders of which stem from an FTT-country (e.g.,
Germany) would be taxed in the latter country. 
If one weighs up the arguments in favour and against the FTT,
then it seem rather clear that the former are primarily based on the
empirical evidence whereas the latter are derived from that
economic (“idealistic”) paradigm which has been the mainstream
in economics and politics over the past decades. If one assumes
that the “freest” markets, i.e., the financial markets, cannot
produce systematically wrong price signals – as would be the case if
trending is conceived as the most characteristic property of asset
price dynamics – then one has to reject even a very modest taxa-
tion of financial transactions.
In spite of the rejection of the FTT by mainstream economists,
the European Commission changed its position towards the tax
fundamentally between August 2010 (when it still rejected such a
tax – see EC, 2010b) and September 2011 (when it proposed the
“Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction
tax” – see EC, 2011b and 2011c). The reasons for this turn were
predominantly political: NGOs continued to campaign intensively
for the FTT, the support of the majority of the EU population
remained strong (see the Eurobaromenter commissioned by the
European Parliament and published in June 2011 – EP, 2011), the
European Parliament supported the tax in two resolutions in
March 2010 and in March 2011 (based on the Podimata report)
with an overwhelming majority, and last but not least, the govern-
ments of the key EU Member States, Germany and France, called
for the introduction of the FTT.
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The main features of the FTT concept of the EC (in the
following abbreviated as ECP) are as follows (I refer to the modified
version of February 2013 – EC, 2013). 
The tax base is defined very comprehensively. Almost all transac-
tions in financial instruments carried out by financial institutions
(FIs) are subject to the tax except for currency spot transactions, for
transactions of/with the European Central Bank, the European
Stability Mechanism and the European Union itself and for transac-
tions on primary markets (both for shares and bonds).
As regards the country to which the tax revenues accrue, the ECP
adopts the “residence principle” and completes it – in the modified
version of February 2013 – with the “issuance principle”. The resi-
dence principle means that all transactions of FIs established in one
of the 11 FTT countries (FTTCs) are subject to the tax wherever they
are carried out. If both parties to a transaction are established in a
FTTC the tax revenues go to the respective states, if a FI established
in a FTTC trades with a FI established in a Non-FTTC the revenues
for both sides of the trade go to the respective FTTC.
The issuance principle means that also transactions in financial
instruments, which are issued in a FTTC, are subject to the FTT
even if none of the parties is established in a FTTC.
For the minimum tax rates the ECP proposes 0.1% as regards
financial instruments other than derivatives (i.e., spot transactions
of stocks and bonds), and 0.01% as regards derivatives transac-
tions. Each party has to pay the tax at the respective rates, i.e.,
0.1% or 0.01%, respectively.
The second phase in the struggle over the FTT (September 2011
to February 2013) was characterized by many attempts to find
political ways how to implement the tax in the EU as a whole or at
least in a group of Member States. I summarize only the most
important steps in this process.
At first, the EC and the finance ministers of the “coalition of the
willing” under the leadership of the German finance minister
Schäuble tried to find compromises with the EU Member States
which opposed most strongly the FTT, in particular the UK and
Sweden. The main objective was to get the FTT implemented in the
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was not willing to deal with a compromise proposal put forward by
Schäuble at the ECOFIN in Copenhagen in April 2012. 
As a consequence, the “coalition of the willing” aimed at imple-
menting the FTT in their jurisdictions in the form of an “enhanced
cooperation procedure” (ECOFIN in Luxemburg in October 2012).
This intention was approved by the EC and supported by a resolu-
tion of the European Parliament in December 2012.
In February 2013, the EC published its modified proposal for an
FTT implementation in the 11 EU Member States joining the
“enhanced cooperation procedure”. Finally, it seemed as if the FTT
would soon be implemented, even though only in 11 countries.
But it should come quite differently.
3.3. The successful counter-attack of the financial lobby since 2013 
Even though the modified FTT proposal of the EC did not differ
essentially from the original (the issuance principle should
complement the – still dominant – residence principle), the
reaction of the financial lobby and its supporters in central banks
and the media to the publication of the modified concept was
completely different from the situation in fall 2011. This time,
the economists and managers in the respective institutions had
had enough time to prepare and organize the most powerful
campaign ever. 
The specific targets of the attack were as follows:
— Bomb the public and politicians with as many assertions
about the disastrous effects of a FTT as possible within a
short period of time. What counts is quantity, not quality.
— Pretend that the interests of the national finance industry
are national interests.
— Pretend that the interests of governments to finance their
debts stay in conflict with the FTT proposal of the EC.
— Pretend that a FTT harms the interest of the (little) private
investor in having his/her money “work”, in particular for
his/her retirement.
— Ignore all arguments of FTT proponents concerning trading
practices, “manic-depressive” asset price fluctuations and
their impact on the real economy.
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systemic risk of transnational repo financing.
— Declare the willingness of the financial sector to carry its fair
share of the costs of the crisis.
Like in any war the most important intermediate target was to
split the front of the enemies, in other words, to play off groups of
actors and their interests against each other: National interests
against the interests of “Brussels bureaucrats”, national interests of
EU Member States against each other, government’s interest in
easy debt financing against the interests of the civil society, the
interests of the latter against the interests of the (little) private
investor, etc.
Demonstrating to the majority of the EU population and to the
governments of the key Member States Germany and France that
they were wrong and act against their own interests seemed to be a
mission impossible. Yet, the “total war” of the financial lobby was
successful: In a blanket-bombardment on the whole area of
governments, civil society, media and EU-institutions the concept
of a comprehensive FTT (“all institutions, all markets, all instru-
ments”) was destroyed within a few months.
Crucial to the success of their attack was the combination of
well-prepared activities and their concentration on the period
immediately after the publication of the EC proposal (March to
June 2013):
— Mobilization of all important banks and financial lobby
organizations to flood the public with a concentrated load of
the already previously discussed objections against a FTT.
— Organizing the (discrete) backing of the counter-offensive by
important central banks.
— Concentration of all forces on a decisive breakthrough on a
new front where governments (of the FTT-supporting coun-
tries) are most vulnerable, the repo front.
The mass mobilization of financial institutions materialized
primarily in press conferences and publications of practically all
big banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, JP
Morgan, Citigroup, etc.) and lobby organizations (International
Banking Federation, the ICMA European Repo Council, the Euro-
pean Fund and Asset Management Association, etc.). In all their
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standard arguments against a FTT: The tax would hamper liquidity,
the cascading effects would increase the cost of capital, in
particular the costs for financing government debt, the tax would
reduce the profits of banks and consequently their tax payments,
hedging costs would rise, as a consequence overall financial
stability would be reduced.
These assertions were then used to drive a wedge between
members of the “coalition of the willing”, in particular between
France and Germany: “Indeed, we think the FTT would de facto be
a transfer of French taxes (on, e.g., derivative transactions of the
French banks, which are the market leaders in Equity Derivatives)
to other jurisdictions.” (Morgan Stanley, 2013, p. 2).
The intention to play off governments of the “coalition of the
willing” against each other was facilitated by the fact, that France
and Italy introduced their own FTT in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
The French tax is essentially a “stamp duty” on the change of
ownership of French stocks, the scope of the Italian tax is wider as
it also covers derivatives. 
Once there were national FTTs introduced, the respective
governments did no longer stick to the FTT proposal of the EC but
wanted the latter to be changed according to their national FTT
concepts. E.g., the French government wanted the residence prin-
ciple to be removed and derivatives to be excluded from the tax as
both measures would hurt the competitiveness of their national
banks (in France, all big banks have specialized in “finance
alchemy” through short-term derivatives trading whereas in
Germany this is mainly the case for Deutsche Bank). At the same
time the Italian government insisted in leaving out government
bonds from the FTT. 
In an extremely important manoeuver, the financial lobby
mobilized the central banks, in particular the ECB (even though
Draghi had officially to declare his support of the FTT “in prin-
ciple”): Between March and July 2013, the “consultations”
between the ECB and the financial lobby on the FTT issue intensi-
fied. In May 2013, the then Governor of the Bank of England
stated bluntly about the FTT in a press conference: “Within
Europe, I can’t find anyone in the central banking community
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Banque de France and the President of the German Bundesbank
criticized the FTT explicitly in the public (see Corporate Europe
Observatory, 2013).
The attack of the financial lobby would not have been so
successful had it not opened a new front, the repo front (with a
repurchasing agreement, a bank raises cash by selling a security –
usually a government bond – to the lender, and commits itself to
repurchase the security when the repo expires – in most cases just
after one day). The assertion that the FTT would damage in a disas-
trous way one of the most important markets for collateralized
finance turned out to become the most effective weapon against
the FTT proposal of the EC. There are several reasons for that:
— Until spring 2013 the question, how the repo market might
be affected by the FTT had not attracted much attention.
Hence, the lobby could pretend that the proponents of the
FTT, the European Commission and politicians in general
had just overlooked the damage such a tax would cause to
one of the most important instruments of the European
financial system.
— Politicians who had supported the FTT proposal became
uncertain as they were in fact not familiar with repos, the
greatest component of the European shadow banking
system.
— At first glance, it does indeed seem inconsistent that unse-
cured credits remain FTT-free whereas collateralized
borrowing is taxed (legally, the lender gets ownership of the
security).
— The most important types of collateral in repos are govern-
ment bonds. According to the financial lobby, the FTT
would strongly dampen liquidity in the repo market. As a
consequence, the costs of financing the government debt
would rise. Even though this reasoning just repeated the
(wrong) argument that a high turnover in the secondary
market lowers capital costs, it hit a very salient issue of
finance ministers.
— In a similar manner it was argued that also pension funds
would see lower returns as consequence of higher repo costs.
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once the repo market dries out – and this will make it much
more difficult to withdraw from measures of unconventional
monetary policy (a particularly great concern of German
central bankers).
All this reasoning hides the core properties of repo transactions
and of the repo market as the core component of the shadow
banking system:
— Most repo transactions finance short-term trading activities,
in particular proprietary trading of banks.3 Intraday trading
is financed by so called tri-party repos where purchasing and
repurchasing takes place within hours.
— Repos facilitate leveraged trading to the extreme in the sense
that one can purchase an asset (almost) without cash by
borrowing money to buy the asset and simultaneously
posting the asset as collateral. 
— Short-selling is fostered by the repo market. One lends
money in the repo market, takes the security one intends to
short as collateral, and then sells the security.
— The extremely high leverage of repo transactions strengthen
boom-bust-cycles of asset prices and increase systemic risks:
Rising asset prices stimulate repo financing which feeds back
onto the bull market and conversely in the case of a bear
market.
— The possibility to re-use the collateral produce “repo chains”
(e.g., bank A sells a security to bank B in return for cash, bank
B sells the security to bank C, etc.), increasing systemic risk:
Strong and persistent movements of securities prices cause
“chain reactions” feeding back on the bull or bear market.4)
It is no surprise that the increasingly short-term repo transac-
tions developed in tandem with the increasingly short-term
proprietary trading of (certain) banks. This type of trading is
predominantly unrelated to market fundamentals (it is to a large
extent driven by trading systems). 
3. According to survey studies of the Bank of England two thirds of repo turnover concern
overnight deals (Hördahl and King, 2008).
4. For the different channels through which the repo market produces (avoidable) systemic
risk see the excellent paper by Gabor (2014) and the literature quoted there.
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financing to become unprofitable due to the implementation of a
FTT. This, however, might not be a disadvantage but an advantage
to the economy as a whole insofar as these transactions finance
predominantly short-term and destabilizing asset speculation. 
To put it differently: If banks were focused on financing activi-
ties in the real economy like real investment, production and trade
of enterprises as well as housing and durables of private house-
holds, there would be no need to shortly raise millions through
overnight repos. It is one objective of a FTT to change the incentive
conditions in favor of real world activities at the expense of the
profitability of “finance alchemy”.
The “production” of systemic risks by short-term repos is
confirmed by their role in the recent financial crisis (e.g., Hördahl
and King, 2008; Gorton and Metrick, 2010; Tuckman, 2010; for a
summary see Gabor, 2014). Before the outbreak of the crisis, banks
and their “special purpose vehicles” created securities from loans
which often were backed by subprime mortgages. These securities
were then used as collateral for repos. At the same time also the
main segment of the repo market where government securities
serve as collateral, boomed. In this way “securitized banking”
created liquidity which further fuelled the bubbles in the stock
markets, housing markets and in the commodity (futures) markets.
When the confidence in the real value of mortgage backed secu-
rities became weaker and weaker and house prices started to
decline, the confidence crisis spilled over to the repo market as a
whole. The subsequent “run on repo” caused interbank interest
rates to shoot up, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
September then accelerated the simultaneous fall of stock prices,
house prices and commodity prices dramatically, turning the
liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis of the banking system
(Figure 9). The strong and simultaneous devaluation of the three
types of wealth in turn was a main factor for the spill-over of the
financial crisis to the real economy.
All these aspects were – of course – neglected in the attack of the
financial lobby on the FTT. It focused on the rising costs of banks,
governments, pension funds and private investors which would be
caused by the FTT. One needed, however, some kind of “scientific”
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became a research report of Goldman Sachs, in the following
termed “GS study” (Goldman Sachs, 2013).
This study is a perfect example how economists develop
research methods guided by the interest in reaching certain results.
In the case of the GS study this interest consisted in “blowing up”
the costs of the FTT to the maximum extent. This interest was so
overwhelming that the GS researchers accepted making absurd
assumptions and calculating meaningless “effective annual tax
rates”. In addition, the researchers changed their own method
whenever convenient for the purpose of their exercise.
The GS study summarizes the main results right at the begin-
ning: “On a 2012 pro-forma basis, the FTT would amount to
€170 bn for the 42 European banks we have analysed. By affected
balance sheet category, the bulk of the impact stems from the
European banks’ REPO books (€118 bn), followed by derivatives
(€32 bn), equities (€11 bn) and government bond books (€4 bn).
By bank, the impact extends across business models – investment,
universal, global and domestic retail banks. Similarly, by geog-
raphy, it has a reach well beyond the EU-11. Indeed, we show
some of the most affected banks would be those in the UK and
Switzerland.
Individually, we show that the most affected banks are the
French and German institutions. The six French and German
banks show a 2012 pro-forma FTT as a percentage of 2015E PBT
(i.e., profits before taxes) ranging from 168% (BNP), up to 362%
(DBK) and finally 423% (Natixis). But even pure-play retail lenders
– the Italian/Spanish domestic banks for example – stand to be
significantly impacted (16%-130% of 2015E PBT).” (Goldman
Sachs, 2013, p. 4).
The messages are clear:
— Just for the 42 banks analysed, the overall FTT costs are five
times higher than estimated by the EC for all financial
institutions.
— Also banks outside the EU11 are heavily affected by the FTT.
— The two countries pushing strongest for the FTT, France and
Germany, would inflict the biggest damage to their own
banks.
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investment banking – would be heavily affected by the FTT.
In a few lines – written in a sober tone – the researchers sent
messages to all types of banks of different countries within and
outside the EU11 calling for standing up against the FTT.
In order to arrive at these “magic” figures, the GS researchers
invented a new estimation procedure: “... we attempt to gauge
what the 2012 FTT (theoretically) payable by individual banks
would be, were they asked to apply FTT retroactively, to 2012
balances. This is a theoretical, ‘all else equal’, exercise. The results,
however, allow us to identify the business areas/product lines
where the FTT impact would be most pronounced...” (Goldman
Sachs, 2013, p. 16).
In other words: When calculating the costs of the FTT, GS
researchers assume that transaction volumes remain unaffected by
the tax – they call this the “pro-forma-effect”. On other occasions,
however, the report of GS Research stresses the effect that transac-
tion volume will be the more reduced the more frequently an
instrument is turned over. 
The degree of seriousness of this procedure can be illustrated
using the following example. Trading volume in UK financial
markets amounted to 563 times the British GDP in 2010 (even
without repo transactions which are not covered by the BIS data
base).5 On a “pro-forma” base, a general and uniform FTT rate of
0.1% would generate tax revenues of 56.3% of GDP, at a rate of 1%
the British government might even receive revenues amounting to
5.6 times the British GDP.
The GS researchers justify the “pro-forma” estimation arguing
that “the results allow us to identify the business areas/product
lines where the FTT impact would be most pronounced...” This is
simply wrong: The structure of activities differ markedly between
European banks (as the report itself stresses). Banks which are
specialized on short-term trading and repo financing (“finance
alchemy banking”) will therefore reduce these activities in reaction
5. Based on data from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the BIS overall
transaction volume in 2010 on UK markets is estimated at 1,270,4 tn. $.
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traditionally operating banks (“boring banking”).
For the same reason, the calculations of the distributions of the
“pro-forma” FTT payments by types of banks and by countries are
flawed. However, the publication of these numbers should
strengthen the resistance of banks against the FTT and should
deepen (potential) conflicts between EU governments: “French
banks are the largest contributors, at €61 bn (36%). Germany (this
includes only DBK and CBK) absorbs the second highest hit with
€35 bn, mainly driven by Deutsche Bank (€26 bn)” Goldman
Sachs, 2013, p. 28). 
To serve its “research interest”, GS researchers introduced the
concept of an “effective annual tax rate”. This means that the esti-
mated annual FTT payments are related to the average repo value.
In this way one can document astronomically high “tax rates” as
these rates becomes the higher the shorter the financing period of
the REPO is. For tri-party-REPOS which are turned over 3 to 5 times
per day, GS Research arrives at an “effective annual tax rate” of the
FTT of 360% (Goldman Sachs, 2013, exhibit 12 on p. 19).
The problematic of this procedure becomes evident if one
considers the following example: An US household spends every
day on average 100$ on consumption for which it has to pay 5$ in
sales tax. What sense does it make to calculate an “annual effective
sales tax” of 365 times 5% = 1,825% instead of speaking of a
general sales tax rate of 5%?
Another example for the predominance of the “research
interest” in the reasoning of GS researchers: When discussing the
FTT impact on the profits of European exchanges the researchers
does not stick to their “pro-forma” estimation but applied the
assumption of the EC about the FTT-induced reduction of trading
volumes. In this way, the GS report arrives at the following conclu-
sion: “... we estimate that the average European Exchange & IDB
(i.e., interdealer brokers) under our coverage would see pre-tax
profits decline by 22% as a result of the tax. Our analysis suggests
that Deutsche Börse would see the largest impact to earnings, with
a potential 51% reduction in our forecast pre-tax profits for 2014.”
(GS Report, p. 44). Again: stupid Germans harm themselves.
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the FTT on retail investors: “Our analysis suggests that much of the
burden of the FTT... would fall on retail investors rather than insti-
tutional investors we estimate that a typical retail investor from
the Euro area-11 could expect to incur an annual FTT charge of
33 bp, while a similar institutional fund manager would incur
11 bp in tax. On this basis, a 30 year-old retail investor in the Euro-
11 area who invested €1,000 a year until retirement at 65 could
expect to see 14% of the principal investment consumed by the
FTT.” (GS Report, p. 54).
These calculations are biased in three respects. First, it is
assumed that investors would not reduce the turnover of their
portfolio due to the FTT. Second, it is – unrealistically – assumed
that the retail portfolio returns over 35 years 6% p. a. on average.
Both assumptions result in a high sum of cumulative tax payments
(4.875 €). Third, this sum is then related to the cumulative cash
invested (35.000 €) leaving out the interest-compound effect. If
one takes the latter – correctly – into account, the cumulative tax
burdens amounts to only 4.1% of the closing portfolio (this ratio is
documented in exhibit 34 but not mentioned in the main text).
The “dirty” campaign of the financial lobby, designed by
economic researchers as their intellectual servants was successful:
The tensions between members of the “coalition of the willing”
rose, in particular between Germany and France, and the EC
proposal is no longer the common base of the “enhanced coopera-
tion procedure.”
In order to make some statement on the FTT issue before the
elections to the European Parliament, 10 finance ministers of the
EU11 (Slovenia did not sign up) declared on May 6, 2014: “...The
Council Working Group has reviewed the Commission’s proposal
during the past months. It is evident that complex issues have
arisen. As a result, more technical work needs to be conducted. Our
commitment to the introduction of a financial transaction tax
remains strong... We agree on the following key elements: The
work on the introduction of a harmonized financial transaction
tax is to be based on a progressive implementation of the tax. The
progressive implementation will first focus on the taxation of
shares and some derivatives.”
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the financial lobby during past months was too strong. This forced
us to give up the ‘all institutions, all markets, all instruments’
approach proposed by the European Commission. Instead, we
shall introduce a tax on shares like the British ‘stamp duty’, but
with much lower tax rates. We commit ourselves to call it ‘finan-
cial transaction tax’”.
To tax only spot transactions in shares in a first step means (no
important derivatives will be included as the French government
does not want to disturb “their” banks’ business): Out of all instru-
ments the “FTT” would tax exactly only those which are less used
for short-term speculation and more for holding wealth (compared
to derivatives). It won’t be too difficult for pension and investment
funds to carry out a campaign against such a one-sided “FTT”. But
even if such a tax is implemented, it will soon be suspended since
the revenues will fall short of projections – trading will shift to
stock (index) derivatives and new forms of derivative “stock
hybrids”.
As project of the “enhanced cooperation procedure” this type of
“FTT” will probably never be introduced because there won’t be
the minimum of 9 Member States available. It simply does not pay
off for politicians to support such a tax as proponents of a true FTT
conceives such a support as mockery of their engagement and
opponents reject any kind of transaction tax.
4. Outlook
The defeat of the FTT proponents did not come as a surprise. It
just reflects the power of “big finance” which has been growing
over the past 40 years in tandem with the transformation of the
economic system from “real capitalism” in the 1950s and 1960s to
“finance capitalism” afterwards. The key difference between both
types of capitalism concerns at which activities is striving for
profits – the “core energy” of capitalism – focused on.
In real capitalism, the framework/incentive conditions promote
entrepreneurial activities in the real economy because under stable
exchange rates, stable commodity prices and interest rates stabi-
lized at a level far below the rate of economic growth it is hardly
possible to “make money out of money”. Under these conditions,
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savings to investments (“boring banking”).
The “scientific” legitimation of a real-capitalistic system is
provided by theories which stress the inherent (financial) insta-
bility of capitalism and, hence, the necessity of strict regulations of
the financial sector and of an active economic policy. In more
general terms, in real capitalism one strives for an integration of
the great contradictions: Between governance through politics and
governance through market forces, between cooperation and
competition, between individual self-interest and social coher-
ence/social self-interest, between (real) capital and labour.
The real-capitalistic phase of the 1950s and 1970s was shaped
by the predominance of Keynesianism as the theoretical/ideolog-
ical basis, by stable financial conditions, by building-up the welfare
state, by strong expanding real investments (the main form of
profit-seeking), and consequently by high economic growth and
full employment. These conditions strengthened over the 1960s
trade unions and social-democratic parties, the institutions of the
welfare state helped to secure their power, intellectuals moved to
the left.
All these developments provoked the offensive of a counter-
movement by the late 1960s. The core demands of neoliberalism,
i.e., fighting trade unions, weakening the welfare state and liberal-
izing financial markets, were strongly supported by “big business”
and scientifically legitimized by the monetarist theory.
The stepwise realization of the monetarists’ demand for de-
regulation of financial markets transformed the system from a real-
capitalistic to a finance-capitalistic regime over the 1970s.
Unstable exchange rates, commodity prices, interest rates above
the rate of growth, booms and busts in the stock market together
with financial innovations – in particular the emergence of finan-
cial derivatives – progressively fostered “finance alchemy” at the
expense of entrepreneurial activities (figures 1 to 8). These
systemic changes have strongly contributed to the decline of
economic growth from decade to decade, and to the related
increase in unemployment as well as in the public debt. This
process has caused (many) banks and hedge funds to transform
themselves from institutions serving the real economy to special-
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process is discussed in Boot and Ratnovski, 2012). 
However, economic history shows that this type of profit-
seeking is self-destructing since it produces progressively more
financial assets which are not backed by real values – “fictitious
capital” in the form of overvalued stocks and government bonds.
The simultaneous devaluation of stock wealth, housing wealth and
commodity wealth through the coincidence of three bear markets
deepened the financial crisis und was the most important systemic
cause of the most severe crisis of the real economy since the 1930s
(Figure 9 – the stock market crash 2000/2003 can be conceived as a
“foreshock”). The European elites could not recognize this cause,
mainly because the neoliberal “Weltanschauung” has been domi-
nating already for more than 30 years – first at the universities,
then in the media and – at least since the early 1990s – in politics. 
As a consequence, the European elites resorted to “more of the
same”: “Finance alchemy” was completed by a new game, the spec-
ulation against sovereign states, austerity policy has been
strengthened, labour markets liberalized, real wages cut. All these
measures only deepened the crisis: Unemployment is higher than
ever before in post-war Europe, the public debt has risen tremen-
dously. Whereas the real economy is depressed, stock prices boom
again, fuelled by a pseudo-Keynesian monetary policy (conven-
tional Keynesianism cannot work under finance-capitalistic
framework conditions).
The US policy followed a much more pragmatic course:
“Finance alchemy” was somewhat dampened by the Frank-Dodd
act, in particular by the restrictions on proprietary trading
(“Volcker rule”) and no strict austerity measures were imposed on
the economy. In the US, “realistic economics” has been to a much
lesser extent marginalized in academia, media and politics as
compared to Europe where – under German leadership – “idealistic
economics” has almost completely obsessed the heads of the elites.
These differences are also reflected by the development of
financial transactions (Figure 11). In 2007, overall trading volume
amounted to 105.5 times GDP in the US and to 101.1 times GDP in
Europe. Until 2013, trading volume fell in the US to 80.2 times
GDP whereas it rose to 118.5 times GDP in Europe (based on data
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“World Federation of Exchanges” – the data do not comprise repos
and CDSs).
To sum up: Since the outbreak of the crisis six years ago the
resistance of the European elites to learning from the crisis and to
reconsidering their neoliberal “Weltanschauung” and the “naviga-
tion map” derived from it, has not been weakened but
strengthened. As a consequence, the long-term divergence between
a booming financial economy and a progressively depressed real
economy has been sharpened since the crisis. In such an environ-
ment, the proposal of a comprehensive FTT had finally to be
rejected. The real surprise is that the idea of a general FTT made it
up to an official proposal of the European Commission.
If elites are unable to learn from a crisis they have to repeat it.
This will happen in the near future, once again triggered by the tilt
of stock prices from a bull market to a bear market. Even if stock
prices fall “only” as strongly as in 2000/2003 or 2008/2009 (they
could fall stronger as the recent boom was also stronger – see
Figures 2 and 8) will the related worldwide devaluation of stock
wealth dampen final demand. It will dampen directly consump-
tion and investment because many households and enterprises are
Figure 11. Financial transactions in the global economy
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Source: BIS, WFE, WIFO.
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The struggle over the Financial Transactions Tax: A politico-economic farce 53already in a precarious financial situation. The situation will be
aggravated by the fact that governments – certainly in Europa – will
not be willing and able to stabilize the economy through expan-
sionary fiscal policy measures. The situation could worsen further if
the extremely high bond prices fall in tandem with stock prices.
In other words: The next bear markets and the thereby induced
crisis will accelerate the process of self-destruction of finance capi-
talism during the trough phase of the long cycle6). The depression
will only be overcome if framework conditions are changed in such
a way that entrepreneurial activities are much more rewarded that
“finance alchemy”. A general FTT could serve this purpose, but
more radical solutions will probably be necessary. 
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used to assess different sustainability dimensions of tax systems and/or indi-
vidual tax categories also in a cross-country comparison and over time. In
particular, the European Commission has developed a set of indicators trying to
capture the contribution of member states' tax systems to the goals of the
Europe 2020 strategy. This set of indicators, however, focuses on the growth-
friendliness of member states' tax systems, while indicators for their distribu-
tional and environmental impact play a less prominent role. The paper
attempts at establishing a conceptual basis for the development of a consistent
set of indicators to capture the sustainability impact of tax systems. Firstly, we
formulate fundamental objectives underlying a sustainable tax system. Then we
present some fundamental deliberations about the function of indicators and a
classification of indicators which may be useful to assess the sustainability
impact of tax systems. Against this background, we critically review the Euro-
pean Commission's indicator-based approach to evaluate EU member states' tax
systems within the European Semester. Finally, we address open questions and
next research steps.
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Margit Schratzenstaller581. Introduction
Rather coincidentally, together with the outbreak of the current
financial and economic crisis a fundamental debate emerged
among economists focusing on two main inter-related issues: First,
to develop alternative concepts to secure and improve economic,
social and environmental sustainability. Second, to replace the
conventional approach to define and measure the welfare of an
economy and its members via the steady growth of GDP by an
approach taking into account a broad set of economic, social and
ecological aspects and indicators. This recent debate is led under
the catchphrase “Beyond GDP” and roots in an initiative started by
European Commission, European Parliament, Club of Rome,
OECD and WWF in 2007 by hosting a high-level conference titled
“Beyond GDP”. The “Report by the Commission on the Measure-
ment of Economic Performance and Social Progress” (the so-called
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Report) issued in 2009 serves as the starting
point for a growing number of contributions from the academic as
well as from the political side, the latter both on the national and
the supranational levels, concentrating on alternative concepts for
welfare and well-being for economies and societies as well as on
alternative indicators to assess overall social, economic and envi-
ronmental progress1.
Up to now, the “Beyond GDP”– activities following the Stiglitz-
Sen-Fitoussi-Report of 2009 have been focusing on the outcome of
the total of (economic) policies on individual and societal well-
being and welfare as well as on economic, social and ecological
sustainability. Single policy areas have barely received any atten-
tion. Especially the potential contribution of public sector
activities and interventions to improve economic, social and envi-
ronmental sustainability has not played a very prominent role in
this recent debate. This is particularly surprising with respect to tax
policy. Given the level of tax ratios in industrial countries,
reaching about 40 percent of GDP on the EU average, tax policy
can be expected to exert a significant influence on decisions of
1. Also within the EU research project WWWforEurope alternative welfare indicators and
concepts are elaborated, see e.g. Kettner, Köppl and Stagl (2012) and van den Bergh and Antal
(2014).
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well as on labour supply and demand and thus on their respective
contributions to the sustainability of the lifestyle of economies and
societies. Moreover, tax policy has a considerable potential to
change the market distribution of incomes and wealth and is
therefore one important factor influencing individual well-being
as well as social cohesion.
At the same time, aspects of sustainability are not systematically
taken into consideration in the current academic and political
debate on the quality of public finances in general and of tax
systems in particular. For the last few years, OECD, International
Monetary Fund as well as the European Commission have been
pushing the case for enhancing the growth-friendliness of tax
systems: According to this work, tax systems should primarily
promote economic growth (Arnold et al., 2011; Acosta-Ormaechea
and Yoo, 2012). Ecological and social/equity considerations are
not completely neglected, but appear to have lower priority in the
hierarchical order of aims and objectives guiding the design of tax
systems. Moreover, the (social and environmental) “quality” of
economic growth does not play any role. The concept of green tax
reforms has a wider focus, explicitly combining environmental
and employment goals via the “double dividend hypothesis”:
Revenue-neutral green tax reforms aim at reducing environmental
damage by increasing ecotaxes, the proceeds of which are used to
cut labor taxes and thus to increase employment.2
Altogether, currently tax theory and tax policy are addressing
partial aspects of sustainability, but do not adopt an integrated
perspective. On an internationally comparable basis, an increasing
number of data and indicators are regularly published by the Euro-
pean Commission and the OECD that can be used to assess
different sustainability dimensions of tax systems and/or individual
tax categories also in a cross-country comparison and over time. In
particular, the European Commission has developed a set of indica-
tors trying to capture the contribution of member states’ tax
systems to the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. This set of indica-
tors, however, focuses on the growth- and employment-friendliness
of member states’ tax systems, while indicators for their distri-
2. See, e.g., the contributions in Ekins and Speck (eds.) (2011).
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consistent set of indicators conveying an overall picture of a tax
system’s contribution to sustainable development is still missing.
This short paper attempts at establishing a conceptual basis for
the development of such a set of indicators. We firstly formulate
fundamental objectives underlying a sustainable tax system
(chapter 2). Chapter 3 presents some fundamental deliberations
about the function of indicators and a classification of indicators
which may be useful to assess the sustainability impact of tax
systems. Against this background, chapter 4 critically reviews the
European Commission’s indicator-based approach to evaluate EU
member states’ tax systems within the European Semester. Chapter
5 concludes by addressing open questions and next research steps.
2. Sustainability challenges for tax systems and features of 
a sustainable tax system
The concept of sustainability, which has been developed,
refined and modified since decades based on the so-called
Brundtland report (WCED, 1987), encompasses three dimensions:3
the economic, the social (or socio-cultural), and the environmental
dimension (Rogall, 2008). Very generally, the economic dimension
encompasses growth, efficiency and stability; the social dimension
includes empowerment, inclusion and governance; and the envi-
ronmental dimension is concerned about resilience, natural
resources, and pollution (Lozano, 2008). It is debated in the litera-
ture whether these three dimensions hold equal positions in terms
of relevance, as is assumed by Munasinghe (2007) in his well-
known sustainability triangle, or whether there is a hierarchical
order, as put forward by Daly (1973) who frames the natural envi-
ronment as the “ultimate means” constituting the foundation of
the triangle, while the economy is interpreted as “intermediate
means” to reach equity and human well-being (i.e. the social
dimension) as “ultimate ends”. Some authors, e.g. Hart (2000),
even postulate environmental sustainability as the precondition
for economic and social sustainability: while the environment can
3. For an extensive overview over the most relevant definitions of sustainability and the
related literature see Dimitrova et al. (2013).
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exist without the economy, neither society nor economy can exist
without the environment. This paper assumes, however, that the
three sustainability dimensions are equally ranking.
These three sustainability dimensions break down into several
sustainability challenges for tax systems. From the perspective of
economic sustainability, an important challenge – particularly in
the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crisis – is
restoring sound public finances, i.e. to contribute to long-term
fiscal sustainability. Related is the increasing international
mobility of capital and profits, as well as demographic change (i.e.
ageing of societies). Further challenges for economic sustainability
which are relevant also for tax systems are the ongoing instability
of the financial system, as well as weak (employment) growth and
high unemployment. Environmental challenges refer to climate
change, energy transition and the depletion of natural resources.
Challenges from the view of social (socio-cultural) sustainability
include the increasing inequality and concentration of income and
wealth that can be observed quasi globally (Förster et al., 2014), as
well as the persistent gender gap prevailing in many countries
worldwide (World Economic Forum, 2014).
From these sustainability challenges, several objectives a
sustainable tax system should pursue can be derived.
An economically sustainable tax system should generate suffi-
cient revenues to finance government activities. This includes
curbing tax flight, i.e. legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion:
An economically sustainable tax system should take into account
the international framework, in particular the mobility of (capital)
income and wealth which has increased dramatically over the last
few decades. An economically sustainable tax system should
furthermore avoid negative incentives for economic decisions in
general. In particular, it should minimize employment barriers,
particularly – but not exclusively – for women and low-wage
earners. It should contribute to stabilizing the financial system,
and it should have a role in the internalisation of externalities as
well as with regard to the production or consumption of (de)merit
goods (e.g. health or education). Not least, compliance costs and
costs of tax collection should be kept as low as possible.
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sustainability should discourage consumption and production
activities which contribute to climate change and environmental
degradation. Moreover, it should encourage energy transition.
A socially sustainable tax system should reduce the increasingly
unequal market distribution of income and wealth, and it should
aim at contributing to equal opportunity. Related is the objective
to contribute to the reduction of gender gaps. Also from the
perspective of social sustainability tax systems may be used to
further or to curb, respectively, the consumption or production of
(de)merit goods. A socially sustainable tax system should also
minimise tax flight and be as transparent and simple as possible to
ensure acceptability and legitimacy of taxation. 
Altogether, many of the objectives mentioned above contribute
to more than one dimension of sustainability; as – for example –
the internalisation of negative externalities or the containment of
tax flight.
3. The role of indicators
Analogously to GDP, which often serves as the central indicator
to measure economic and societal success and progress of an
economy, the overall tax ratio (i.e. total tax revenues in relation to
GDP) is often used as the most important indicator to assess a
country’s tax system. As GDP, the overall tax ratio has the advan-
tage that it is easily available, also in an international comparison
and over long periods of time, and easily communicable. Analo-
gously to GDP, however, the overall tax ratio is of rather limited
value to assess a tax system in general and its contribution to
sustainability in particular. The overall tax ratio does not give any
indication on the social and environmental impact of a tax system.
It also does not convey any specific information on potential
economic effects of a tax system, as these depend on the overall tax
structure and on the concrete design of individual taxes contrib-
uting to overall tax revenues. As ample empirical evidence shows,
there is no clear-cut relationship between the level of the overall
tax ratio and economic growth. The existing empirical results
allow to conclude safely only that further tax increases will harm
economic growth when the total tax burden has reached a very
Sustainable tax policy: Concepts and indicators beyond the tax ratio 63high level already.4) With respect to fiscal sustainability, the
overall tax ratio can be seen as a snapshot indicator to gauge – in
comparison to public expenditures – whether the state receives
sufficient funds to fulfil its tasks or whether there is a shortcoming
of tax revenues which needs to be compensated by new govern-
ment deficit. However, to evaluate a tax system’s contribution to
fiscal sustainability in the longer run, additional indicators (e.g.
overall revenue elasticity or the tax gap) are needed.
3.1. Purpose of indicators to assess the sustainability of tax systems
From what has been said above, it should have become clear
that in the context of efforts to improve the sustainability proper-
ties of tax systems indicators beyond the tax ratio (similarly to
indicators beyond GDP) are required. These are needed for several
purposes. Firstly, they are necessary to assess the overall sustaina-
bility of a given tax system at a given point in time, also in an
international comparison. Secondly, they should help to identify
specific sustainability gaps in a given tax system. Thirdly, indi-
cators are needed to measure progress over time on the way to a
sustainable tax system. Fourthly, they should help to capture
incentive effects and the incidence of individual taxes or whole tax
systems which may be relevant for all or selected dimensions of
sustainability. Thus they should provide adequate information as
well as guidance for political decision-making aiming at achieving
progress towards sustainable development of countries or regions.
Fifthly, indicators are an important communication instrument
directed not only at policy-makers and stakeholders, but also at the
general public. Overall, a set of indicators would be useful to grasp
the complexity of whole tax systems and to account for the three
sustainability dimensions when trying to assess overall tax
systems. In this respect, a set of indicators is much more useful and
appropriate than the attempt to derive one composite index
aiming at grasping the potential overall sustainability impact of a
tax system.
4. See for recent overviews about the current state of the empirical literature Arnold (2008),
Myles (2009) and European Commission (2010).
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In general, indicators used to gauge the sustainability properties
of a tax system should meet the usual requirements guiding the
selection of indicators. In particular, an indicator should be easily
communicable and globally available, also in an internationally
comparable form. An indicator should also permit a clear and
broadly accepted normative interpretation, i.e. there should be
consensus about the desirable development of the indicator. And
finally, an indicator should be valid (i.e. it should really measure
what it is intended to measure) and reliable (i.e. it should measure
the phenomenon of interest reliably).
In the context of an assessment of a tax system’s contribution to
sustainability, various types of indicators can be distinguished
(Figure 1). 
3.2.1. Aggregate/global indicators versus structural indicators
Aggregate indicators convey a global picture of the overall tax
system. They can be based on real data (taken from tax statistics or
national accounts) or can be the result of estimations. The tax ratio
is the most encompassing aggregate indicator. The picture it
conveys, however, is limited to the total amount of tax revenues in
relation to GDP. The tax ratio does not give any indication about
the structure of overall tax revenues, i.e. about their sources with
respect to tax bases and tax payers, and about the distribution of
overall tax revenues among the overall group of tax payers. The
only differentiation possible on this global level is to distinguish
between the tax ratio including and excluding social security
Figure 1. Sustainability indicators for tax systems
Source: own.
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financing social security systems via genuine taxes may impact
differently on sustainability compared to social security contribu-
tions levied on labour incomes. To get a more in-depth and
detailed impression about tax revenue sources and about their
potential impact on the different sustainability dimensions,
however, structural indicators are needed. The same holds true for
a second, important macroeconomic indicator: namely the overall
revenue elasticity of a tax system, which is a first indicator for the
sufficiency of tax revenue to finance public expenditures and thus
gives some idea about a tax system’s contribution to fiscal sustaina-
bility in the longer turn, but does not offer any details about the
contribution of individual taxes.
Naturally, tax gap indicators, which capture the difference
between the amount of tax revenues that should be collected based
on the existing tax provisions and the amount that is actually
collected, have to be determined by estimations. The total tax gap
is the result of legal tax avoidance and illegal tax fraud (criminal
attacks, tax evasion and “hidden economy”); it indicates tax reve-
nues foregone in relation to overall tax revenues actually collected.
3.2.2. Macroeconomic versus microeconomic indicators
Macroeconomic indicators relate to macroeconomic tax bases
and are based on macro data (tax data or data from national
accounts). Macroeconomic indicators may capture structural char-
acteristics of the overall tax system from a macroeconomic
perspective (most important the composition of overall tax reve-
nues5) or the effective tax burden on macroeconomic tax bases
(e.g. the effective macroeconomic tax burden on labour, on
consumption, on capital and energy as calculated regularly by
Eurostat in its annual publication “Taxation Trends in the Euro-
pean Union”). Microeconomic indicators are directed at the
individual level, at individual subjects, i.e. towards a “typical” indi-
vidual representative tax payer6 or an individual representative tax
base,7 and build on micro data. They give an indication about the
5. The most important data sources are Eurostat’s annual publication “Taxation Trends in the
European Union” and the OECD’s annual publication “Revenue Statistics”.
6. E.g. the marginal and average labour tax rates regularly calculated for different household
types by the OECD in its annual publication “Taxing Wages“.
Margit Schratzenstaller66tax burden individual tax payers (e.g. specific household types) or
individual tax bases (e.g. specific investment projects) are carrying.
As due to their different socio-economic situations men and
women are affected differently by tax policy on the one hand, and
as on the other hand sustainable tax systems should be designed in
a gender-sensitive way, microeconomic indicators should – if they
address tax payers – be gender-differentiated.
3.2.3. Forward-looking versus backward-looking indicators
Backward-looking indicators depict past developments within
tax systems. They may be based on real data coming from tax statis-
tics, national accounts (macroeconomic indicators) or micro data
sources (tax data, other micro data, e.g. firm data bases), or they
may be the result of model calculations. As already mentioned
above, it is in the nature of some specific tax-related phenomena
– namely those having to do with legal or illegal tax avoidance –
that there are no real data showing their quantitative dimension.
This calls for the use of estimates (e.g. to quantify tax gaps8).
Backward-looking indicators comprise indicators depicting the
structural characteristics of the overall tax system from a macroeco-
nomic perspective (e.g. the share of labour, property or
environmental taxes in overall tax revenues) as well as indicators
reflecting the effective tax burden on a macroeconomic level (e.g.
the effective macroeconomic tax burden on labour) or on a microe-
conomic level. Forward-looking indicators are based on current or
future tax provisions. They range from nominal tax rates (e.g.
corporate tax rates, personal income tax rates) as the simplest indi-
cators to rather complex indicators derived from model
calculations (e.g. effective company tax rates or effective tax rates
on labour incomes for specific household types). Generally, these
forward-looking indicators are directed at the microeconomic level.
Another aspect is important when distinguishing between
forward-looking and backward-looking indicators: Forward-looking
indicators – when capturing the marginal tax burden on an indi-
7. E.g. the effective marginal and average corporate tax rates for model investment projects
calculated by ZEW for the European Commission.
8. E.g. the VAT tax gaps presented by the European Commission in its regular publication
“Tax Reforms in EU Member States” or the estimates of corporate tax losses by profit shifting
undertaken by Zucman (2014).
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marginal tax wedge on labour incomes) – are useful to evaluate the
incentive effects of taxation and thus are particularly relevant with
regard to the economic dimension of sustainability, as they influ-
ence economic decisions. Backward-looking indicators capturing
the average tax burden for individual tax payers are more relevant
to gauge the distributive effects of taxation and thus for the social
sustainability dimension.
3.2.4. Indicators at various hierarchical levels
Finally, indicators may be differentiated according to hierar-
chical levels (Kettner et al., 2012). Headline indicators address
high-level policy making and the general public. Core indicators
serve to evaluate core policy areas and are used for communication
between experts, politicians, and the wider public. Further in-
depth policy analysis and a thorough understanding of specific
issues require analytical indicators.
3.2.5. Potential impact of individual tax categories on different 
dimensions of sustainability
To gauge the sustainability properties of tax systems, input indi-
cators are required. These input indicators refer to the design of a
tax system and aim at capturing its (potential) impact on various
dimensions of sustainability. Thus these indicators may serve to
assess the ambition of tax policy makers dedicated to the sustaina-
bility impact of tax systems. In a next step, the outcome in the
various sustainability dimensions should be determined, by
applying quantitative methods to identify systematic relationships
between sustainability – relevant features of a tax system (e.g. share
of environmental taxes) and sustainability – relevant outcomes
(e.g. development of greenhouse gas emissions). This requires the
identification of output indicators which specify the various
sustainability dimensions.
Table gives a first qualitative indication on the potential impact
different individual tax categories may have with regard to the
three sustainability dimensions according to conventional text-
book wisdom. It is obvious at first sight that the potential impact
we assign to the individual tax categories may be disputed in
several cases, as neither theoretical nor empirical relationships
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are always clear-cut. Moreover, the direction of the relationship
may be ambiguous: For example, environmental taxes may one the
one hand impact on the level of greenhouse gas emissions; it
might as well be the case, on the other hand, that policy-makers
increase environmental taxes to react to undesirably high levels of
greenhouse gas emissions. Also the individual sustainability
dimensions may include several contradictory aspects, which may
preclude clear statements about the impact of a specific tax cate-
gory on the sustainability dimension in question: For example, sin
taxes on alcohol and tobacco consumption may positively impact
on individuals’ health and thus on social sustainability, whereas
their regressive distribution effects hamper social sustainability.
These potentially conflicting effects on a specific sustainability
dimension should be disclosed; it is then up to tax policy-makers
to decide which specific effect should be prioritized.
Nonetheless this exercise conveys a first impression that many
tax categories may impact on more than one sustainability dimen-
sion, and that while the impact may be positive regarding one
sustainability dimension, it may be negative regarding the
other(s), suggesting trade-offs and conflicts, respectively. At the
same time, it can be assumed that a number of indicators positively
impact on different sustainability dimensions simultaneously,
which indicates the existence of synergies. In any case, the indica-
Table. Qualitative assessment of potential impact of different tax categories 
on different dimensions of sustainability
Economic sustainability Social sustainability
Environmental 
sustainability
Inheritance and gift tax + + 0
Net wealth tax + + 0
Real estate tax + + 0
Capital transfer taxes - + 0
Environmental taxes + - +
Sin taxes (tobacco, alcohol) + ? 0
Value added tax - - 0
Personal income tax - + 0
Social security contributions - - 0
Corporate income tax - + 0
Tax exemptions - ? (-)1)
Source: Own. + positive impact. – negative impact. – 0 neutral. - ? impact unclear/ambiguous. - 1) in case of environ-
mentally harmful tax exemptions.
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on the impact of tax structures and individual tax categories on the
various dimensions of sustainability.
4. The European Commission’s indicator-based approach
Indicator-based approaches to assess (economic) policy in
general seem to have gained in popularity (again) in the last few
years. This development has probably been inspired, inter alia, by
the already mentioned work on indicators beyond GDP and the
ensuing efforts to evaluate (economic) policy not only with a focus
on its growth implications but based on a much broader view of
overall sustainability. However, as elaborated on above, the evalua-
tion of individual tax categories or specific tax policies often is
more or less explicitly based on selected indicators, but up to now
no encompassing system of indicators exists to evaluate the
(potential) sustainability impact of whole tax systems. 
The most comprehensive indicator-based approach to assess tax
systems has been presented recently by the European Commission.
Two key issues guide the selection of indicators in this recent work,
namely “… the need and scope for either consolidation on the
revenue side or shifting taxes away from labour.” (Wöhlbier,
Astarita, and Mourre, 2014) More concretely, the European
Commission in the context of the use of tax policy for fiscal consoli-
dation is mainly concerned about two issues: Firstly, about the high
tax burden on labour prevailing in many EU member states, particu-
larly for low-skilled workers and second earners in couples.
According to recent empirical research identifying a “tax-and-
growth-hierarchy”, a shift away from direct taxes and especially
from high labour taxes towards more growth-friendly taxes –
consumption taxes including “sin taxes” on tobacco, alcohol and
polluting activities as well as recurrent taxes on property including
inheritance taxes – can be expected to increase the overall growth-
friendliness of tax systems in the long run and price competitiveness
in the short run.9 The European Commission’s second concern is –
departing from the fact that many countries for several reasons have
not been relying exclusively on spending cuts in their fiscal consoli-
9. See Wöhlbier, Astarita and Mourre (2014) and the literature cited therein.
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aftermath of the financial and economic crisis – that these tax
increases should be designed as growth-friendly as possible, again
according to the “prescriptions” that can be derived from the above-
mentioned tax-and-growth-hierarchy.
Both these issues focus on growth- (and actually employment-)
friendliness of tax systems, and thus primarily on the economic
dimension of sustainability. If growth-friendly tax categories are
favourable also from the perspective of environmental and/or
social sustainability, then this appears to be welcomed as a positive
side effect. However, there seems to be a clear hierarchy favouring
economic sustainability vis-à-vis environmental and social
sustainability. Accordingly, the indicators used (mostly backward
looking indicators) mainly focus on economic sustainability,
although quite a few of them may also capture the social and the
environmental dimension of sustainability, even if these are not
explicitly mentioned. 
The European Commission’s regular assessment of EU member
states’ tax systems, which is one key element of the European
Commission’s monitoring activities through the European
Semester, is characterized by a broader approach.10 In its most
recent evaluation (European Commission, 2014), the European
Commission widens its focus to include – as the Europe 2020
strategy aiming at smart, inclusive and sustainable growth and
therefore at all three dimensions of sustainability does – also the
social and the environmental dimension of sustainability. The
choice of the indicators used in this screening exercise is guided by
a selection from those headline indicators formulated to opera-
tionalize the Europe 2020 strategy. Insofar the European
Commission attempts to relate input indicators, which are used to
capture certain sustainability properties of member states’ tax
systems, to those Europe 2020 headline indicators the European
Commission expects to be influenced by those structures and
features of national tax systems captured by the input indicators.
The headline indicators selected by the European Commission to
be related to member states’ tax systems include employment rates
10. The so-called European Semester is the yearly cycle of economic policy coordination and
monitoring of member states’ progress towards the Europe 2020 targets.
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nability; and greenhouse gas emissions, covering environmental
sustainability. Instead of the headline indicators used within the
Europe 2020 strategy in the realm of poverty and social exclusion,
i.e. the social dimension of sustainability, namely people at risk of
poverty or social exclusion, several core and analytical indicators
are used as output indicators. Also within the economic and the
environmental sustainability dimension the headline Europe 2020
indicators applied in the European Commission’s screening exer-
cise are complemented by additional core and partially analytical
indicators, as for example employment rates for specific labour
market groups (second earners, low-skilled and young people) or
the consumption of petrol and diesel as propellants.
Altogether, the European Commission pursues, compared to
the bulk of theoretical and empirical literature mostly addressing
specific aspects and subareas of tax systems in a rather narrowly
focused way, a relatively broad approach to assess, based on input
and mainly backward looking indicators, the potential contri-
bution EU member states’ tax systems may make to the three
sustainability dimensions. However, this approach has its
limitations.
These are, first of all, grounded in the break-down of sustainable
growth and development into selected headline indicators within
the Europe 2020 strategy that capture only partial aspects particu-
larly of the social and the environmental dimension of
sustainability. It seems that this is an especially severe restriction
when trying to comprehensively assess the sustainability properties
of tax systems: These – intentionally or not – affect quite a few
sustainability aspects not addressed in the Europe 2020 strategy and
its headline indicators. Just to name a few examples: Social sustain-
ability does not only include preventing and combating poverty as
well as a “fair” income distribution. It also comprises the distribu-
tion of wealth, including inheritance; the distribution of resources
among men and women and equal social participation of women
and men; equality of opportunity; intergenerational equity; as well
as health aspects. Environmental sustainability is not only about
green house gas emissions, the use of renewable energy and about
primary energy consumption, but also about resource use in a
broader sense. This neglect of certain sustainability aspects auto-
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design options from being considered in a sustainability check – as
for example inheritance taxes or resource taxes. Related is the
danger that certain sustainability deficits inherent in member
states’ tax systems – which may perhaps be even more harmful to
sustainability than those identified based on the indicators applied
for the European Commission’s screening – remain undetected.
This limited perspective is restricted further in the European
Semester process. The starting point of the European Semester is the
European Commission’s Annual Growth Survey which puts
forward priorities for the respective upcoming European Semester
for various policy fields and thus also for tax policy. Again the main
focus are growth-friendly reforms, and thus the tax priorities for the
2014 European Semester as formulated in the Annual Growth Survey
2014 (European Commission, 2013) are broadening tax bases and
removal of ill-targeted exemptions; shifting the tax burden away
from labour – in particular for the low skilled and young workers –
towards consumption, property and pollution; improving tax
compliance through fighting tax fraud and tax evasion; reviewing
tax schemes which lead to debt biases in taxation.
Secondly, the European Commission’s assessment of member
states’ tax systems is based not only on an incompletely defined
concept and operationalization of sustainability, but also by a set
of indicators which is incomplete insofar as the European Commis-
sion does not necessarily use the “best needed” indicators, but
rather the “best available” indicators.11 One example is the impact
of tax systems on income distribution, which is measured by the
difference of the Gini coefficient for the income distribution
before and after taxes and transfers. When focusing on the redis-
tributive impact of tax systems, this indicator is too rough, as it
does not allow to identify separately the contribution of the tax
system (which compared to the transfer system in many countries
is rather limited) to the extent of redistribution organized via
public sector activities. 
Thirdly, there is a striking neglect of the recognition of links
and interrelations between the three sustainability dimensions.
11. See for this distinction Kettner et al. (2012).
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immovable property, which are considered as growth-friendly
alternatives to high labour taxes to improve the economic sustain-
ability of tax systems, a comprehensive assessment of the impact of
individual tax categories on all three sustainability dimensions is
missing. As a consequence, synergies as well as conflicts which
may arise from the use of certain taxes/tax categories with regard
to the individual sustainability dimensions do not receive
adequate attention.
5. Next steps and open questions
This paper can be seen as a first step towards the development of
a consistent set of indicators to capture the potential sustainability-
related impact of tax systems. Further research should aim at
analysing the usefulness of important and often-used existing indi-
cators, some of which are mentioned as examples in this paper,
taking into account recent empirical results on the impact of tax
structures and tax categories, respectively, on the individual dimen-
sions of sustainability. In this respect, it is also a task of future
research to identify the need for additional or alternative indica-
tors, respectively, and to formulate these, to overcome potential
gaps between “best available” indicators, which can be filled with
existing data, and “best needed” ones. Hereby specific attention
needs to be given to links between individual indicators and to
indicators addressing more than one sustainability dimension.
The deliberations in this paper have been limited to input indi-
cators. Further work on the sustainability impact of tax systems
should identify also output/outcome indicators: i.e. indicators to
measure the degree of sustainability achieved in a given sustaina-
bility dimension (e.g. CO2 emissions, labour market performance
indicators, or GINI coefficients before and after taxes) which can
be influenced by taxation. Actually, the development of adequate
input indicators should be guided substantially by an output/
outcome perspective.
A further interesting exercise would be to assess the overall
sustainability of European tax systems, going beyond the recent
evaluations undertaken by the European Commission discussed
above. Various approaches are conceivable. A given tax system
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case, the evaluation may focus on the development of relevant
sustainability indicators – e.g. the share of environmental taxes in
overall tax revenues – over a certain period of time to identify
developments within the country analysed. However, it may be
more meaningful to put a specific country within a comparative
context, i.e. to benchmark the country under evaluation against a
group of other countries. This approach is pursued by the Euro-
pean Commission in its indicator-based approach presented above
(Wöhlbier, Astarita, and Mourre, 2014): The countries involved in
the benchmarking exercise are divided into three groups according
to the concrete value of a given indicator representing a specific
tax policy area, and a country is considered to do well (badly) if it is
amongst the “best” (“worst”) third. Alternatively, the countries are
just ranked based on a simple ordinal approach. Obviously, one
question this benchmarking approach raises (even if internation-
ally comparable data are available, which in itself will be
problematic for numerous indicators) is the issue of comparability
of the countries involved. The EU is a very heterogeneous group of
countries, and how serious the potential negative impact of a
country’s position in the group of worst performers with respect to
a specific indicator is will also depend on the general socio-
economic conditions as well as the concrete challenges the
country is facing in the respective policy area. Related is the ques-
tion whether there are specific threshold values above/below
which a country’s tax system or specific taxes/tax categories can be
expected to impact positively or negatively on overall sustaina-
bility. Or to put it differently: Can/should a tax system’s potential
impact on sustainability be measured in relative or in absolute
terms – and if the latter is the case: How do we arrive at appropriate
threshold values? And if we consider a one size fits all-approach as
inadequate: How do we arrive at country-specific threshold values?
In general, regardless of whether we analyse a specific country
for itself or its position within a larger group of countries, there are
numerous open questions and problems work on indicators for the
sustainability impact of tax systems is confronted with. First of all,
synthesising a country’s respective positions with regard to indi-
vidual indicators to arrive at a bigger and consistent picture is a
great challenge, which poses the question of which weight should
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to deal with inter-linkages (trade-offs versus synergies) between the
different sustainability dimensions and or/indicators. For example,
higher environmental taxes may strengthen a tax system’s sustain-
ability with regard to the environmental dimension, but may at
the same adversely affect social sustainability due to the regressive
distributionary effect of many environmental taxes. Third, there is
the question how comprehensive a set of indicators to capture the
potential sustainability impact of tax systems should be: there is
certainly a trade-off between accuracy and level of detail on the
one hand and manageability and communicability on the other. A
fourth question is whether to use quantitative indicators only, or
whether to complement the quantitative picture by qualitative
indicators, e.g. indicators giving an indication in how far the tax
system is perceived as fair, or about the degree of trust in the tax
system. Fifth, a meaningful interpretation of individual indicators
and their (desirable) development requires relatively clear-cut
empirical evidence about the impact of respective taxes/tax catego-
ries on the various dimensions of sustainability, which is not
always available.
Finally, the analysis of the potential sustainability impact of a
tax system needs to be embedded in a bigger picture. The effective-
ness of specific tax policies – as captured by appropriate indicators –
depends inter alia on other policy instruments and their coordina-
tion with tax policy. And certainly the debate about a tax system’s
potential sustainability impact needs to be embedded into a
broader perspective of the overall contribution of the public sector
(particularly public expenditures) to sustainable development.
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The trend of increasing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth
in most developed countries has led to calls for corrective tax increases for the
rich and wealthy. Such calls are often confronted with the claim that higher
taxes on top personal incomes, corporate income and wealth are detrimental
to growth and employment and/or will foster tax avoidance. This paper argues
that even the dominating theoretical framework leaves substantial leeway for
redistributive taxation. Furthermore, from a Keynesian macroeconomic
perspective redistribution may even be systematically conducive to growth and
employment. At the same time a change towards such a policy of redistribution
may for some economies, particularly the German one, well be the prerequisite
for compliance with the European Fiscal Compact if an increase of the
macroeconomic imbalances that have come to be seen as a root cause of the
global financial and economic crisis 2008/2009 and also the euro crisis by
many observers is to be avoided. Therefore, besides attempts at international
tax coordination and harmonisation, national tax policies should actively use
their room of manoeuvre for progressive taxation to correct the disparities in
the income distribution and at the same time to increase the fiscal space.
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In most OECD countries, the redistributive effect of the tax
system has been substantially weakened by deliberate tax policies
over the last decades. However, the trend of increasing inequality
in the distribution of income and wealth in most developed coun-
tries, has led to calls for corrective tax increases for the rich and
wealthy. Such calls are often confronted with the claim that there
was a serious trade-off between equity and efficiency: according to
the dominant view, higher taxes on top personal incomes, corpo-
rate income and wealth are detrimental to growth and
employment and/or lead to increased tax avoidance. In fact,
within the field of public economics usually a more or less strong
trade-off between (re-)distribution and efficiency is assumed. 
First, this paper argues that even the dominating theoretical
framework offers substantial leeway for redistributive taxation. In
the light of the standard – and above all the recent – literature the
arguments against raising marginal personal or corporate income
tax rates because of allegedly negative effects on work intensity,
career decisions, tax avoidance and other behavioural responses
are not convincing neither from a theoretical nor from an empir-
ical point of view.
Second, it will be demonstrated that a macroeconomic perspec-
tive may even systematically change the picture and make the
whole trade-off disappear. Redistribution may be conducive to
output and employment both in the short and in the long run. In
addition, if (part of) the generated revenue is used to increase
public expenditure recent empirical estimates suggest that the
balanced budget multiplier may be substantially positive leading
to strongly positive growth and employment effects. These results
are highly relevant, because they suggest, that a change towards a
policy of redistribution may well be the prerequisite for compli-
ance with the constitutional debt brakes that are called for by the
fiscal compact if an increase of the international macroeconomic
imbalances that have come to be seen by many observers as a root
cause of the global financial and economic crisis 2008/2009 and
also the euro crisis is to be avoided. 
The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries 81Third, in a brief case study applying some of the results to
Germany it will be argued that the regressive German tax reforms
and the concomitant revenue losses in the early 2000s may be seen
as a major reason for the German stagnation until 2005. The
impressive recovery of the German economy was only possible
because the expenditure side consolidation strategy was given up.
For the future, using the revenues generated by progressive tax
reforms may be used to finance major investment projects thereby
boosting domestic demand and contributing to the necessary
rebalancing within the Euro area. This insight is of particular
importance in the current situation in which both France and Italy
seem to be trying to copy the opposite strategy of cutting taxes and
expenditures simultaneously – although it failed spectacularly in
the German example. 
We start with an overview of the regressive taxation trends
since the 1980s in section 2, and show that despite some progres-
sive changes in current trends and policy proposals there are no
signs of a comprehensive trend reversal. In section 3 we turn to the
scrutiny of the standard wisdom regarding the negative economic
effects of progressive tax reforms. After having enriched the anal-
ysis by the macroeconomic perspective in section 4 we turn to a
brief case study trying to apply some of the findings to the German
economy in section 5. In section 6 we draw some conclusions for
future tax policy on the national and international level.
2. Taxation trends since the 1980s: Traditional standards 
of tax justice under pressure2
Matters of income distribution and redistributive taxation
require normative standards of equity or tax justice. Although the
traditional distributional goals of taxation were never uncontested,
there used to be a widespread consensus as to employing the
“ability to pay” principle in the determination of the tax burden.
The criterion of horizontal equity implies that tax payers with the
same ability to pay should be treated equally by the tax system.
The ability to pay can be measured in terms of income, wealth, and
expenditure. According to the Haig-Simons definition “income is
2. For a more extensive overview see Godar and Truger (2015a).
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consume during a period” (Rosen and Gayer, 2008, p. 382), i.e. also
savings and capital income are included in the determination of
the ability to pay, as they represent an increase in potential
consumption. Although difficult to apply in practice in a
completely consistent manner (Boadway, 2004, p. 3), this was
interpreted to call for the comprehensive income approach to taxa-
tion excluding systematic tax privileges for specific sources of
income. According to the sacrifice approach used to operationalize
the dimension of vertical equity (Prest, 1960, pp. 115) a tax system
should impose the same sacrifice on the taxpayers whose indi-
vidual utility is reduced by the tax. Due to the diversity of possible
sacrifice approaches no overall conclusion can be drawn for the
desirability of progressivity, so that an additional value judgement
is required (Prest, 1960, p. 117). However, in the past it was widely
accepted that some – and indeed a high – degree of progressivity
was socially desirable in rich industrialised countries.
However, since the 1980s, the distributive goal of fiscal policy
was increasingly seen as an obstacle to efficient tax design rather
than a goal by itself. Indeed, according to the OECD (2011,
pp. 267) since the mid-1980s market incomes have become more
unequal in most OECD countries (Table 1). Additionally, on
average redistribution by the state has become less effective since
the mid-1990s. The redistributive impact of the tax and transfer
system can be estimated by comparing the development of Gini
values for market incomes (Gm) and the Gini value for disposable
income (Gd). As can be seen in column 7 “between the mid-1980s
and the mid-1990s, redistribution systems compensated nearly
three quarters of the increase in market-income inequality”
(OECD, 2011, p. 268). Even though the rise in market-income
inequality was less pronounced in the following decade (columns
1 and 2), the redistribution “became less effective at offsetting
growing inequalities” (Ibid.). Consequently, taxes and transfers
compensated only 53 percent of the total increase of inequality
between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s.
 
The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries 83It is impossible to trace exactly to what extent the changes in
the tax systems are responsible for the fall in redistribution for all
OECD countries in a consistent manner. However, the general
taxation trends as reflected in some important indicators can be
used to establish a plausible connection: Strongly falling trends in
the top marginal income tax rate, in the corporate income tax rate,
as well as an increasing trend of dualisation of the income tax, i.e.
increasing privileges for capital income and a lower tax burden on
wealth, demonstrate that the traditional standards of tax justice
have come under severe pressure in recent decades Godar et al.
(2014, pp. 96).
In the face of rising inequality and strong budgetary pressures,
in many OECD countries since the Great Recession there have been
some signs that the downward trend in redistributive taxation may
have come to a halt, recently.3 At the same time, a number of inter-
national institutions have commented in a roughly progressive
way on how to respond to the need for fiscal consolidation in
terms of socially acceptable tax reforms. Whereas those recent
developments are steps in the direction of increased tax justice,
some steps in the other direction must also be noticed: since 2009
many European governments have raised their value added tax and
excise tax rates in order to generate additional revenues (EC, 2013a,
Table 1. Redistribution: general country trend
Inequality before and after taxes and transfers1
  Market income
Disposable 
income
Redistribution
  Gm
Change,
% of base-
period
Gd Gm-Gd
% of 
Gm
[4]/[1] 
Change, 
% of base-
period Gm
[6]/[2]
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
12-country 
average2
mid-1980s 36.2  26.7 9.5 26.4   
mid-1990s 39.2 8.2 27.4 11.7 29.9 6 73
mid-2000s 39.8 9.8 28.3 11.4 28.7 5 53
1. Households headed by a working-age individual (15-64, except in Sweden where 25 was chosen as the cut-off age
in order to minimise the impact of a change in the definition of a household that occurred in the mid-1990s). Gini
values (G) are shown in percent. All measures are based on equivalised household income using the square-root equi-
valence scale. Standard LIS practice was followed for top- and bottom-coding (see www.lisproject.org).
2. Countries with full tax and benefit information for mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-2000s: Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, West Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Source : OECD (2011, p. 268).
3. For a more extensive overview see Godar and Truger (2015a).
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sion (EC, 2013a., p. 30), the revenue increasing measures since
2009 have heavily focused on usually regressive consumption taxes
– a clear move away from tax justice and redistribution. 
Within the last few years many important international institu-
tions have presented proposals on how to respond to the need for
fiscal consolidation in terms of socially acceptable tax reforms.
While it seems to be a widely-held view that combating tax
evasion, limiting tax avoidance and the introduction of a financial
transaction tax should enjoy high priority, opinions differ much
more when it comes to the need for truly progressive tax reforms.
The trade unions, ILO, UNCTAD and some NGOs more or less call
for such reforms whereas the dominant mainstream institutions
European Commission, IMF, and OECD are very reluctant if not
openly opposed to such reforms.4
Based on de Mooij and Keen (2013) and IMF (2010a, 2010b), the
IMF (2013, p. 25) states its understanding of the conventional
wisdom regarding revenue side consolidation in the sense of broad-
ening the tax base of the value added tax as well as the personal and
corporate income tax, increasing recurrent taxes on residential
property as well as increasing environmental taxation. Obviously,
the focus is primarily on raising additional revenues without
affecting low-income households too much, a view exactly shared
by the OECD (2012c). Although some of the proposed measures
may be able to reduce the disparity in the income distribution or at
least show a concern for negative distributional side effects; it is
striking that more fundamental reforms, i.e. a direct reversal of the
downward trend in tax rates is not called for: increasing the tax
rates of personal and corporate taxation as well higher general taxa-
tion of wealth are not on the agenda, although the former is
discussed extensively and not ruled out per se by the IMF (2013, pp.
33). The major reason for not proposing such a more fundamental
change consists in the perceived trade-off between equity and effi-
ciency: as the OECD (2012d, p. 39) puts it: “Simply raising marginal
personal income tax rates on high earners will not necessarily bring
in much additional revenue, because of effects on work intensity,
career decisions, tax avoidance and other behavioural responses.”
4. For a more extensive overview see Godar and Truger (2015b).
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under scrutiny5
As the above statement suggests the standard arguments
against progressive taxation rely on negative incentive effects on
private households’ and firms’ decisions and on an increase in tax
avoidance. There can be no denying that those effects may poten-
tially pose a serious threat to a comprehensive move towards more
progressive taxation. However, on the basis of standard main-
stream textbook knowledge (e.g. Rosen and Gayer, 2008; Salanié,
2011) and literature, it can be argued that these effects need
not necessarily be large so that the equity efficiency trade-off
alluded to may actually be rather small. In addition, government
spending financed with the additional revenue may offset or even
overcompensate for the negative effects of taxation on output
and employment. 
Analysing first the private household sector, the most important
negative incentive effects discussed refer to labour supply, savings
and – more recently – tax avoidance. The typical argument raised
against progressive income taxation is that taxes reduce the hourly
compensation for work and thus lower the opportunity cost of
leisure. Theoretically however, the overall effect on labour supply is
indeterminate: it can decrease because leisure time becomes rela-
tively more attractive (substitution effect) or it can increase because
for the same amount of hours worked the overall income will be
lower and the economic agent may want to compensate for this loss
(income effect) (Salanié, 2011, pp. 18). Since high-income earners
are often assumed to be high-productivity workers, Salanié argues
that discouraging their labour supply may cause a greater welfare
loss than discouraging the labour supply by the low-productivity
worker (ibid., pp. 88). However, the idea that top executives really
face the type of decision may be unrealistic. As Corneo (2005, p. 17)
puts it: the substitution effect is only relevant as long as a person’s
working potential is not exhausted. In general the preoccupation
with labour supply seems exaggerated. 
Therefore, it hardly comes as a surprise that empirically, the
labour supply seems to be rather inelastic with respect to wages.
5. For a more extensive overview and discussion see Godar and Truger (2015c).
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uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply. The mean of the
empirical distribution of estimated elasticities for the labour
supply of men is 0.07 and the median is 0.08. The respective values
for women are 0.43 and 0.27 or 0.34 and 0.26 excluding outliers
(pp. 32). This would imply that on average, a percentage change in
the net hourly wage rate, ceteris paribus, leads to a 0.07 percentage
change in hours worked by men and 0.43 (0.34) by women. The
evidence that female labour supply is more sensitive to the wage
can partially be explained by the fact that on average women still
“undertake a much higher load of unpaid work than men” (OECD,
2012e, p. 73). According to the OECD, in countries with high
child-care cost women are much more likely to work part-time
(ibid., p. 84). In addition, Alvaredo et al. (2013, p. 9) suggest that
the model of pay determination used in much of the optimal tax
literature may be oversimplified. They consider the possibility that
top income earners’ growing bargaining power may help them to
increase their compensation at the expense of other income
groups. From this perspective lower top marginal tax rates provide
an incentive to increase bargaining efforts which have nothing to
do with productivity enhancing work efforts. Higher top incomes
may thus be the result of redistribution in between income groups
rather than of additional economic activity. Including the effect of
top marginal tax rates on bargaining efforts may allow for a higher
marginal tax rate as discouraging bargaining efforts can have posi-
tive effects on economic efficiency. This is the case if due to their
bargaining power, top income earners manage to raise their remu-
neration above marginal productivity and at the expense of the
remaining incomes. As Kleven et al. (2010), and Young and Varner
(2011), point out, despite individual examples of migrating
millionaires, it is also improbable that rich households will try to
avoid taxation by changing their country of residence. 
Although it is often argued that taxes on capital income
discourage savings and therefore investment and growth,
economic theory does not provide clear results supporting this
view. This is not astonishing since even in a simple life-cycle
model of consumption the income effect can outweigh the nega-
tive substitution effect of taxation on saving (Salanié, 2011,
p. 289). Banks and Diamond (2010) review different versions of
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that the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. They find that
“at present, the literature has only little to say about how to
combine the two sources of income to determine taxes” (ibid, p. 6). 
Instead of actually changing behaviour in real terms, another
way of responding to high taxes, especially for wealthy households,
is to avoid the tax for example by formally becoming a resident of a
tax haven or by opening a bank account in a tax haven sheltered by
intricate legal structures to conceal its true ownership. Apparently,
tax planning and tax evasion might represent a certain threat to the
governments’ ability to effectively redistribute income and wealth.
However, Piketty et al. (2011) estimate an average long-run elas-
ticity of top incomes with respect to the net-of-tax rate of about 0.3-
0.4. In order to compute the optimal top marginal tax rate they
develop a model integrating three different components of this
overall elasticity: a supply side effect (real behavioural adjust-
ments), a tax avoidance effect, and a compensation bargaining
effect. For the U.S. Piketty et al. (2011) estimate that the top
marginal tax rate is well below its revenue maximising point,
suggesting potential for much higher tax rates. With a similar
approach, the IMF (2013, pp. 34-37) calculates a range of revenue-
maximising top personal income tax rates for 16 OECD countries.
In 12 countries the actual top rate is below or in the lower half of
that range indicating substantial leeway for increased tax rates. 
The tax that according to standard mainstream reasoning is seen
as the most detrimental to economic growth is the Corporate
Income Tax (CIT). “Corporate income taxes are the most harmful
for growth as they discourage the activities of firms that are most
important for growth: investment in capital and productivity
improvements” (OECD, 2010, p. 20). Furthermore high corporate
tax rates are supposed to induce firms to move their production
abroad and thus decrease domestic employment. The theoretical
mechanism behind these effects runs through the effect of the CIT
on the cost of capital: “As a broad rule of thumb, a lower cost of
capital encourages investment, while a high cost of capital discour-
ages it” Vermeend et al. (2008, p. 150). The basic neo-classical
argument is that “firms accumulate capital as long as the return to
investment exceeds the cost of finance and depreciation. Due to
decreasing returns to scale, there is a marginal project that just
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costs (pre-tax rate of return on the marginal investment project is
defined as the cost of capital)” (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008,
p. 684). As it turns out, however, this standard approach relies on
some very narrow theoretical assumptions. The fact that firms
invest as long as the return to investment is higher than the cost of
capital does not offer any answer to the question of how much
higher the return on investment must be. The neoclassical break-
even point is only reached under perfect competition and it implies
that firms do not realise profits on their marginal investment
project. However, with imperfectly competitive markets firms
realise more than zero profit on the marginal investment project so
that, as long as the corporate tax does not completely deplete this
economic profit there will still be an incentive to invest. 
Furthermore, as Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, p. 306) point
out, the effects of corporate taxes on investment depend on the
specification of the investment function, i.e. on the underlying
theory of investment. Although investment may, ceteris paribus,
depend inversely on the interest rate and therefore on taxation
through its effect on the cost of capital, relaxing the ceteris paribus
assumption a multitude of other variables, including past sales, the
business climate or unit labour cost, also play a role and on their
part may positively be affected by sound public finances. There-
fore, for example the potentially positive long-run effects of public
funding of R&D expenditures and human capital accumulation
should be considered; as well as potential positive agglomeration
effects that may compensate for the negative effects of taxation
Brühlhart et al. (2012). 
Empirical evidence suggests that investment behaviour is
affected by corporate taxation but it is hard to get reliable estimates
of the magnitude and thus the relevance of this effect. There is not
much empirical evidence of tax effects on aggregate real invest-
ment. Evidence from micro-level studies hints at negative effects of
taxes on investment ranging from rather inelastic (-0.25) to more
elastic (-1) responses of investment but it is difficult to transfer
these results to aggregate investment on the macroeconomic level
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p. 148). A meta-study, by de Mooij
and Ederveen (2008), on the impact of taxation on foreign direct
investment shows varying effects: on average “a 1-percentage point
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capital by 3.3 per cent” (p. 689). However, the standard deviation of
4.4 is high and foreign direct investment cannot be used as a proxy
for aggregate real investment as it also includes portfolio invest-
ment. Two recent studies trying to assess investment effects of
corporate tax cuts in Germany (Reinhard and Li, 2011), and the UK
(Maffini, 2013), come to the sobering result that there is no
convincing evidence that the goal of encouraging investment was
reached. Reinhard and Li (2011, p. 735) even conclude that “market
opportunities and competitive pressures appear to be more impor-
tant for investment decisions than domestic tax changes”. In a
different strand of the literature on the effects of the tax mix on
long term growth the CIT is usually estimated to have the most
negative effect (IMF, 2013, p. 30). However, the IMF (2013, p. 30)
stresses citing Xing (2012) that these results are not robust and that
Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) find almost no negative effect of
a tax mix relying more on the CIT.
Besides the real behavioural reactions to taxation discussed in
the literature, a much debated issue today are firms’ avoidance
strategies which aim at manipulating the tax base without actually
changing the level of economic activity in a country. According to
the OECD (2013b) multiple opportunities exist for corporations to
shift income among entities and thereby to countries where lower
tax rates or special exemptions are applied. Examples for such
opportunities are using licences for brands, patents, or other finan-
cial services provided by a foreign subsidiary in a low tax
jurisdiction as well as the manipulation of transfer pricing.
Although there are no reliable numbers about how much profit
shifting actually occurs (Ibid., p. 15), the existence of profit-shifting
activities is “largely unquestioned” (Heckemeyer and Overesch,
2013, p. 1). Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013), review the empirical
literature on profit-shifting behaviour of multinational firms. On
average, the 25 studies estimate a semi-elasticity of reported profit
or earnings before interest and taxes with respect to the interna-
tional tax differential between a country and other subsidiary
locations of 1.55 with a relatively high standard deviation of 2.23.
(ibid. p.8). Although at first sight the number seems substantial, it
implies that on average a country with an overall tax rate on corpo-
rate profits of 20% may increase its rate by 5 percentage points or
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would not receive the full revenue benefits of the tax increase in the
absence of tax avoidance, but after all, more than two thirds of it.
All in all, therefore, the case against progressive taxation turns
out to be substantially weaker than often claimed. Both from a
theoretical and an empirical point of view, the negative effects on
growth and employment and the erosion of the tax base may not
be large. And although we cannot know the counterfactual,
average growth rates in many industrialised countries tended to
decrease over the last three decades, despite all the cuts in the tax
rates. Furthermore, factors other than taxation (cyclical condition
of the economy, infrastructure investment, research and develop-
ment expenditures, the educational system as a provider of a
qualified workforce) may be much more important for the overall
economic effects of taxation. If those factors can be enhanced by
government expenditures financed through progressive taxation
then the overall economic effect of the latter may well be positive.
4. Macroeconomic arguments in favour 
of progressive taxation 
The trade-off between progressive taxation and growth and
employment need not be too important even from a neoclassical
microeconomic perspective. However, the problem remains that
within neoclassical microeconomic tax theory, progressive taxa-
tion is always automatically in a defensive position as the standard
assumption is that progressive taxation is detrimental to growth
and employment. The picture may change, however, from a more
Keynesian macroeconomic perspective. In what follows, therefore
we briefly sketch a macroeconomic view that may lead to
completely different results as progressive taxation may be system-
atically conducive to growth and employment both in the short
and in the long run under certain conditions. 
4.1. Inequality, progressive taxation and private consumption
The conflict between equity and efficiency derived in neoclas-
sical public finance is by no means necessary if one goes back to
the traditional stabilisation branch of public finance as Musgrave
(1959), and takes into account the essential role of aggregate
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effective demand consists of private consumption demand and
investment demand. Keynes put particular emphasis on the impor-
tance of investment demand, because he was convinced that its
high volatility in combination with the multiplier process was the
most important source of fluctuations in overall economic activity
(Keynes 1937; 221). Investment demand depends on the fluctu-
ating subjective expectations of firms in terms of profitability of
real investment and the monetary interest rate, which in turn is
influenced by the fluctuating liquidity preference of economic
agents. However, private consumption also plays a central role in
the argument, especially the fact that it is assumed to be
dependent on current disposable income. Keynes assumes that
private consumption is positively related to overall disposable
income in the economy. The marginal propensity to consume
indicates how large the part of income is which flows into addi-
tional consumption, and thus, automatically, how large the
residual is that goes into savings. If overall income increases
because of an increase in investment activity, then this leads to an
additional increase in private consumption according to the
marginal propensity to consume, which in turn leads to an addi-
tional increase in income, etc. The induced multiplier process will
be the stronger the higher the marginal propensity to consume
and hence, the lower the marginal propensity to save.
Based on these theoretical assumptions one can obviously
derive a negative relationship between the degree of inequality in
the distribution of income and private consumption. Since the
marginal propensity to consume tends to decrease with increasing
disposable income at the household level, redistribution from
households with lower incomes to households with higher
incomes should result in a lower rate of consumption in the aggre-
gate, or a higher savings rate vice versa. In this case, the increasing
inequality in the recent past would have led to a weakening of
private consumption. Conversely, a (tax) correction of the
disparity in income distribution would lead to a strengthening of
private consumption and hence, ceteris paribus, to an increase of
growth and employment. If the increase of demand has also a posi-
tive impact on firms’ sales and profitability expectations, one can
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further reinforce the positive growth dynamics.6
There is a second aspect of redistribution and inequality that
may also lead to negative growth and employment effects which is
related to the functional income distribution. Of course, the nega-
tive trend in the labour income share to be observed within many
economies may also show up in increased disparities in the
personal income distribution. Additionally, in post-Kaleckian
models of distribution and growth usually redistribution from
workers to capitalists is seen as detrimental to growth because the
propensity to consume out of profit income is assumed to be lower
than the propensity to consume out of labour income (see e.g. Hein
2008 and 2012). As Behringer and van Treeck (2013) and Belabed et
al. (2013) have argued this result may critically depend on retained
profits and the existence of the ‘corporate veil’ which prevents an
increase in capital owners’ wealth from increasing their private
consumption expenditures. Also there seems to be a systematic rela-
tionship according to which countries with a more stable personal
income distribution – mostly in continental Europe – also tend to
be those countries with the strongest decline in the labour income
share, whereas the countries with a large increase in income dispari-
6. The underlying assumptions of this result regarding private consumption behaviour are
certainly not uncontroversial (see van Treeck and Sturn, 2012, especially pp. 13). The validity of
the Keynesian consumption function is assumed, which states that private consumption
depends on current real disposable income. In addition, it is assumed that the marginal
propensity to consume or to save in different income classes remains unchanged with a change
in income distribution. However, other consumption theories could certainly lead to different
results. If one follows Friedman's (1957) permanent income hypothesis, it would depend on
whether the increase in inequality is permanent or temporary. Only in the latter case, private
households would under risk aversion reduce their marginal propensity to consume. In the
former case, however, households would leave their consumption behaviour unchanged. If the
validity of Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income hypothesis is assumed, private households
which are affected by a relative reduction of their income will increase their marginal propensity
to consume, in order not to fall too far behind the example given by the consumption of higher
income classes. The expected result of the Keynesian consumption hypothesis, a fall in private
consumption due to an increase in inequality, would at least be mitigated, avoided or in the
extreme case even overcompensated. Indeed, there is some evidence for the validity of the
relative income hypothesis, especially for the United States (Frank, 2005; Frank et al. 2010).
Overall, the response of private consumption to increasing income inequality seems to depend
on country-specific factors, mainly the access of lower and middle income groups to credit (van
Treeck and Sturn 2012). However, it is hardly conceivable that a paradoxical positive
relationship between inequality and private consumption will go on forever, as lower income
households would ultimately be forced into piling up debt and there are limits to the sustainable
debt level in the long run. Moreover, in countries in which the traditional Keynesian
consumption function holds, increased disparities in the income distribution will be directly
detrimental in growth terms due to their negative effect on private consumption.
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income distribution. Therefore, theoretically both an increase in
the personal as well as the functional income distribution may lead
to a decrease in private consumption. Accordingly, a more progres-
sive taxation of personal income as well as higher taxes on
corporate profits may be growth enhancing.   
4.2. Exploiting the balanced budget multiplier
In the preceding section, a revenue-neutral shift of the tax
burden away from the lower and middle income households
towards high income households has been assumed. The relatively
higher marginal propensity to consume of the lower and middle
income classes can then lead to an increase in private consumption
and therefore also to higher growth and employment. Alterna-
tively, the increase in the tax revenue due to more progressive
taxation could also be used to finance additional government
spending. Following the standard textbook example of the Haav-
elmo-Theorem this policy should be expansionary as usually the
multiplier of additional government spending can be assumed to
be higher than the negative revenue multiplier – a result that is
broadly confirmed by most empirical multiplier estimates (see
Bouthevillain et al. 2009; Gechert and Will 2012, and section 5.6).
As the multiplier for government spending on investment and
consumption is most probably larger than the multiplier for tax
cuts and transfers for low and middle income households, the
expansionary effect would most likely be even stronger than by
revenue-neutral redistribution within the tax system. Of course,
one may question the effectiveness of fiscal policy due to Ricardian
equivalence or even non-Keynesian effects. However, these coun-
terarguments have certainly not gained much strength in recent
times (see section 5.6) and it is questionable whether they apply to
revenue neutral shifts in taxation or fully compensated increases in
government spending.
4.3. Inequality as a root cause of macroeconomic imbalances 
and the crisis
Especially current account imbalances, large deficits as well as
surpluses, quickly moved into the centre of criticism after the
global financial and economic crisis, as a cause of the crisis or at
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Germany and the oil-producing countries can be seen as main
representatives of surplus economies, while the United States can
be considered as the main representative of the deficit countries,
together with the United Kingdom and Spain. The U.S. produced
significant imbalances since the early 1980s under the surface of a
seemingly robust and dynamic development, which were essential
for the deepness of the global financial and economic crisis and the
speed of its spreading. Despite weak private investment demand
after the collapse of the New Economy boom in 2000/2001, the
balance of the private sector was negative, which is evidence for a
debt financed consumption boom. The government balance was
negative, also because of deliberately countercyclical fiscal policy.
Consequently, the balance of the external sector had to be positive.
High and rising current account deficits meant increasing capital
inflows which financed the U.S. consumer boom and the govern-
ment deficits. Such a situation, however, is extremely fragile
because it relies on steadily rising asset prices in the domestic
economy, thereby allowing increasing consumer demand under
conditions of low wages and high inequality of household income
through an expansion of household debt. Externally, a drastic
devaluation of the U.S. dollar has to be prevented, which would
have been required to improve the international price competitive-
ness of U.S. producers and thus the current account under normal
circumstances. In that way, steady capital inflows were provided
without the need to significantly increase domestic interest rates,
which in turn would have involved the danger of the collapse of
domestic demand. If such a fragile situation finally collapses, not
only the U.S. and other deficit countries are affected but also the
rest of the world. After all, the surplus countries have to suffer
twice. First, capital exports, which are associated with current
account surpluses, were devalued in the highly speculative U.S.
market within the financial crisis. Therefore the financial crisis
rapidly affected the surplus countries. Second, they will also be
quickly affected by the real crisis due to the collapse of export
markets. While the dynamic model, driven by the consumption of
the U.S., was dependent on the will and the ability of households to
7. The argument in this section is based on Hein and Truger (2011, section 3). See in more
detail the monograph by Hein (2012) and van Treeck and Sturn (2012).
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(stagnating) export-driven model of the surplus economies like
Germany and Japan was based on the will and ability of foreign
economies to go into debt. The export-driven model was therefore
just as fragile as the American one. On the one hand the only
moderate growth rates were already reliant on dynamic export
markets and thus the expansion of the world economy. On the
other hand increasing capital exports to more dynamic economies
brought the risk of contagion in the event of financial crises in
these markets. During the global economic and financial crisis,
these two dependencies and their associated transmission channels
for the crisis were visible in a dramatic way. The extreme increase in
inequality in the US thus went hand in hand with a strong long
term debt-financed development of private consumption and a
significant increase in household debt which triggered the financial
market bubble, until it burst. However, in countries with less acces-
sible credit markets, where households with relative losses were
unable to get credit due to credit rationing by banks, the Keynesian
consumption theory seemed to hold, even in the short term.
From this perspective a decrease in inequality would be neces-
sary both for the surplus economies to boost domestic demand and
for the deficit economies to dampen domestic demand and the
tendencies towards a debt-led consumption boom – all of this with
the goal of mitigating the global economic imbalances.8 
4.4. Theoretical considerations: the macroeconomic relevance of 
changes in aggregate demand
The potential harmony of redistribution via taxes and fiscal
policy on the one hand and growth and employment on the other
hand depends on increases in aggregate demand. This raises the
question under which conditions such an increase in demand will
actually be transformed into higher overall economic activity.
Obviously the answer to this question depends very much on the
underlying macroeconomic paradigm.
8. In the case of the deficit economies, however, this is most probably only a second-best
strategy, as the first-best strategy would consist in reregulating financial markets and in
removing the factors that led to the unsustainable consumption boom in the first place.
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tion is not even an issue, the economy is ultimately modelled as a
pure barter economy in which Say's law inevitably applies and
aggregate demand does not appear as a relevant category (see Hein
2008, pp. 30). In the neoclassical paradigm the situation is quite
similar, higher private consumption could result at best as an
outcome of private households’ increased preferences for present
consumption and would merely change the composition of overall
output in favour of consumption and at the expense of invest-
ment.9 Also a tax-financed increase of government spending
would remain without any expansionary effect for the level of
output and would, at the most, modify its composition.
Different results may be derived from the currently dominating
literature, the so called New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM)
(Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003; Carlin and Soskice, 2006 and
2009; critique by Arestis, 2011). These approaches combine a func-
tion of aggregate demand (IS curve), which is negatively
dependent on the real interest rate, and decreasing short-run
Phillips curve – due to nominal wage rigidities (for example due to
duration of collective agreements) – with a central bank reaction
function. In the long-run, the Phillips curve is vertical at the so-
called NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment)
and the associated output and employment equilibrium. 
However, the limitation of the effectiveness of demand side
changes in the NCM approach depends on very restrictive and
sometimes unrealistic assumptions. If one modifies these assump-
tions, the scope for demand-side effects increases significantly. The
first modification deals with the assumptions underlying the
NAIRU model and its short-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment (Hein, 2002, Lavoie, 2009). The implied wage
bargaining behaviour of workers and/or unions assumes that any
positive or negative deviation from the NAIRU mechanistically
immediately causes lower or respectively higher real wage
demands, which then lead to cumulative deflationary or infla-
tionary processes in the absence of central bank intervention.
However, if the bargaining parties follow a macroeconomic wage
9. In the long term however, once lower investment has reduced effective capacities, future
production will decrease due to a lower capital stock.
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the target inflation rate of the central bank for example, the NAIRU
would not be one unique equilibrium point, but there would be a
whole range of unemployment rates that are consistent with a
stable inflation rate. 
If there is hysteresis, for example due to processes of disquali-
fication of the long-term unemployed, an increase in the actual
unemployment rate automatically leads to a partial increase of the
NAIRU and vice versa. The consideration of both modifications
lead to the recommendation of a less restrictive monetary policy,
which in turn leaves more room for positive demand side effects by
redistributive tax and fiscal policy. 
The second type of modifications questions the central bank’s
ability to control the economy through interest rate policy. First,
the central bank might not be legally responsible for the national
inflation and demand policy of the economy, as in a monetary
union for example (Allsopp and Vines, 2005). Second, the effective-
ness of the central bank’s interest rate policy may be asymmetric:
while the central bank may be able to fight any expansionary
process by corresponding increases in interest rates, there is abso-
lutely no guarantee that it is actually able to effectively combat a
downturn: the monetary transmission mechanism may be
disrupted if banks do not pass on lower costs induced by interest
rate cuts by the central bank due to higher risk premiums or pessi-
mistic expectations decrease creditworthy demand for loans. In
addition, investment demand may collapse due to pessimistic
expectations of investors. If the key interest rate is already at (near)
zero, and/or when the economy slides even further into deflation,
the interest rate policy of the central bank has completely lost its
ability to stabilise the economy. This situation is dramatic within
the NCM approach because the economy loses its central stabiliza-
tion mechanism and moves further away from equilibrium via
cumulative inflationary or disinflationary processes. In such a situa-
tion, the economy is dependent on tax and fiscal policy measures
in order to effectively support the level of aggregate demand.
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of the multiplier
Maybe one of the very few and small positive side effects of the
Great Recession and austerity crises in many countries is that it has
strongly encouraged empirical research on fiscal policy effective-
ness and the size of the multiplier. And, in fact, many of the recent
studies support the more Keynesian views of a sizeable multiplier.
Firstly, the case for expansionary consolidation has severely been
damaged by Guajardo et al. (2011) and Perotti (2012). Secondly,
especially under the current conditions in the euro area with
monetary policy at the lower bound, fixed exchange rates within
the currency union and simultaneous consolidation, the multiplier
tends to be large and (sometimes well) above one (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Batini et al., 2012; Blanchard and Leigh,
2013; Baum et al., 2012; Coenen et al., 2012; DeLong and
Summers, 2012; Holland and Portes, 2012). Thirdly, as suggested
by the standard Keynesian textbook models and the Haavelmo-
Theorem, the expenditure multiplier tends to be larger than the
revenue side multiplier (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012;
Batini et al., 2012; Gechert and Will, 2012). Fourthly, multipliers
tend to be higher during strong recessions (Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko, 2012; Batini et al., 2012; Baum and Koester, 2011; Baum
et al., 2012; Creel et al., 2011; and Fazzari et al., 2012). According to
Batini et al. (2012, p. 23), the expenditure multiplier during reces-
sions may be in the range of 1.6 to 2.6 whereas the tax multiplier
only in the range of 0.16 to 0.35. 
Of course, the recent studies are interesting in themselves and
they may even constitute considerable progress from an econo-
metric or methodological perspective. However, it should be noted
that most of their conclusions – most notably that there tend to be
sizeable multipliers and that expenditure multipliers are larger
than revenue side ones – could easily also have been drawn on the
basis of the earlier literature well before the crisis (see e.g. the over-
views by Hemming et al., 2002, Arestis and Sawyer, 2003,
Bouthevillain et al., 2009, and Creel et al., 2011). 
However, there is still a central point missing within the empi-
rical literature on multiplier values: to our knowledge, there are no
comprehensive studies on macroeconomic effects of redistributive
tax policies. With respect to revenue-side multipliers the empirical
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Coenen et al. (2012) as an exception state average multipliers of
their results from 7 widely used DSGE models for changes in
consumption, corporate and labour taxes for the United States (US)
and the European Union (EU) and find that a change in the
consumption tax rate yields a first-year multiplier of 0.61 for the
US and 0.66 for the EU. According to Coenen et al. (2012) the
corporate tax multiplier is 0.24 in the US and only 0.15 in the EU.
So, a corporate income tax increase would only have a small nega-
tive effect on GDP, especially in countries of the EU. A different
picture arises with respect to their labour income tax multiplier,
where they calculated 0.23 for the US and 0.53 for the EU. Coenen
et al. (2012) also present values for transfer shocks. They differen-
tiate between general and targeted transfers and found a
magnitude of 0.42 for the US and 0.29 for the EU with respect to
the former and values as high as 1.30 for the US and 1.12 for the
EU regarding the latter. Using a macroeconometric model for
Germany Truger et al. (2010), also differentiate between tax catego-
ries. For Germany, they estimated a value added tax multiplier of
0.8. A one percentage point change of indirect taxes will have an
GDP effect of 1.0%. However, they found a lower effect for income
taxes with 0.3 to 0.7. Moreover, Truger et al. (2010) calculated a
multiplier for contributions to social security with 0.8 and govern-
ment transfers with 0.4 to 0.9. 
Future research should focus more on the comparative effects of
increases of the tax burden for the rich and a simultaneous reduc-
tion of the tax burden for households at the lower end of the
income distribution. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Coenen et al.
(2012, p. 52) tax multipliers are very much dependent on the
degree and the behaviour of financially constrained households
within an economy and these, usually low income households,
have a higher propensity to consume out of their income, thus one
can expect in line with their results high positive output effects
from a redistributive policy from high to low income households.
Nevertheless, from the empirical perspective the output effects of
redistributive tax policies among different classes of income
remain a rather open question.
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of rebalancing under the debt brake in Germany
Although the disparity of income distribution in Germany is
still far away from the degree of inequality in the United States, it
has grown strongly over the last decade (OECD 2008, 2011a). The
top income range has achieved particularly strong gains Bach et al.
(2009), which seem to have been caused by significant tax cuts in
the recent past (Haan and Steiner, 2004; Truger, 2004 and 2009;
Bach et al., 2011). In what follows we try to connect two of the
aspects raised in the previous section for the German case. In
particular, firstly, we argue that the regressive German tax reforms
and the concomitant revenue losses in the early 2000s may be seen
as a major reason for the German stagnation until 2005 through
the working of the balanced budget multiplier. Secondly, for the
future, the revenues generated by progressive tax reforms may be
used to finance major public investment projects thereby boosting
domestic demand and contributing to the necessary rebalancing
within the euro area.
5.1. Tax cuts, induced expenditure cuts and the sick man of Europe
It is often forgotten today, that not too long ago Germany,
currently seemingly the “economic powerhouse” of the euro area,
used to be the “sick man” of Europe, namely in the long stagnation
period from 2001 to 2005 with strongly rising unemployment and
the famous “Agenda 2000” reforms of the red-green government in
order to overcome what was perceived as a deep structural crisis by
way of deregulation and dismantling of the welfare state. We have
argued elsewhere that this view of the German crisis is seriously
flawed and that, instead, a macroeconomic explanation in terms of
the restrictive effects of the ECB’s monetary policy, slow wage
growth and a procyclically restrictive fiscal policy is much more
plausible (Hein and Truger, 2005). An important part of this
restrictive policy mix, namely fiscal policy, can in turn be
explained by the inadequate and rather aggressive tax cuts (Truger,
2004 and 2009). 
German government budgets had, from 2001 to 2005, been
weakened by drastic, permanent tax cuts – particularly in the
personal as well as the corporate income taxes. Figure 1 shows the
net fiscal effects in 2000-2013 of the changes made in the tax laws
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in office at each date. The effects were calculated by adding up and
projecting the data from the finance table published by the Federal
Finance Ministry. These are indeed net effects – i.e. tax increases
introduced in the meantime are taken into account and are offset
against the quantitatively much larger tax cuts. 
 After drastic tax cuts by the Social Democratic-Green federal
government, there were compensatory increased revenues from
2006 onwards, starting with the Grand Coalition’s consolidation
drive and primarily attributable to the increase in the value added
tax by three percentage points from 16 to 19 per cent. If there had
been no further changes, the revenue losses would have stabilized at
about half the figure brought about by the Social Democratic-Green
reforms. However, within the framework of the economic packages,
further tax cuts were then adopted, so that by 2009, the revenue
increases from the measures brought in by the Grand Coalition had
almost all been eaten away again. Nevertheless, the Christian
Democrat – Liberal Democrat coalition, which had taken office in
the autumn of 2009, opted for further tax cuts via the so-called
Growth Acceleration Law. Overall, the revenue loss to all levels of
government from 1998 onwards, due to past tax-cutting policies,
Figure 1. Impact of tax law changes by the various coalition governments since 1998, 
2000-2013
 In € bn
Sources: Federal Finance Ministry, authors’ own calculations.
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Sarah Godar, Christoph Paetz and Achim Truger102was running at about €45bn (1.7 per cent of GDP) in 2013. Along-
side transitory, cyclically induced declines in revenue, the drastic
tax cuts described in the previous section are also the main cause of
the budget deficits that have arisen over the past twelve years. 
What is most important for the German stagnation period
under review is that the German government after some time lag
reacted to the revenue losses caused by the economic crisis after
the bursting of the dotcom bubble and by the tax cuts by increases
in social security contributions and by sharp expenditure cuts in
order to control the budget deficit. As Figure 2 shows, the overall
government revenue ratio has dropped dramatically since 2000
(due mainly, as has been seen, to tax-cutting policies), and this led
to a rise in the overall government budget deficit. Hence an even
steeper drop in the expenditure ratio from 2003 onwards, i.e. in
order to consolidate the budget, the State – except during the brief
economic package phase in 2009 and 2010 – made a lasting reduc-
tion of some three percentage points in its claims on GDP, from
around 48 per cent in the early 1990s to only about 45 per cent
since 2005. 
Figure 2. Overall government revenues and expenditures*,
1991-2012
In percent of GDP
* Expenditure in 1995 excluding debt assumption by the Treuhandanstalt (privatization agency for Eastern
Germany) and by the housing sector of the former GDR (totalling €119.6bn) and in 2000 excluding the proceeds
from the auctioning of UMTS licences (€50.8bn)
Source: Federal Statistical Office.
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the crisis and the self-inflicted revenue losses can be shown more
clearly and in more detail both by looking at the discretionary
stance (Figure 3). From 2003 the expenditure side stance turned
negative with the most severe cuts in 2004. We already used the
argument at the time (Jacoby and Truger, 2002 and Truger, 2004)
and elaborated on it in Truger et al. (2010). Using standard multi-
plier values and simulations with a macroeconometric model, it
can be shown that the result of this simultaneous exercise in tax
and expenditure cuts during a recession/stagnation period was
bound to produce severely and often overlooked negative effects for
the German economy. Interpreted in the light of the new results
from the multiplier literature, maybe the argument should be better
understood today than it was a few years ago. The recovery was
only allowed to gain momentum when the strong expenditure side
consolidation strategy was loosened and government consumption
and above all investment started to recover in 2006. 
5.2. Redistribution and perspectives of rebalancing under 
the debt brake 
The potential macroeconomic advantage – or given the
constraints of the debt brake probably the necessity – of a more
Figure 3. Discretionary fiscal stance,
2001-2013 
In percent of GDP
Source: Horn et al. (2013, p.18).
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ment of the financial balances of economic sectors (Figure 4). By
definition, the sum of the balances of the private sector (consoli-
dated balance of private households and firms), the public sector and
the external sector must – apart from statistical discrepancies –
always be zero. Over the period from 1980 to 2013, the balances
show the usual economic fluctuations. The balance which developed
most constantly over time has been the one of the public sector
which is usually in the focus of public debate. Apart from the excep-
tional years 1995 and 2000 (inclusion of debt related to German
unification into the government sector and UMTS auction reve-
nues), the government budget balance ranged from 0 to -4% of GDP
and moved quite smoothly around an average deficit of 2% of GDP.
However, the balance of the private sector has undergone a
rather spectacular development. After a period of temporarily low
surpluses of about 1% of GDP in the wake of German reunification,
the private sector balance has increased steeply since the economic
slump at the beginning of the new century varying around values
 of 8% of GDP since then. This is due to both an increase of the
surplus of private households from previously 4% to over 6% of
GDP as well as the transformation of the traditional deficit making
Figure 4. Sectoral financial balances in Germany, 
1980 -2015 
  In percent of GDP
Source: Ameco database of European Commission, Spring 2014; Authors’ calculations.
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The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries 105firm sector to a sectoral balance with a surplus of just over 2%
of GDP. 
The increase of private household surpluses since the beginning
of the new century can be explained plausibly with the acceler-
ating increase in the disparity of income distribution since then
(Bach et al., 2009; OECD, 2008 and 2011) and the consequential
increase in the savings rate. The hypothesis that the increase in
income inequality in Germany had a negative impact on private
consumption was raised by various authors (Deutsche Bundesbank
2005, p. 26; ARGE, 2006, pp. 263; Meinhardt et al, 2009, pp. 57).
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect an increase in consumer
spending via a (fiscal) reduction of income inequality in Germany.
There has also been a massive shift in functional income distribu-
tion at the expense of (low) labour income and in favour of profits
which is observable in the labour income share. As one could have
expected, all this had a negative effect on private consumption
demand: private consumption to GDP crashed by about
3 percentage points compared to the situation at the beginning of
the century and has not reached its former level since then. 
What is much more difficult to interpret is the amazing devel-
opment of the business sector balance over the same switching
from a previously typical deficit to persistent surpluses. Appar-
ently, a substantial proportion of rising profits of companies,
which can be derived from the declining labour income share,
have not been distributed to households, which in turn is likely to
have weakened private consumption even further. But most
importantly, the increase in retained earnings – differently as one
could expect from the neoclassical perspective – was accompanied
by a clear weakness of real investment, which in parallel to the
drop in private consumption also barely made positive growth
contributions anymore.10
Since the mid-1990s, and especially after the recession in 2000/
01 to 2006/2007 domestic demand and thus growth and employ-
ment in Germany has been very weak and it has been intensified
by a dysfunctional macroeconomic policy (Hein and Truger, 2005,
10. This development can be seen in the context of the so-called process of “financialisation”,
i.e. an increasing importance of financial markets within and for the real economy (see Epstein
and Power, 2003, Epstein and Jayadev, 2005). 
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led to extremely moderate wage increases, thus contributing to
inflation rates below the euro area average which then led to
unusually high real interest rates. This made Germany particularly
sensitive to the restrictive monetary policy of the European Central
Bank (ECB). Attempts of fiscal policy to balance the budget in
times of weak private demand via spending cuts led to a further
weakening of domestic demand, however, without achieving the
original goal of consolidation (Truger 2004 and 2009). This left the
high and ever-increasing export surpluses as the only driving force
of the weak growth environment. The current account surplus
(=deficit of the foreign sector) quickly reached values  of more than
4% of GDP after the recession of 2000/2001, at its peak in 2007 it
rose to 7.5% of GDP. The reason behind the increasing export and
current account surpluses was on the one hand the extreme wage
restraint, which significantly improved the price competitiveness
of German companies, and on the other hand the low domestic
demand, which dampened imports compared to exports. From a
financial balances perspective, the huge surpluses of the private
sector were not absorbed domestically due to the lack of willing-
ness of the public sector to take on debt, which in the end led to
correspondingly severe deficits of foreign countries against
Germany, currently still more than 6% of GDP.
For these reasons, the current sectoral balance structure of the
German economy (Figure 4) is most likely not sustainable and
economic policy alternatives must be considered in order to reduce
the persistently high current account surpluses11. There are only
two ways to achieve this. First, with consistently high surpluses of
the private sector, a greater part of them could be absorbed by a
larger public budget deficit. However, this solution is precluded
due to the debt brake in the German Constitution and also the
Stability and Growth Pact on the European level. The debt brake
even further intensifies the problem, because it limits the average
government budget deficit to only 0.35% of GDP over the
economic cycle, which is almost 2 percentage points lower than
the average of the last three decades. That leaves only the possi-
11. The hope that a sustainable balance will be reached through automatic adjustment
processes is quite low from a Keynesian point of view (see Sawyer, 2011).
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whether it is the balance of private households or firms or both. 
The exact consequences of a policy designed to correct the
sectoral balances cannot be determined precisely without an
explicit macroeconomic model.12 However, it seems clear that
progressive redistribution policies and mechanisms described in
Section 4 should be used for the correction of the sectoral balances.
A revenue-neutral tax reform, which increases the tax burden on
high incomes and wealth as well as corporate profits, and reduces
the tax burden on low and middle incomes, would reduce the
surplus of the private sector via the expected reduction of the
savings rate. If redistribution leads to higher private consumption,
it can be associated with increasing demand and profit expecta-
tions of firms which will also lead to a strengthening of firms’ real
investment, hence once would even reduce the surplus of the
corporate sector. The increase of domestic demand would lead to a
partial improvement of the government budget balance, but also
to a reduction of current account surpluses. If at least part of the
gained revenue from a progressive tax reform was used to expand
public investment, purchases of goods and services as well as trans-
fers, one could expect stronger domestic growth due to higher
expenditure-side multipliers, which should also lead to a corre-
spondingly stronger correction of sectoral balances.
6. Conclusions for tax policy13
The perspectives for a truly progressive reform of the tax system,
i.e. reversing the long run international trend of decreasing tax
justice and increasing disparities in the distribution of income and
wealth, while at the same time raising urgently needed revenues
for government budgets, have developed in a rather favourable
way over the last few years. There are some signs that the down-
ward trend in redistributive taxation may have come to a halt
recently. At the same time, a number of international institutions
have commented in a more or less progressive way on how to
12. However, the role of redistribution in the development of international macroeconomic
imbalances is now analysed in extended NCM models as well (see Kumhof et al., 2012).
13. For a more extensive discussion of reform proposals and alternatives, see Godar and Truger
(2015b).
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acceptable tax reforms. Against this background the conclusions to
be drawn from this paper for tax policy are at least twofold. 
First, on the international level the widespread consensus as to
the need for combating tax evasion and limiting tax avoidance as
well as the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax should be
used to implement reforms in the most ambitious way possible.
The EU commission’s revision of the Savings Directive making
“financial products that have similar characteristics to debt claims”
and income from investment funds subject to an automatic
exchange of information among member states (EC, 2014) as well
as the new global standard of automatic information exchange as
suggested by the OECD and the G20 (OECD, 2014, p. 3) are impor-
tant steps against tax evasion by individuals. In the area of
corporate taxation, the same applies for the OECD Action Plan in
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD, 2013c). 
However, much more could be achieved, for example by the
more comprehensive approach of Unitary Taxation which would
make multinational companies submit their worldwide consoli-
dated accounts (covering all parts of the company engaged in a
unitary business) to local tax authorities so that their internal
transfers would no longer be of interest (Picciotto, 2012). This
should be complemented with minimum tax rates to prevent
harmful tax competition. In general, the harmonisation of tax
rates, especially with respect to capital income, would be extremely
helpful in reducing the pressure for national tax policies. A global
wealth tax as proposed by Piketty (2013, chapter 15) could be the
ultimate goal for the international taxation of extremely rich
private households. A Financial Transaction Tax covering both
spot and derivative assets could help reduce size and volatility of
financial markets while at the same time generating substantial
revenue (Schulmeister et al. 2008). However, as has become clear
especially with the Financial transaction tax (Schulmeister, 2015),
for all of these proposals there is the serious danger that they will
be delayed, watered down or not be implemented at all due to
political pressure by some individual states or partisan interests.
Second, quite independently of the success of the measures on
the international level, national tax policies should seek to achieve
a substantially higher level of redistributive taxation even without
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cies on the national level has been shown to be considerably larger
than claimed by the dominant mainstream view and institutions.
Therefore, there is no need for national tax policies to restrict their
efforts to the rather faint-hearted measures proposed by many
influential international institutions like broadening the tax base
and increasing taxation of residential property. Instead, for many
national governments, there seems to be substantial leeway to
increase top personal income tax rates, the corporate income tax
and the taxation of capital in general. This leeway can substan-
tially be increased by determined efforts at increasing tax
compliance. National governments should use this leeway, as it
would increase revenues for essential public uses, decrease
inequality while at the same time encouraging progressive reforms
on the international level.   
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THE GREAT TAX REFORM, A FRENCH MYTH
Henri Sterdyniak1
OFCE, Sciences Po 
The need for a great tax reform is often debated in France, although the
content and objectives of such a reform are never clearly specified. There is no
unanimity on how the tax reform should be designed, some advocating that the
reform should aim at cutting taxation (which implies further public spending
cuts) while according to some others the tax system become more progressive.
The French tax-to-GDP ratio is 46%, and primary public expenditure amount to
50% of potential GDP. This high level of public spending reflects a choice of
society, which should be maintained. The French tax system is already very
progressive, similar taxation applies to capital and labour incomes. France is one
the very few countries where inequalities have not risen in the recent past. 
The paper addresses, for each category of tax, the reforms which could be
introduced, and discusses whether they would be appropriate. In particular, the
paper shows that replacing employers’ social contributions by VAT would be
useless. It is desirable but difficult to raise environmental taxation; French taxa-
tion should remain family-based, merging the income tax with the CSG is not
desirable. Tax expenditures should be reconsidered, especially as concerns
companies’ and households’ tax optimization schemes. Merging PPE and RSA is
not obvious. A competitiveness shock (i.e. strong cuts in employers’ social
contributions and corporate taxation financed by a rise in CSG) should be
implemented only in a European context. 
Keywords: tax reform, French tax system.
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Henri Sterdyniak1201. Introduction
French tax revenues increased by 60 billion euros (i.e. 3% of
GDP) between 2010 and 2014. France ranks second in the world
behind Denmark in terms of tax-to-GDP ratio. There seems to be a
broad consensus according to which the French taxation system is
not only heavy, but also unfair, complex and opaque. In the 2012
presidential election campaign, François Hollande had promised a
great tax reform and has since then been widely criticized for not
having undertaken it. Following protests related to the eco-tax
introduction, and more generally, the rise in tax discontent, Jean-
Marc Ayrault, Prime Minister, announced on 19 November 2013,
that he would launch a great tax reform. In 2014, tax and social
security contributions cuts were announced. But they were not
part of a great tax reform, since they have no specified counter-
parts in terms of public spending cuts. The need for a great tax
reform is often mentioned in economic debates in France, but the
contents and objectives of such a reform are never clearly specified.
There is a consensus on the need for a tax reform, but not on how
it should be designed.
Taxation has three objectives: financing public and social
expenditures, income redistribution, and economic incentives.
According to some (see for instance, OECD, 2013), the tax system
should have limited ambitions in these three areas; for some
others, these ambitions should be strengthened.
Some are in favour of substantial tax cuts, expected to support
the French economy by increasing domestic competitiveness, by
giving firms incentives to invest and to create jobs, by giving
people incentives to work more and to save more. But the imple-
mentation of tax cuts implies additional public spending cuts,
although the Government is already committed to cut taxes by 50
billion euros before 2017. 
Some propose to transfer the financing of social welfare from
firms to households. Hence, the Medef (the French employers’
organisation) requests company taxation to be cut by 137 billion
euros. Should France step in tax competition in Europe through
company taxation cuts, partly offset by higher households’ tax
burden and by public and social expenditure cuts?
The great tax reform, a French myth 121Some advocate tax cuts on labour and capital incomes and tax
increases on consumption, deemed less harmful to output, but
others denounce the unfairness of indirect taxes, which hit more
in proportion poorest people who consume almost entirely their
incomes. 
Others propose to share the tax burden more fairly between
labour and capital incomes, to make French taxation more redis-
tributive, to tax more heavily high incomes and wealth. But France
is already one of the most redistributive countries, where richest
people and capital incomes are more heavily taxed than elsewhere. 
Some propose to abolish all tax expenditures, to widen tax bases
and to cut tax rates. But they forget about the incentive role of
taxation. Many tax schemes, even when they are complex, are
justified for fairness reasons (such as the quotient familial), for jobs
(such as social security contributions rebates on low wages, tax
deductibility of child care expenditure, financial support to
working poor (such as the Prime pour l’emploi, PPE), or incentives
(such as tax relief for donations to charity, trade unions’ member-
ship, tax credit for maintaining historical buildings). It may be
noted that some incomes are not taxed, such as some capital
incomes (life insurance, Plan d’épargne en actions, PEA), unrealized
financial gains (but it is difficult to tax non accrued gains),
imputed rents (for owner occupied housing, but who would dare to
tax these rents?). What is needed is a long and patient process to
dismantle tax expenditures rather than a great reform.
French taxation should become more environmentally-friendly,
but is there really a double dividend (environment and jobs) or do
ecological gains induce costs in terms of jobs, purchasing power, or
competitiveness? Can French environmental taxation be increased
in the absence of a European (if not world-level) agreement which
looks very unlikely today? How to reconcile environmental and tax
revenues objectives? Ecological taxation is necessarily complex if
ones tries to avoid to (too much) hit farmers, industrial sectors,
poorest people, peripheral regions, etc. This is what the failures of
the carbon tax (in 2009) or eco-tax (in 2013) have shown.
Tax evasion implemented by large companies and richest people
should be combatted, but this requires taxation harmonisation at
the EU level, and is not without danger, if this obliges France to
Henri Sterdyniak122bring its tax rates in line with EU average tax rates (as concerns
wealth tax, corporate income taxation and income taxation). As for
all EU issues, one should oppose a tax harmonisation liberal project
according to which tax revenues should be cut, and a project where
the European social model should be preserved and developed. But
where could these two projects be democratically debated? 
A ‘miraculous’ project re-emerged in France: merging the
income tax with the CSG (Contribution sociale généralisée, see
Landais, Piketty and Saez, 2011). But, here also, neither the objec-
tives nor the means of the project were clearly specified. Is the
project expected to make our system simpler or more redistribu-
tive, to be fairer to families or to support women’s autonomy? 
There is a risk that the idea of a great tax reform is a fallacy,
hiding the inability to tackle the real problems of the French
economy: the difficulty to insert in the new international division
of labour; the rise in inequalities in status and in primary incomes
induced by globalisation and the financialisation of the economy;
the inability of developed countries, especially in the euro area, to
find a new growth path since the financial crisis.
The structure of the taxation system is probably not the main
problem to address, but rather the economic policy mistake made
at the euro area level, to add fiscal austerity on top of the depres-
sive shock induced by the financial crisis and, in France, to
increase taxation by 3 percentage points of GDP since 2010 in
order to cut the public deficit entirely induced by the recession. 
The French tax-to-GDP ratio is 46%; primary public spending
amount to around 50% of potential GDP. This high level of public
and social expenditure is a choice of society which should be main-
tained. The French tax system is already highly redistributive.
France is one of the few developed countries where income
inequalities did not rise strongly in the recent past. Certainly,
some reforms are needed to make the tax system even more redis-
tributive, to make it more transparent and more socially
acceptable. However, inequalities should be reduced first and fore-
most at the level of primary incomes. There is no miraculous tax
reform: the current system results from a long process of economic
and social compromise and will be difficult to improve.
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In 2013, French public spending amounted to 57% of GDP,
placing France third among OECD countries, after Finland and
Denmark. The economic depression led this ratio to rise tempo-
rarily: primary public spending (excluding interest payments)
account for 50% of potential GDP.2 
This level corresponds to a French (and even European) choice
of a mixed economy, a compromise between socialism and capi-
talism, where a significant share of households’ needs are covered
in a socialized way, either by benefits in kind (education, health,
childcare), either by benefits in cash, such as universal benefits
(family benefits), assistance benefits (old age minimum income,
RSA, Revenu de Solidarité Active) or social insurance benefits
(pensions, unemployment). There are no proposals from any polit-
ical party or social movement to dismantle this model. Thus, the
various pension reforms have not chosen to switch from a pay as
you go to a pension funds system. Thus, under Sarkozy’s Presi-
dency, the RSA was introduced which extends further social
protection. 
Over the last 17 years, the weight of primary public expenditure
increased in France (+2.8 percentage point of potential GDP
against +0.7 percentage point in the euro area); primary public
spending in volume increased by 1.9% per year, on average, but
GDP grew by 1.5% only per year. This contrasts with the strong
falls observed in Austria, Sweden and Germany (Table 1). But
primary public spending rose substantially in several EU countries
(Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom); this is also true for the
United States and Japan. Two opposite trends took place in
developed countries: rising social needs (education, health,
pensions) induce a rise in public expenditure, whereas the liberal
ideology pushes for less State intervention and for privatizing some
of its functions. But private solutions are often more expensive,
raise inequalities and undermine social cohesion. Thus, in the euro
area as a whole, the share of public spending has increased slightly
over the last 17 years despite the pressures from the Commission.
2. The GDP level corresponding to normal cyclical conditions, if we assume that such a level
may be estimated.
Henri Sterdyniak124France is one of the countries with the highest public spending
to GDP ratio. Apart from regalian functions (armed forces, police
and justice), the State provides free services to households (educa-
tion, health); finances collective equipment, research, culture,
substantial; allocates substantial transfers (family policy, minimum
income) and organises a substantial collective insurance (pensions,
unemployment). The ageing of populations generates an increase
in health and pension expenditure, the technical changes generate
a need for higher education and research spending, the rise in
exclusion makes it necessary to increase solidarity benefits; the
population wishes more collective equipment, more safety
measures. Innovative companies like sectors in difficulty should be
supported. Large military spending like large international aid
Table 1. Public expenditure to GDP ratios
Public 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
GDP
Primary 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
potential 
GDP
Public 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
GDP
Primary 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
potential 
GDP
Public 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
GDP
Primary 
expendi-
ture,
in % of 
potential 
GDP
Change
2013 2007 1996 2013/1996
Finland 58.5 56.9 47.4 51.1 60.2 56.7 +0.2
Denmark 57.2 55.0 50.8 52.9 58.9 56.0 -1.0
France 57.0 53.3 52.6 51.9 54.5 50.5 +2.8
Belgium 54.7 52.7 48.2 45.7 52.4 43.6 +9.1
Sweden 51.8 51.7 50.9 52.4 62.9 58.3 -6.6
Greece 58.5 39.6 47.5 38.0 43.8 32.9 +6.7
Austria 51.3 47.8 48.6 48.6 55.9 51.9 -4.1
Netherlands 49.7 46.4 45.2 45.7 49.4 44.4 +2.0
Euro area 49.8 45.7 46.0 44.9 50.5 45.0 +0.7
Italy 50.6 43.3 47.6 44.3 52.2 41.4 +1.9
UK 49.8 43.3 43.4 43.6 41.4 38.2 +5.1
Germany 44.6 42.7 43.5 41.9 49.0 45.6 -2.9
Japon 43.1 42.3 35.8 36.9 36.3 35.6 +6.7
Ireland 42.9 42.2 36.7 32.7 39.2 33.9 +8.4
Portugal 48.7 41.9 44.4 42.3 42.4 38.2 +3.7
Spain 44.8 39.8 39.2 39.6 43.2 37.9 +1.9
USA 41.9 35.5 37.1 35.3 36.6 32.0 +3.5
Note: Public expenditure to potential GDP ratios depend substantially on the output gap, which is particularly diffi-
cult to estimate for 2007 and 2013. In this table, we use the OECD figures. According to our own estimates, the
French ratios would be 49.3% in 1996, 50.1% in 2007 and 2013, i.e. would have risen by 0.8 percentage point only. 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, November 2013.
The great tax reform, a French myth 125expenditures are necessary to play an important role at the
international level. For all these reasons, there is a rising trend in
public spending. 
The high level of French public spending is especially clear in
the area of social protection, which is 4% of GDP higher in France
than in the euro area average (Table 2). France has made no choice
between solidarity benefits, insurance benefits and universal bene-
fits: it provides the three of them. The French health system is
almost entirely public, there are universal family allowances,
young child-care allowances to help working women who take a
job, and allowances to help women who give up their job to care
after their young children; unemployment benefits are relatively
generous (accounting for housing benefits). There are also a RSA
(Revenu de solidarité active – minimum income) and housing bene-
fits. Last, there is relatively generous pensioner minimum income
(accounting for housing benefits). The supplementary pensions
system is public. Public expenditures dedicated to education are
1 percentage point of GDP higher in France than in the euro area,
due to a larger proportion of young people in the population and
to the low level of private education expenditure (Table 2). 
Table 2. Public expenditure per function in GDP in 2012
Percent of GDP
France Germany Italie Euro aera UK Sweden USA
General services 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.2 2.8 6.2 2.0
Interest payments 2.4 2.5 5.4 2.7 3.0 1.0 3.8
Defence 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.4 1.4 4.2
Public order 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.4 1.4 2.2
Functioning 9.6 8.8 12.4 9.0 10.6 10.0 12.2
Economic affairs 3.7 3.4 3.4 4.3 2.8 4.4 2.2
Environment 1.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.0
Housing,
collective amenities 1.9 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Culture 1.4 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.3
Health 8.3 7.0 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.1 8.7
Education 6.1 4.3 4.2 5.0 6.1 6.8 6.3
Social protection 24.4 19.4 21.0 20.6 18.0 21.4 8.1
Total 56.6 44.7 50.6 50.1 48.1 52.0 40.0
Source: OECD database.
Henri Sterdyniak126So, any substantial cut in the public expenditure ratio implies
privatising, in one way or another, expenditures directly benefiting
households. Either public spending is fully privatised, at the expense
of the poorer, or public spending is allocated only to the poorer, the
rest of the population having to turn to private institutions. There is
a risk that the society becomes a three-speed society, with free but
low quality health or education for the poor; and higher-quality
benefits for the richer who can afford to pay for them.
Besides, public spending is not a GDP component. A large
number of public expenditure consist in transfers to companies
and to households, which finance private consumption spending,
themselves satisfied by private companies.
Many economists, politicians, liberal think-tanks (Institut
Montaigne, 2012), and international institutions (OECD, 2013)
consider that France should implement a competitiveness strategy,
through sharp cuts in social benefits allowing to cut employers’
social contributions. But such a strategy would weigh on house-
holds’ incomes, households having to pay for private health
insurances for instance. Such a reform would result in a more
expensive (as shown by the US example) and unfair system (each
family would pay according to its risks and not to its incomes). It
would be preferable to consider each objective separately: on the
one hand, social protection should be managed according to its
own objectives; on the other hand, competitiveness should be
improved either through R&D, innovation or, as a last resort,
through lower wages (and dividends) paid by firms. There is no
reason a priori why competitiveness gains should be obtained
mainly via lower social spending. 
The current Government is committed to cut public expendi-
ture by 50 billion euros (i.e. by 4.5%). This implies substantial cuts
in public services and social expenditure, which is harmful for
social cohesion, is economically and socially undesirable in times
of weak demand and mass unemployment.
So far, the social protection level has remained high in France.
As a result, income inequalities and poverty rates are lower in
France than in Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries, and
they are not rising contrary to Nordic countries and Germany
(Table 3). 
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of the 1% highest wages in the total gross payroll increased from
5.5% in 1996-1998 to 6.9% in 2008 and remained at 6.6% in
20103. From 2004 to 2010, the number of households’ paying the
ISF (wealth tax) rose by 69%. In households’ incomes, the share of
the 0.1% richest rose from 1.72% to 2.03%; the share of the 1%
richest rose from 6.48% to 7.07%4. 
In 2013, the D10/D1 income ratio was 20.1 before redistribu-
tion and 5.9 after (Table 4). The French system is strongly
redistributive, mainly because of social benefits. The redistributive
role of taxation is less clear, particularly for higher incomes.
Table 3. Rates of poverty in Europe
1997 2007 2013
Change
1997/2013
Germany 12 15.2 16.1 +4.1
Austria 13 12.0 14.4 +1.4
Belgium 14 15.2 15.1 +1.1
France 15 13.1 13.7 -1.3
Netherlands 10 10.2 10.4 +0.4
Spain 20 19.7 20.4 +0.4
Greece 21 20.3 23.1 +2.1
Italy 19 19.9 19.1 +0.1
Portugal 22 18.1 18.7 -3.3
Denmark 10 11.7 12.3 +2.3
Finland 8 13.0 11.7 +3.7
Sweden 8 10.5 14.8 +6.8
Ireland 19 17.2 16.1 -2.9
United Kingdom 18 18.6 15.9 -2.1
Source: Eurostat. Poverty rate at 60% of median income.
3. According to Emploi et salaires, INSEE Références, 2013.
4. According to Les revenus et le patrimoine des ménages, INSEE Références, 2013.
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In 2013, France ranked second among OECD countries in terms
of compulsory tax rates (table 5), at the same level as Northern
European countries. 
Table 4. Primary and disposable incomes in 2013
Incomes before 
redistribution 
Social benefit 
ratio Tax ratio
Incomes after 
redistribution
D1 14.4 168.4 -4.3 41.6
Q1 26.6 61.1 -4.9 46.8
Q2 59.6 8.1 -6.9 66.1
Q3 82.8 3.4 -10.1 84.7
Q4 111.4 1.7 -12.7 108.7
Q5 219.6 0.6 -20.2 193.5
D10 289.8 0.5 -22.9 246.6
Total 100 5.7 -14.4 100
Source: INSEE, France, Portrait social, 2014.
Table 5. Total tax revenues as a % of GDP 
1990 2007 2013 (p)
Denmark 45.8 47.7 48.6
France 41.0 42.4 45.0
Belgium 41.2 42.4 44.6
Finland 42.9 41.5 44.0
Sweden 49.5 44.9 42.8
Italy 36.4 41.7 42.6
Austria 39.4 40.5 42.5
Euro area 36.5 38.3 39.3
Netherlands 40.4 36.3 37.3
Germany 34.8 34.9 36.7
Greece 25.0 30.9 33.5
Portugal 26.5 31.3 33.4
United Kingdom 34.2 34.1 32.9
Spain 31.6 36.4 32.6
USA 25.6 26.9 30.1
Ireland 32.4 30.4 28.3
Japon 28.5 28.5 27.8
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2014. 
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EU partners (Tables 6 to 8):
— There are two income taxes in France (a progressive tax (IR)
and a flat tax (CSG)) having in total a relatively low weight.
Conversely, the household’s local tax is relatively heavy.
— Employers’ social contributions are high; employees’ contri-
butions are relatively low.
— Local business taxes are relatively heavy.
— Capital taxation is relatively high, while consumption taxa-
tion is rather low.
Indeed, there is no reason why French taxation should be
brought in line with EU partners’ taxation. Social contributions
should be high in a country where social insurance benefits are
Table 6. Structure of taxation, in % of GDP in 2007
DE AT BE ES FI FR EL IE IT
Personal income 9.0 9.4 12.2 7.4 13.0 7.5 4.9 8.8 11.1
Corporate income 2.2 2.4 3.6 4.6 3.9 3.0 2.6 3.4 3.8
Employers' social contributions 
and wage tax 6.3 9.3 8.3 8.9 8.7 12.2 5.1 3.3 8.9
Employees (and other people) 
social contributions 6.9 7.6 5.3 3.2 3.2 5.1 6.6 1.6 4.1
Taxes on capital 0.9 0.6 2.3 3.0 1.1 3.5 1.4 2.5 2.1
Taxes on goods and services 10.6 11.7 11.0 9.5 12.9 10.7 11.4 11.1 11.0
Others 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.5* 0.0 0.0 2.6**
Total 36.0 41.8 43.6 37.2 43.0 43.7 31.8 31.0 43.4
NL PT DK SW UK EU15 JP US
Personal income 7.7 5.5 25.3 14.6 10.8 9.7 5.5 10.6
Corporate income 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.2 4.8 3.1
Employers' social contributions 
and wage tax 4.5 4.8 0.2 12.3 3.7 7.3 4.7 3.3
Employees (and other people) 
social contributions 8.3 6.9 1.0 3.0 2.9 4.9 5.6 3.3
Taxes on capital 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.2 4.5 2.4 2.5 3.1
Taxes on goods and services 11.2 13.7 16.3 12.9 10.5 10.9 5.1 4.7
Others 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0
Total 38.7 32.5 48.9 47.4 36.0 39.4 28.3 27.9
* Mainly business local taxes.
** Mainly IRAP.
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2014.
Henri Sterdyniak130high. The high level of employers’ contributions is partly offset by
the level of net wages. However, these figures could suggest that
France should reduce public spending, increase the weight of its
income tax and of its VAT, cut employers’ social contributions and
capital taxation. But this would mean implementing a tax compe-
tition strategy, harmful at the EU level. France needs to make a
social and political choice: remain original (which is dangerous for
an open economy) or come in line with other countries.    
Table 7. Structure of taxation in Germany and France, in 2012
In % of GDP
Allemagne France 
Total 36.5 44.0
Personal income 9.3 8.0 (2.9+5.1)*
Corporate income 1.8 2.5
Employees' social contributions 6.2 4.0
Employers' social contributions 6.5 11.3
Others social contributions 1.2 1.3
Wage taxes — 1.4
VAT and other indirect taxes 10.4 10.8
Local business tax — 1.1
Taxes on capital, of which : 0.9 3.8
    Households' local tax 1.1
    Households' property tax 0.2 0.8
    Company property tax 0.3 0.6
    Wealth tax — 0.2
    Inheritance/donation 0.2 0.5
    Transactions 0.3 0.6
*CSG-CRDS+IR
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2014.
Table 8. Implicit tax rates in 2012
Labour Consumption Capital
EA17 38.5 19.3 30.7
Germany 37.8 19.8 22.2
Belgium 42.8 21.1 35.5
Spain 33.5 14.0 25.3
France 39.5 19.8 46.9
Ireland 28.7 21.9 13.0
Italy 42.8 17.7 37.0
NLD 38.5 24.5 13.7
Netherlands 38.6 26.5 30.6
UK 25.2 19.0 35.7
Source: Eurostat, Taxation trends in the European Union, 2014.
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The recent history of French taxation can be split into four
episodes.
1) The tax-to-GDP ratio decreased by 1.6 percentage points from
1999 to 2002. This is the so-called ‘jackpot’ effect of Lionel Jospin:
strong GDP growth in 1997-2000 reduced the public deficit,
prompting the government to cut taxes. The measures introduced
by the Jospin Government amount to roughly 35 billion euros, i.e.
2.3% of GDP, split between households (12 billion), companies
(12.5 billion) and indirect taxes (10.5 billion). Some of these
measures (VAT and CIT rates cuts) were a return to normal after the
1995-1997 tax increases measures introduced to meet the
Maastricht criteria. Other measures are part of an employment
policy based on lowering employers’ social contributions and
removing the inactivity trap (introduction of the PPE, prime pour
l’emploi, an employment premium, cut in residency tax). Some had
purely electoral purposes and hardly any economic justification
(income tax cuts, car tax (‘vignette automobile’) abolition). From a
macroeconomic viewpoint, this policy was strongly criticized by
the European Commission, which considers it was responsible for
the high level of French public deficits in 2003-2004. According to
the Commission this is an illustration of a pro-cyclical policy.
2) Measures introduced in 2007 by Nicolas Sarkozy, at the
beginning of his presidency, in particular the TEPA law (law for
labour, employment and purchasing power) induced tax cuts of
around 16 billion euros in full-year basis: tax-exemption of over-
time pay, of mortgage interest payments, cuts in ISF (high wealth
tax) and inheritance taxes, cuts in local business taxes, widening of
the Crédit Impôt Recherche (tax credit for R&D expenses). In the
following years, the government also cut the VAT rate on hotels
and restaurants (2.4 billion euros) and reformed companies’ local
taxation (4.5 billion euros). 
3) However, starting from 2011, France accepted the European
constraint of reducing public deficits. From 2011 to 2013, tax
increases reached 60 billion euros (3% of GDP). The Fillon govern-
ment removed the tax exemption on mortgage interest payments,
rose the ‘forfait social’ and capital income taxation, introduced a
contribution on high incomes, toughened CIT and income tax
legislations, froze income tax brackets (formerly price-indexed); all
Henri Sterdyniak132in all raising tax revenues by 30 billion. The five-year Sarkozy’s
Presidency shows that it is difficult to implement a liberal reform
of French taxation. The announced objective of cutting massively
the tax-to-GDP ratio (by 4 percentage points) was not met: the
ratio rose from 42.1% in 2007 to 43.7% in 2012. 
From 2012, François Hollande removed the tax-exemption on
overtime pay, increased inheritance taxation and the ISF, increased
capital income taxation, maintained the non-indexation of
income tax brackets, lowered the ceiling of the family tax reduc-
tion (the quotient familial), rose the forfait social, the social
contributions on pensions and self-employed contributions,
toughened CIT legislation (25% of interest payments subject to
CIT, increase in capital gains taxation). In addition, in 2014,
households’ taxation was increased by 12 billion euros (increase in
VAT rates and in inheritance taxation, additional lowering of the
ceiling of family tax reduction, taxation of complementary health
employers’ contributions, etc.). 
The financial crisis cut French GDP by 8%; i.e. 4 percentage
points in terms of tax revenues. The Fillon and Ayrault govern-
ments both agreed to comply with financial markets and EU
Commission’s diktats and to add an austerity tax shock to the
financial crisis shock. The strong rise in taxation, without counter-
parts in terms of expenditure had a negative impact on output and
fed a feeling of tax revolt (the so called ‘ras-le-bol fiscal’).
Conversely it allowed abolishing several unjustifiable tax expendi-
tures and to increase taxation on capital incomes and on the
wealthiest.
4) Another episode started in 2014. Under strong lobbying
from employers complaining about excessive taxation harmful to
firms’ competitiveness and investment, the government intro-
duced the CICE (competitiveness and employment tax credit) and
announced a responsibility Pact, CIT cuts, and the abolition of the
C3S5, totalling 40 billion euros. In face of growing tax discontent,
the government also announced households’ tax cuts, such as cuts
in employees’ social contributions on low wages (which was later
5. Contribution Sociale de Solidarité des Sociétés, a tax on gross sales of larger firms to finance
non-employees pensions.
The great tax reform, a French myth 133rejected by the Conseil Constitutionnel) and income tax cuts for low
and middle incomes (amounting to 5 billion euros).
The Government committed to cut the public deficit by
50 billion euros and company taxation by 40 billion between 2013
and 2017. This would be financed by public expenditure cuts
amounting to 50 billion euros. 40 billion are thus lacking: the
French government seems to have abandoned the objective of
rapid public deficit reduction. 
5. The reform of the Social Security financing
There are three arguments in favour of reforming social protec-
tion financing. The first argument is that financing should follow
an economic and social rationale, according to which social insur-
Table 9. Tax-to-GDP ratios
In %
Tax-to-GDP ratios
1999 43.6
2000 42.8
2001 42.5
2002 41.9
2003 41.8
2004 41.9
2005 42.5
2006 42.8
2007 42.1
2008 41.9
2009 41.0
2010 41.3
2011 42.6
2012 43.7
2013 44.7
2014 44.7
2015 44.6
2016 44.5
2017 44.4
Source: INSEE until 2013, and Projet de loi de programmation des finances
publiques 2014-2019, from 2014.
Henri Sterdyniak134ance benefits (unemployment, retirement) should be financed by
contributions on wages while universal and assistance benefits
(health, family and minimum income) should be funded by
general taxation. The second argument is that universal benefits
financing should not be harmful to employment; and should
therefore weigh either at the level of companies on all production
factors: labour, capital and energy, or at the level of households, on
all their incomes. The third, and more circumstantial argument, is
that French companies need a price-competitiveness shock and
since currency devaluation is impossible, labour costs need to be
cut via lower employers’ contributions. But in counterpart other
resources should be allocated to social protection.
France is the country with the highest social security contribu-
tions in the world. This is due to the size of the social protection
system: the French worker does not have to pay a private insurance
for his retirement and health. Family and unemployment benefits
are relatively generous. Net wages may be lower (which offsets the
additional wage costs induced by social security contributions).
Since 1984, employers’ social contributions have fallen quite
substantially as a share of value added, from 19.8% in 1984 to 15.8%
in 2007 (Figure 1), thanks to tax exemptions. Hence employers’
social contributions can hardly be blamed for being responsible of
the recent competitiveness losses of the French economy.
Figure 1. Employers’ social contributions share in companies’ value added
In percentage points
Source: INSEE.
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The great tax reform, a French myth 135At the median wage level, social contributions rates stand at
44% for employers and 21.7% for employees (including the CSG).
A French specificity is to collect social security contributions
without ceiling and to cut payroll taxes on low wages (with social
security entitlements being unaffected). Thus, wages at below 1.6
times the SMIC (the minimum wage) benefit from employers’
contributions rebates, amounting to 28 percentage points at the
SMIC level. Besides, low-wage earners are entitled to the RSA
(revenu de solidarité active) or the PPE (prime pour l’emploi). This
system is highly progressive and difficult to reform without
reducing its redistributive characteristics. 
The reform should clearly distinguish social insurance benefits
(pensions, unemployment, and sickness replacement benefits),
entitled on the basis of work-related contributions. These contribu-
tions should remain proportional to wages if benefits are to remain
linked to wages. General taxation cannot entitle higher benefits to
higher-wage earners. These real contributions amount to
38.5 percentage points. They should not be part of the compulsory
tax rate. The latter should be lowered by 15.5 percentage points,
from 44.5 to about 29 points. Any future increase in these benefits
should be financed by higher employees’ contributions so that the
employees’ social choice – contributions/pensions level/retirement
age – is transparent and does not weigh on competitiveness.
Currently, employees’ social contributions finance only social
insurance benefits. The plan of lowering employees’ contributions
on low wages (announced by Francois Hollande on 31 March 2014)
had no economic rationale and would have complicated the wage
bill further. Fortunately, the Constitutional Council rejected the
plan, saying that these regimes should continue to be contributive:
benefits entitlement relies on contributions paid. 
On the contrary, universal (health, family) or solidarity benefits
should be financed by taxation. Currently, they are financed by
employers’ social contributions (without ceiling), by the CSG and
by social levies on households’ capital incomes. In the past, it was
considered that companies were benefiting from the existence of
health and family (especially child-care expenditure) benefits,
which were ensuring the availability of a healthy labour force, and
hence it was not illegitimate that companies contribute to
universal social protection financing. Firms’ competitiveness and
Henri Sterdyniak136wage costs issues lead to put this argument aside. Any future
increases in terms of health expenditure should be financed by
taxation on households’ incomes, such as the CSG. Here also, this
will have no impact on firms’ competitiveness. 
Therefore, the underlying problem is: what shall be done with
current health and family employers’ social contributions (i.e.
17.45 percentage points)? Five projects are on the table. The first
two (CSVA or ecological taxation) would not improve firms’
competitiveness, but could increase employment via substitution
effects. The third (increase in the CSG offset by an increase in gross
wages) would bring a social clarification, without economic
impact. The last two (CSG rise not offset, VAT rise) imply lower
households’ incomes to increase French companies’ competitive-
ness or profitability. 
5.1. Employers’ social contributions exemptions.
In the absence of a comprehensive reform, the solution adopted
since 1993 has been to extend social security contributions’
exemptions schemes. In 2014, there were 71 exemption schemes,
amounting to 28 billion euros (table 10). It has become the major
instrument of the French employment policy. These exemptions
are based on the theory according to unemployment is high
because of labour costs, especially at the minimum wage level.
Conversely, these exemptions undermine the social protection
financing, which sees its own resources declining; these exemp-
tions tend to devalue the social role of work (see Friot, 1999).
Table 10. Exemptions from social security contributions in 2014
Billion euros
Offset Non-Offset
Low wages 20,700
Overtime 510
Specific workers 1,140 1,740
Geographical areas 1,410
Households' workers 180 1,770
Other sectors 630 150
Total 24,570 3,660
Source: PLFSS (2015).
The great tax reform, a French myth 137Companies benefit from social security contributions cuts on
low wages, amounting to 28 percentage points (over 44) for
workers paid at the SMIC (minimum wage) level and decreasing
linearly up to 1.6 times the SMIC. This lowers the minimum wage
cost by 18.6%. In addition, minimum-wage earners are entitled to
the PPE (7.7% of the net SMIC) in order to widen the gap between
the minimum wage and the RSA (the minimum income). These
social security contributions rebates had ex ante a cost of around
20.7 billion euros in 2013. Their impact is controversial (see Ster-
dyniak, 2007); according to the French ministry for Labour, the
impact is 800,000 additional jobs (26 000 euros by job, which is
high when the employers’ total wage cost for a worker paid at the
SMIC level is 24 540 euro without social contributions rebates. The
ex-post cost would be significantly lower, 10 billion euro, since
these jobs generate 12 billion euros in terms of social contributions
and lower unemployment benefits. According to Heyer and Plane
(2013), the impact would be 500 000 additional jobs (110 000 via
capital-labour substitution, 230 000 via a basis effect, 80 000 by
higher demand effect and 80 000 by a competitiveness effect). The
effect comes down to 330 000 (250 000) if the measure is financed
ex post by higher taxes (by lower public expenditure). 
Three justifications may be given for targeting low-wages social
contributions. The first one is that the minimum wage is too high
in France and deemed responsible for unskilled workers’ high
unemployment while graduate workers are close to full employ-
ment. But one may argue that in a mass unemployment situation,
companies have a choice and may prefer to hire over-skilled
employees, themselves resigned to apply for a job below their
skills. It is true that unemployment rates are higher and employ-
ment rates are lower for unskilled than for skilled people. But the
gap between unemployment rates is not larger in France than else-
where (Table 11), despite the SMIC, and the gap between
employment rates did not shrink despite the policy of lowering
social contributions at low-wage levels (Table 12). The second justi-
fication is a pure basis effect: it is less costly to cut labour costs for
low than for higher wages. But social contributions cuts on low
wages are an incentive to create poor quality jobs.
  
Henri Sterdyniak138The third justification is that labour demand elasticity to labour
costs would be higher for low than for higher wages. Thus, Heyer
and Plane (2013) assume that this elasticity ranges from 0.9 at the
minimum wage level to 0.2 for higher wages. According to Brunel
et al. (2013) this elasticity is 0.75 at the SMIC level and 0.25 above
1.6 SMIC. As long as the elasticity is lower than 1, this policy
Table 11. Unemployment rates by level of education (2012)
 Primary Tertiary Gap
Spain 31.2 14.0 17.2
Germany 12.8 2.4 10.4
United States 14.3 4.6 9.7
Belgium 12.1 3.4 8.7
France 13.8 5.1 8.7
OECD 13.4 5.0 8.4
Sweden 12.3 4.0 8.3
Finland 11.6 3.9 7.7
United Kingdom 10.5 3.6 6.9
Italy 12.2 6.4 5.8
Austria 7.7 2.1 5.6
Denmark 9.6 4.7 4.9
Netherlands 6.6 3.0 3.6
Source: OECD (2014): Employment Outlook.
Table 12. Higher-graduates and non-graduates employment rates 
 1994 2012 Change
Germany 34.4 30.4 -4.0
United States 34.0 27.2 -6.8
Belgium 34.0 37.0 + 3.0
Austria 32.8 31.4 -1.4
Italy 32.7 27.8 -4.9
Netherlands 30.6 25.4 -5.2
United Kingdom 30.3 27.3 -3.0
France 29.4 28.9 -0.5
Spain 28.5 28.0 -0.5
Denmark 28.4 25.0 -3.4
Finland 28.3 29.2 + 0.9
Sweden 20.5 24.7 + 4.2
Source: OECD (2014): Employment Outlook.
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2012b). But these estimates have no recent empirical basis on
French data. Cahuc and Carcillo (2014) find an elasticity of 2 at the
SMIC level, but they generalise a very specific episode, when
during the 2008-09 crisis, a temporary social contribution cut
allowed small firms to reduce the number of layoffs. 
This strategy has three drawbacks: it benefits more to services
than to industrial sectors (where there are fewer low wage jobs); it
is an incentive for firms to create a specific category of jobs at the
minimum wage level, without any career prospect, often through
outsourcing; it supports low-wage companies at the expense of the
companies making efforts to promote their employees.
A single worker paid at the SMIC costs 1 671 euros by month to
his firm (for a 35 hour working week); he pays 540 euros in terms
of contributions to unemployment and retirement schemes, repre-
senting deferred wages; he receives a net transfer of 140 euros (PPE
+ housing benefit - generalised social contribution (CSG) – income
tax – health and family contributions); his disposable income is 1
271 euros. He does not support any tax burden and is entitled to
health insurance for free. The standard of living of minimum
wage-earners is totally disconnected from their labour costs. 
But these exemptions weaken the social security financing.
Employers’ social contributions, and RSA generate low-paid jobs,
for which wage increases are very costly for the employer and very
limited for the employee. Hence, a 100 euros rise in the wage of a
worker paid at the minimum wage, raises the employer’s costs by
165 euros and raises employee’s wage-earnings by 40 euros.
Companies are encouraged to create specific unskilled jobs,
without career prospects, trapped in a low-wage situation. Cutting
contributions on low wages does not encourage skilled job crea-
tion, although there is a certain level of unemployment rate for
skilled people too. One day, France will have to change its employ-
ment strategy. Conversely, the persistence of a large number of
unskilled workers and the social denial to lower the standard of
living of the working poor, do not really allow to dare to remove or
to reduce these schemes.  
Contributions cuts at the minimum wage level (28 percentage
points) are currently larger than health and family employers’
Henri Sterdyniak140contributions (17.45 percentage points), which makes it difficult
and even prevents the implementation of a great reform. It would
be difficult to reform employers’ contributions without increasing
unskilled jobs’ relative labour costs.
5.2. The social contribution on value added
Employers’ social contributions rebates could be offset by
increasing companies’ profits taxation. In so doing, one would
abandon the objective of gaining competitiveness and target
capital/labour substitution. Abolishing all employers’ family and
health contributions (17.45 percentage points or 98 billion euros,
net of exemptions on low wages social contributions) would
require the introduction of a Social Contribution on value added
(SCVA6) of 8.3%: 32 billion euros would weigh on capital rather
than on labour (Table 13). 
Such a measure would not affect company profitability in the
short term. Higher capital taxation would be offset by lower labour
taxation; the overall firms’ burden would be unaffected. In the
medium term, companies would respond in using more labour (at
unchanged real wages, but lower total cost) and less capital (the
overall cost would be higher but the after-tax profit rate would be
unchanged). A priori, prices would not rise.
 
6. Let us recall that it is a "real value added ", without investment or capital depreciation
deductibility.
Table 13. Changing the social contributions basis
In billion euros, figures for 2013
Before reform After reform
Gross wages 612 612
Employers' social contributions 196 100
SCVA on wages  64
Gross operating surplus 352 352
SCVA over gross operating surplus  32
Added value (factor prices) 1,160 1,160
Source: Authors' estimates.
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— The relative labour/capital cost would diminish, which
would be an incentive for companies to use less machines
and more labour.
— The labour cost would be reduced in absolute terms, which
would support service industries.
— Households would be encouraged to buy products with a
high labour content, which would see their relative price
decrease at the expense of capital-intensive products.
— A transfer would be made from highly capital-intensive firms
to labour intensive companies. Social protection financing
would be shared more fairly between branches, while it
currently weighs heavily on branches with high payroll to
value added ratio. 
— At the macroeconomic level, the increase in consumption
(induced by job creation) would offset the decline in invest-
ment (induced by lower capital needs).
From a theoretical perspective, the debates in 1987-1988 as in
2006-2007 showed that this measure made sense only if one
considers that France is durably in a Keynesian unemployment
situation. In a model where the long-term unemployment rate is
equal to an equilibrium rate, this measure cannot, by definition,
create jobs and translates into less capital and less production. 
Let us note σ the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour, w the real wage rate, π the rate of (after tax) profit, t the
employers’ contributions rate, θ the tax rate on gross operating
surplus, n, employment, k the capital. 
The production constraint is: 
y = α . n + (1 − α) . k  
The choice of production technique gives: 
k = n + σ . (w +t − π − θ)
The product exhaustion constraint is: 
y = α . (w + t + n) + (1 − α) . (π  +  θ + k)
The social security resources stability constraint is:
0 = α . t + (1 − α) . θ 
Let us assume that employers’ social contributions are cut; this
being offset via higher profit taxation, the rate of profit, deter-
mined by the world capital market, remaining fixed. 
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l : n = n0 + l . w. But the measure does not increase real wages.
Employment does not change. Ex post, capital decreases by
k = α . σ . t/(1 – α); output by y = –σ . t.
In a Keynesian situation, the real wage is fixed, output is deter-
mined by demand, employment increases by k = α . σ . t/(1 – α);
capital decreases by n = –σ . t. There is labour/capital substitution,
with a fixed output. 
The reform decreases the labour/capital relative cost by 11.2%.
If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is
unitary, then the reform should raise employment by 3.15%
(600,000 jobs). Since the elasticity of substitution is slow, the
production technique changing only once new capital is intro-
duced, then the full effect would be obtained only after several
years. The simulations run with OFCE’s quarterly model of the
French economy (see Timbeau et al., 2007) led to less job creation
(227,000 for 17.45 points), since the elasticity of substitution was
assumed to be 0.45.
According to some economists (see Malinvaud, 1998, Groupe de
travail, 2006), this transfer would undermine the capacity of firms
to innovate and modernise. However, modernisation by substi-
tuting capital to labour is harmful in a mass unemployment
situation. Firms can be innovative in hiring highly skilled workers
rather than in using capital intensively. 
The measure would be detrimental to firms making high profits
and would encourage companies making low or no profits. This
may be considered dangerous for economic activity. On the
contrary, some companies may earn high profits because they
benefit from rents; others may be in trouble because they are high
many workers and face low-wage countries competition, in which
case it would be justified to support them.
However a transition issue remains: the reform may be detri-
mental to existing firms and techniques, and encourage the
emergence of new companies or techniques. This is less of a
problem if the companies supported already exist and if the point
is to keep them alive. 
The measure would provide a competitiveness advantage for
France in labour-intensive sectors and a disadvantage in capital
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differences in labour costs between France and emerging countries)
and that the latter effect is large (due to competition with other
European countries).
Studies implemented in 2006 (see Groupe de travail, 2006)
showed that the employers’ social contributions/CSVA transfer
would be neutral for innovative companies (which benefit from
the research tax credit). It would hurt the energy sector (+1.3% of
the wage bill), financial activities (+0.9%), real estate activities
(+0.5%) and agriculture and food industries (+0.2%). The winning
sectors would be: services to firms (-0.3%), equipment goods (-
0.25%), construction (-0.25%), automotive industry (-0.2%). Large
companies would be losing; small companies would win. The
winners would cover 69% of companies, 50% of value added, 54%
of exports.
In 2006, an argument against this reform was that it would
require the introduction of a new tax, with a new basis – the value
added –, which would entail costs in terms of additional state-
ments for companies and control from public administration
(COE, CAS, 2006). But the introduction of the CVAE (Contribution
sur la valeur ajoutée des entreprises) to replace partly the local busi-
ness tax makes the proposal much more credible: requiring only to
increase the CVAE from 1.5% to 9.8%, i.e. from 12 to 110 billion.
The 2007 debate had rejected this measure as being too risky,
judging also that slowing down capital/labour substitution was not
going in the right direction. 
5.3.  Environmental taxation
The need to save energy and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
makes it necessary to introduce environmental taxes. In a mass
unemployment situation, one may think that any rise in environ-
mental taxation should be offset by lower employers’ social
contributions. On the whole, companies’ tax burden would not
rise and so a priori prices would be unchanged; firms’ competitive-
ness would not be affected; but companies would be encouraged to
use more labour and pollute less. This is the 'double dividend logic':
environmental taxes would have the double advantage of giving
incentives to reduce the use of polluting products and of allowing,
thanks to collected revenues, to reduce labour costs. In 2013, envi-
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compared to 2.3% in the euro area (but 3.8% in Slovenia and 3.6%
in the Netherlands), and 3.9% in Denmark.
Combining environmental taxation and employers’ social
contributions cuts may lead to less pollution and lower unemploy-
ment without any cost for public finances. This is all the more
likely to happen in a country with under-employment. But envi-
ronmental tax revenues will be all the more substantial that
demand for taxed goods has low price-elasticity. There is a contra-
diction between the ecological objective (a high and targeted
taxation may be so effective that it generates ex-post low revenues)
and the revenue objective: tax revenues must be significant to
allow substantial cuts in employers’ social contributions. In terms
of social security resources, the risk is to lose a relatively well-
ensured basis against a basis intended to erode. This would be the
case for example if employers’ contributions were replaced by a
deterrent tax on diesel. 
Two strategies may be considered as concerns ecological taxation:
1. The rise of the eco-tax may be offset by a production (or
consumption) subsidy for each type of product (the bonus-malus
principle); green products are subsidized while polluting products
are more heavily taxed. It can also be offset via subsidies to each
producer (or consumer), according to their past consumption of
polluting goods. Such a strategy has the advantage of not directly
harming polluting sectors, but is difficult to implement: it requires
a fine knowledge of the production processes. How to deal with
new firms? How to embed ongoing technical progress? Taxation
gives companies an incentive to change their production tech-
niques, but it gives no incentive to households for not consuming
goods resulting from a polluting production process. Households
may choose greener cars (instead of stopping using cars). 
2. Environmental taxation may be offset at the aggregate
company level by social security contributions cuts. This hits
directly polluting firms in raising their average production costs;
companies’ price increases lead households to consume less
polluting products. This strategy can be implemented without any
prior microeconomic analysis; it will support labour-intensive
sectors, using little energy, but industrial sectors will be particu-
larly hit.
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implies costly restructuring: some activities are no more profitable
and should therefore be stopped; some others become profitable,
but require new investments. Whether it will generate substantial
financial resources or not is uncertain. 
In France, the failure of the climate-energy tax in 2009 may lead
to be pessimistic: the acceptance of such a tax reform requires that
part of its revenues are used to help poorer households, hit bit
higher fuel and heating prices, and to subsidize energy savings
(collective transportation, construction sector). On the whole,
prices are likely to rise and competitiveness to deteriorate. A price
index excluding energy taxation should be introduced and house-
holds (at the exception of the poorest) should accept lower
incomes to finance energy savings and support to the poorest. 
In any case, such a reform should be coordinated at the Euro-
pean and even at the world level, to prevent polluting sectors from
relocating production in poor or emerging countries, while other
countries could decide not to introduce environmental tax meas-
ures in order to maintain their domestic industries. But poor and
emerging countries will accept a worldwide agreement only if it is
asymmetrical: part of the tax revenues raised in developed coun-
tries should be used to help poorer countries to make the necessary
efforts (adopting less polluting production techniques). The eco-
tax revenues cannot be used to cut employers’ social contributions.
Some have proposed to offset the eco-tax by taxing products
imported from countries not applying the eco-tax. For example, if
European countries raise a 100 euro fee on European companies
per emitted tonne of CO2, they will apply the same tax on
imported products, after deduction of already paid taxes. This
would be justified before the WTO, on the ground of ecological
need and on the principle of domestic and foreign producer similar
treatment. However this project seems unrealistic: the amount of
emitted CO2 would be impossible to calculate, product-by-
product. Moreover, the issue of competitiveness on external
markets would remain (unless the eco-tax is repaid for exports).
Last, can the WTO agree with such a project? Why not apply the
same problematic to social contributions: protecting our social
system in taxing products from countries with too low social
protection?
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to introduce an environmental tax, the revenues of which would
be used to cut employers’ social contributions and allowing us to
tax imports from countries with no environmental taxation. There
would thus be a triple dividend. But will the WTO agree? 
Here again, the measure is effective only in a Keynesian unem-
ployment situation. Let us consider the same model as above. σ is
the elasticity of substitution between labour and energy, w is the
real wage, π the price of energy, t: the employers’ contributions rate;
θ the tax rate on energy, n: employment, e energy consumption. 
The production constraint is: 
y = α . n + (1 – α) . e
The choice of the production technique gives:
e = n + σ . (w + t – π − θ) 
The constraint of product exhaustion is:
y = α . (w + t + n) + (1 – α) . (π + θ + e) 
The stability of social security resources constraint is: 
0 = α . t + (1 – α) . θ
Let us assume employers’ contributions cuts offset by higher
energy taxation, the objective being to decrease energy consump-
tion by η.
In a Keynesian situation, the real wage is fixed, demand deter-
mines output, and the energy tax must be θ = η/α, employment
increases by n = α . η/(1 – α). There is effectively substitution
between energy and labour, at constant output.
In a classical situation, employment is a rising function of the
real wage: n = n0 + l . w. But the tax measure does not allow to
increase real wages. Employment does not change. Ex post, produc-
tion decreases by y = – (1 – α) . η with θ = η/(ασ). The ecological
effect is obtained, but not the employment one.
5.4.  Increasing the CSG
The more coherent reform would be to consider that family and
health benefits only concern households and should be financed
by them. This funding allows for transparent social choices: family
benefits would appear as a transfer between households, health
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in the CSG would provide a well designed resource to Social
security.
The traditional arguments would be left apart: firms need a
healthy workforce (which justifies that companies contribute to
health expenditure), renewing itself (which justifies that compa-
nies contribute to family expenses), and is available (which
justifies that companies contribute to child care costs).
This reform could be implemented through four modalities:
1) With fixed gross wages, the reform would imply a huge
transfer from households to companies. Companies would
gain (households would lose) 17.45% of gross payroll, i.e.
5.5% of GDP (assuming that exemptions on low wages are
abolished). This is the reform advocated by the Institut
Montaigne (2012). This reform corresponds to the competi-
tiveness shock.
2) Employees could benefit from a compensatory 17.45%
increase in their gross wage. The CSG rate could increase
from 8% to 22.3% on wages (+ 14.3 points): in this case, the
reform would be entirely neutral.
3) Alternatively, after the wage increase, the CSG could be
raised by 10.5 percentage points on all incomes. In
purchasing power, employees would thus gain 4.8%;
pensioners would lose 11.3% (their CSG rate would increase
from 7.1% to 17.6%); rentiers (capital income earners) would
lose 12.4% (their CSG – social security contributions on
incomes would increase from 15.5% to 26%).
4) Offsetting measures could be introduced for pensioners or
rentiers so that neutrality is reached.
In the second case, the measure would be neutral; it would be a
simple accounting operation. There would be no competitiveness
shock. Contrary to Piketty’s argument7, it would have no impact
on the cost of wage increases or of job creation. However, low-wage
companies would lose: they would bear a 17.45% rise in the SMIC;
7. « La baisse de coût du travail pour un salaire brut donné, s’appliquera aux nouvelles
embauches et aux augmentations de salaire, mais ne doit pas se faire sur le dos de ceux qui ont
déjà un emploi », Libération, 24 septembre 2012.
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exemptions from contributions (28 percentage points today) are
higher than health and family contributions (17.45%). Offsetting
measures would be required for such companies. 
In the third case, the measure would be neutral for firms; it
would give purchasing power gains to employees at the expense of
pensioners and capital income earners. This raises two issues: is it
fair to deteriorate substantially the relative situation of pensioners
(already projected to deteriorate under the impact of pension
reforms)? As we will see later in the paper, capital income taxation
is already as heavy as labour income taxation, and so the rise in the
CSG would require compensatory measures (abolishing social secu-
rity contributions on incomes or introducing a rebate to account
for inflation or corporate taxation already paid). This could then
lead to the fourth case: an entirely neutral measure. 
5.5. Social VAT
Many industrial business leaders and parliamentarians have put
forward social VAT. But contrary to what its proponents say, social
VAT would not be a ‘miracle’ reform allowing for social protection
to be financed by machines or by foreign producers. It could have a
positive impact on jobs only if it led to lower employees and
pensioners’ purchasing power.
Let us consider first a closed economy. Would social VAT encourage
firms to use more labour? Let us assume that several percentage
points of employers’ social contributions are replaced by VAT
percentage points. At best, firms will translate fully contributions
cuts in production prices and consumer prices will remain stable,
despite higher VAT. However, VAT and employers’ social contribu-
tions have roughly the same base (payroll), since the VAT does not
weigh on investment and hence on capital (see Sterdyniak and
Villa, 1984 and 1998). Therefore, VAT, like employers’ social contri-
butions, weighs only on labour. VAT has no impact on the relative
capital/labour cost: labour costs are lowered but capital goods
prices, which bear no VAT, are reduced similarly. The measure does
not encourage firms to use more labour and less capital. It does not
alter the relative situation of capital-intensive and labour-intensive
industries: labour-intensive industries support both heavy social
contributions and heavy VAT, as they benefit hardly from VAT
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little employers’ social contributions (as they have few employees)
and VAT (since they benefit from VAT refund on their investment).
The cut in employers’ contributions is offset by higher VAT not
only at the aggregate but also at each sector levels. There is no
sector effect to be expected. Relative prices of goods do not change
and hence there is no reason why consumers would change the
structure of their expenditure.
In order to see this more precisely, let us note p consumer
prices, q production prices, w the wage, π the rate of profit, δ the
depreciation rate of capital, t the employers’ contributions rate and
θ the VAT rate. Let us assume that the company produces 1 unit of
goods using 1 unit of labour and k units of capital. Its production
price is: p = (1 + t)w + k(π + δ)q. 
The consumer price is: q = (1 + θ)(1 + t)w + k(π + δ)q
A reform reducing the employers’ social contributions rate and
increasing the VAT rate leaving the (1 + θ)(1 + t) ratio unchanged
has no effect on the capital/labour relative cost, or on the prices of
the various sectors (characterized by different k). The social VAT
can therefore not promote labour-intensive sectors or encourage
companies to use more labour. 
The equivalence between VAT and employers’ social contribu-
tions is however true only at first order, for several reasons:
— VAT weighs only on companies’ sales; social contributions
on initial expenditure. The reform leads company taxation
to be more in line with the business cycle. Profit volatility is
reduced, which may have a positive impact on investment.
But in this case, the best reform is not to increase VAT, but to
tax the gross operating surplus (EBITDA), or even better
profits (Table 14), although this would with increase tax
revenues volatility. But if entrepreneurs like to take risks,
they prefer taxation on production factors than on profits.
— Social contributions weigh on value added less profits; the
VAT on value added less investment. The measure favours
dynamic companies investing at the expense of companies
paying dividends, which is positive for growth.
— The measure decreases the investment price relative to the
consumption price. This decrease hits the owners of the
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capital profitability is unaffected, but the purchasing power
in consumer goods for dividends paid on the capital in place
is reduced. The measure is thus a punctual tax on already
installed capital. 
This “quasi-equivalence” also shows that it is arguable to
consider that VAT is paid by the consumer while employers’ social
contributions are paid by firms or by workers.
Let us consider now an open economy. Replacing employers’ social
security contributions points by VAT points provides competitive-
ness gains: the price of imported goods increases due to the rise in
VAT; the price of domestic products sold on the domestic market
remains fixed in principle; the price of exports, exempt from VAT,
decreases: it is a disguised devaluation. Like devaluation, the
measure has an inflationary impact. Let us assume that VAT is
increased by 5 percentage points while social contributions are cut
by 6 percentage points. The day after the reform, import prices rise
by around 5%; export prices should in theory fall by 5% (if compa-
nies translate entirely social contributions’ cuts in their selling
prices). Consumer prices increase by 1.25%, with imports
amounting to 25% of the domestic market. The domestic economy
benefits from competitiveness gains of 5%, but thanks to a 1.25%
loss of French residents’ purchasing power. Two strategies may
then be considered:
— Let indexation mechanisms play, which involves a rise in the
minimum wage, wages, and pensions. These increases will
have an impact on prices, and then again on wages, until
domestic prices have increased by 5%; the competiveness
gain will therefore be only temporary. The inflationary risk is
all the more stronger that firms transmit slowly the fall in
Table 14. The choice of companies' taxation base
Basis Economic effect Volatility of the resource Impact on firms
Payroll Detrimental to employment Increases the risk
AV Detrimental to employment
EBITDA Detrimental to investment High Reduces the risk
Profit Detrimental to investment Very hign Reduces highly the risk
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rise in VAT and that the sharp rise in inflation in the first
year, may challenge the current weakness of wage increases8. 
— Let prices increase and freeze wages and social benefits.
Competitiveness gains may then be permanent. But it
should be clearly announced that social VAT will lower
workers’ and pensioners’ purchasing power, which cannot
be said to be social. Social VAT is a way to implement internal
devaluation.
The competitiveness of the French economy will be improved
only insofar as higher prices for imported consumer goods have no
impact on wages. Using social VAT thus implies that wage earners’
and pensioners’ purchasing power is reduced.
Social VAT is therefore not a miracle tool which would provide
competitiveness gains without entailing losses in wage earners’
and pensioners’ purchasing power. Social VAT does not allow to
shift the employers’ social contributions burden from domestic
employees to foreign producers. Each country has to finance its
social protection. Social VAT is not more favourable to labour than
to capital. For a given purchasing power, VAT and employers’
social contributions have approximately the same macroeconomic
impact. Social VAT has a few advantages: reducing company profit
volatility, support to dynamic companies, and a once for all taxa-
tion on dividends and interest payments. However, social VAT
cannot modify the social protection financing burden, which
would continue to weigh on labour. Social VAT cannot boost
employment without lowering purchasing power. As compared to
the CSG, the VAT has a drawback (or advantage) or not saying
explicitly which economic agent will pay for the reform: this will
result from the indexation mechanisms
The only tax reform allowing to provide competitiveness gains
without lowering workers’ incomes would be the introduction of
specific duty on imports, using its revenues to lower VAT (see Ster-
dyniak and Villa, 1998), but this is forbidden by the EU and WTO
rules.
8. However, due to the existence of the euro, the rise in inflation in France would hardly be
reflected in interest rates, which would have the advantage of easing the debt burden on
borrowers. 
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Let us assume that an agreement is reached on the need to raise
competitiveness: should employers’ social contributions cuts be
offset by higher VAT or CSG? 
According to the Box, both measures are roughly similar. The
main issue is to know whether companies will choose to keep their
prices unchanged to restore their margins, which will induce in a
large drop in French households’ real incomes or will they cut their
prices to increase their competitiveness. In the first case, the ques-
tion is: will the rebound in investment offset the decrease in
consumption? In the second case, the question is: will external
trade gains offset the decrease in consumption? In the second case,
the policy is uncooperative. Its impact is nil if it is implemented by
all countries. Last, in both cases, the relative labour cost falls,
which could have positive long-term effects. 
The VAT rise leads to some increases in prices. In theory, social
benefits and the minimum wage are price-indexed. They would
therefore suffer no loss in purchasing power. But the social security
deficit will increase and the situation of companies hiring low-
wage workers will not be improved. Also, employees would request
wage increases to offset the rise in prices. The indexation mecha-
nisms would gradually reduce the initial gains in competitiveness
or margins. The measure therefore requests social partners’ agree-
ment to freeze the minimum wage, social benefits and wages. On
the contrary, the victims of the rise in CSG would not benefit from
any indexation mechanism and would have to accept lower
purchasing power. In addition, the CSG has the advantage of being
a resource assigned to social security, more ensured ex ante than
VAT percentage points.
Box.  On the quivalence between VAT and CSG
Let us consider a country where GDP is 100, exports and imports 25.
Wages (including social contributions) are 80; profits, 20. Company
investment is 20, of which half is imported. Consumption is 80 (of
which15 is imported products). In the short term wages and pensions
are fixed.
(1) Employers’ contributions are cut by 5, CSG increased by 5. Firms
maintain their prices and thus increase their profits. Ex post, there is no
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6.25% loss in purchasing power. Profits amount to 25. The relative wage
cost decreases by 6.25%. Under standard assumptions, propensity to
consume wages is 0.8; to invest profits: 0.4; multiplier: 1; capital/labour
elasticity of substitution: 0.3. GDP falls by 2% but employment is stable.
(2) Employers’ contributions are cut by 5, VAT increased by 5. French
companies keep their production prices unchanged. Ex post, there is no
gain in competitiveness. Consumer prices rise by 6.25%. The purcha-
sing power of wages falls from 80 to 75. The relative wage cost is reduced
by 6.25% since investment prices are fixed. The macroeconomic impact
is the same as in case (1).
(3) Employers’ contributions are cut by 5, CSG increased by 5.
Companies fully transmit lower costs in their prices. The producer
prices drops by 5%; consumer prices fall by 4%. The purchasing power
of wages drops by 1% only. Competitiveness gains are 5%. The relative
wage cost decreases by 3.75%. Under standard assumptions of export-
price elasticity at 1, import-price elasticity at 0.5, GDP increases
by1.25% and employment by 2.35%. 
(4) Employers’ contributions are cut by 5, VAT increased by 5.
Companies fully transmit lower costs in their prices. Producer prices
drop by 5%; consumer prices increase by 1%. The purchasing power of
wages decreases by 1%. Competitiveness gains are 5%. The relative wage
cost decreases by 3.75%. The macroeconomic impact is the same as in
case (3).
6.1. Should a competitiveness shock be implemented?
The “competitiveness shock” philosophy is that households
should accept a strong fall in their purchasing power to improve
firms’ profitability or competitiveness. French taxation would
converge towards the standard European model. The reform raises
six issues:
1. Should the Government say clearly to households that they
need to accept their real incomes to fall?
2. What would be firms’ commitments in terms of investment
and jobs in France in exchange of a measure increasing massively
their profits? How to avoid that companies increase dividends
payments or investments abroad? 
3. Should France take steps towards a German strategy:
increasing firms’ competitiveness at the expense of households’
real incomes knowing that this strategy is disastrous at the euro
area level? Of course, this kind of reform replaces the impossible
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partner countries (which would respond with the same kind of
measures) and does not guarantee competitiveness gains vis-à-vis
non euro area countries, which depend mainly on euro exchange
rate developments. Successive internal devaluations cannot
replace a reform of the euro area economic policy framework. 
4. In Europe, France is in an intermediate situation between
Northern countries which made strong competitiveness gains at
the expense of their populations’ purchasing power, and Southern
countries, which experienced excessive wage increases. In 2000,
the wage share in value added was 66.8% in Germany, 66.9% in
France, 65.5% in the euro area. In 2007, it was down to 61.2% in
Germany (-5.6 points), 62.8% in the euro area (-2.7 points), 65.7%
in France (-1.2 points). Should European workers fight against each
other by accepting a lower wage share in value added? On a
2000=100 basis, real wages had fallen to 97.9 in Germany in 2011,
and risen to 111.2 in France (i.e. a 1% rise per year). Which country
is wrong? 
5. The share of profits in companies’ value added was 29.6% in
1973. It fell down to 23.1% in 1982 before rising to 30.2% in 1987
(Figure 2). It stood at 30.8% in 2006, i.e. at a satisfactory level. Since
2007, it has been falling again due to the output fall and labour
hoarding, which should be in principle a temporary phenomenon.
The ratio did not fall because of higher taxation or excessive wage
growth. The profit share in GDP can only recover under a
“economic growth shock”. Similarly, the share of profits (defined
as cash flow + net dividends paid + net interest payments) in value
added has returned to a satisfactory level. The problem in that
investment spending was of the same size as profits in 1973, and is
now 3-4 percentage points lower in terms of value added. Should
the profit share be increased without any guarantee on investment? 
6. Internal devaluation can be effective if the French economy
suffers mainly from a lack of price competitiveness. But de-industri-
alization has probably other deeper roots. Firms prefer to operate
and expand in emerging countries; scientific courses are not the
first choice for students; young people do not wish to start indus-
trial careers where pay is low and career prospects uncertain; France
succeeds neither to protect its traditional industries, nor to develop
in innovative sectors; the financial sector prefers speculation to
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solved by devaluation. France needs an industrial revival, which
was already impulsed by competitiveness poles, the research tax
credit, the Ministry of Industry, and which should be funded by the
BPI (public investment bank), whose ability to act should be
enlarged and field of competence specified.
Despite these doubts, in 2012 the Government decided that
from 2014 French firms would be entitled to a CICE (Credit d’Impôt
pour la Compétitivité et l’Emploi), a tax credit amounting to 6% of
their gross wage bill, applying to wages below 2.5 times the
minimum wage. This tax credit amounts to 20 billion euros and
should be financed by additional public spending cuts (10 billion),
higher VAT (6.5 billion) and higher environmental taxation
(3.5 billion). In January 2014, the normal VAT rate increased from
19.6% to 20%; the intermediate rate from 7 to 10%. As, in the same
time, firms benefited from the CICE, these increases had no impact
on the inflation rate. Choosing a tax credit rather than social
contribution cuts makes the measure complicated and less visible
for firms. 
In 2014, the government decided that a Responsibility Pact
would increase employers’ social contribution cuts by 10 billion
Figure 2. Profit margin, rate of profit, and investment ratio of French companies
In % of value added
 Source: INSEE.
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on industrial sectors (or, at least, should apply to all workers) in
order to improve industrial competitiveness, to support upgrading
firms’ strategy, to support innovative firms (who pay higher
wages). But labour economists insisted on pursuing a low-wage
targeting strategy. Finally, a complicated compromise was made:
5 billion euros to cut employers’ family social contributions by
1.8 percentage points on wages until to 3.5 SMIC, 5 billion to
reduce employers’ social security contributions on low-wages. On
the whole, the measures implemented would cut wage costs by
3.9%; around 22% of the measures would benefit the industry.
France therefore starts to follow an internal devaluation strategy. 
According to Ducoudré and Heyer (2014), these measures will
have virtually no impact on GDP (the effect on domestic demand
offsetting the competitiveness effect); employment would rise
approximately 260 000 (i.e. the unemployment rate would fall by
0.8 percentage point) via a substitution effect. This leads however
to a highly complex system, where social security contributions are
progressive for wages between 1 and 1.6 times the SMIC, and flat
from that level with a tax credit for wages below 2.5 times the
SMIC and a rebate for wages below 3.5 times the SMIC. This
reflects the influence of the idea according to which: “the high
level of the minimum wage needs to be offset”.
The CICE and the responsibility Pact are not part of a coherent
reform of social protection financing, since the French govern-
ment says it intends to finance employers’ social contributions
cuts by lower public and social expenditures.
7. Company taxation
The company tax burden cannot be easily measured, because it
is uneasy to say which part of taxation bears respectively on
companies, workers and consumers. In a company’s location deci-
sion process, all taxes play a role, including management incomes
taxation, and also public expenditure and social protection which
the firm and employees benefit from. Should indirect taxation
(such as excise duties for instance) be incorporated in company
taxation? In principle, the answer is no, because these taxes are
passed on to consumers, but possibly only partly. Should
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because they weigh on wages in the long term, but the long term
may be a very far horizon.
According to a rather arbitrary definition (CIT + taxes on
production), the company taxation burden ranged in the EU in
2013 within 5 to 7 percent of GDP, being clearly higher in France
(9.4%), and Sweden (11.3%), and clearly lower in the Netherlands
(3.6%) and Germany (4.4%, see Table 15). 
Even if the corporate income tax represents a small share of tax
revenues, companies are highly sensitive to it. Over the last twenty
years, globalisation and the European Single Market have facili-
tated the possibility for firms to choose where to locate their
financial or productive activities, which strengthened tax competi-
tion. Almost all EU countries drastically cut their CIT rate
(Table 16). In 2012, the UK launched a new tax competition wave
in cutting its CIT rate to 24%. However, the comparison is made
difficult by the existence of a local business tax which may be
based on benefits (Germany), on value added (Italy, France) and
even more by substantial differences in the tax base assessment (in
particular in depreciation rules). In France there is a normal rate of
Table 15. Non-financial company taxation in 2013
In % of value added
Income taxes Taxes on production Total
Social
contributions
Germany 3.8 0.6 4.4 10.2
Austria 3.6 4.0 7.6 9.5
Belgium 4.4 1.5 5.9 16.5
Denmark 4.0 1.9 5.8 3.1
Spain 3.2 1.4 5.6 11.5
Finland 4.4 0.2 4.6 11.0
France 3.8 5.6 9.4 16.3
Italie 4.8 3.5 8.3 15.4
Netherlands 2.6 1.0 3.6 12.4
UK 3.8 2.9 6.7 9.9
Sweden 4.0 7.3 11.3 13.9
United States 4.2 2.4 6.6 10.3
Source: OCDE (2015), National accounts.
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which large companies have to pay a social contribution (a 3.3%
increase) and a temporary contribution (a 10.7% increase). Finally,
dividends are subject to a 3% contribution. These high rates do not
bring higher CIT revenues.
The existing system is far for being satisfactory at the EU level.
Countries have different rules for tax bases calculations. Transfers
between headquarters and subsidiaries are managed by a patch-
work of bilateral agreements. Large firms use tax optimisation, by
choosing carefully the location of their headquarters, of their
subsidiaries and of their financial operations. They use transfer
prices, inter-enterprise credits and royalties to locate their profits
in low CIT-rates countries. The need to avoid a costly tax competi-
tion, the single market, the rising number of companies operating
in several EU-countries make it increasingly necessary to organise
Table 16. Changes in nominal rates of CIT
1990 2010 2013
Austria 30 25 25
Germany 40.5 DB / 54.5 NDP 30.2 30.2
Belgium 41 34* 34*
Denmark 40 25 25
Spain 35 30 30
Finland 44.5 26 24.5
France 42 DB / 37 NDP 34.4  33.3/34.4/38.0/40.2
Greece 46/ 40 industry 40 26
Ireland 43/ 10 industry 12.5 12.5
Italy 46.4 31.4 27.5
Portugal 40.2 35.2 31.5
Netherlands 35 26.5 25.0
United Kingdom 34 28 23
Sweden 53 26.3 22
Hungary 50 19.6 19
Poland 19 19
Czech Republic 19 19
Japan 50 39.54 37.0
United States 38.65 39.2 39.1
* With a system of notional interest.  DB: dividends; NDP: undistributed profits.
Source: OECD, tax database.
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with MS autonomy in terms of taxation. Hence, Ireland and CEECs
refuse any rise in their tax rates.
Since 2000, the Commission has proposed to reform the multi-
national companies’ corporate tax base. The Commission suggests
that a multinational group may choose to be taxed on a compre-
hensive tax base set by a European rule. The profits of the group
would be split among the different member states where the
company operates, according to an allocation key (value-added,
payroll, etc.). The share of profits made in each MS would be taxed
at the domestic tax rate. This would allow to abolish profit shifting
practices. However, it seems difficult to give companies a choice
between two corporate taxation systems. One can hardly imagine
how multinational companies’ subsidiaries could fill in tax assess-
ments only to the tax authorities of their parent company. How
would the consistence of tax assessments in the host country be
ensured? Finally, this system is hardly compatible with the strong
disparity in national tax rates. 
Hence we do not see how Europe can avoid a painful road
towards a negotiated convergence on corporate taxation, which
should be done through four steps: 
— Strong homogenization of tax bases;
— Recognition of the source principle of taxation, hence agree-
ment to combat unjustified profit shifting in low tax
countries;
— Setting of a floor rate which would vary according to the MS
development level, such as 20% for the new MS, to 30% for
the older MS. The minimum rate would be gradually increased
in line with economic convergence. MS who consider that
they provide specific advantages to their companies would be
entitled to set a higher tax rate, at their own risk; 
— MS in transition should be allowed to subsidize their firms,
on a payroll basis, which would prevent the risk of profit
shifting in these countries. Subsidies to companies should
also be more easily allowed to help the poorest regions, the
sectors in difficulty, innovation and research, jobs for some
categories of workers. Thus, countries could try to attract
job-creating and innovating companies instead of compa-
nies looking for tax optimization.
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Who, between MS and the Commission, would decide upon
temporary (for economic reasons) or structurally (to encourage
R&D) tax relief measures? 
EU countries should also combat tax and regulatory heavens.
First, a comprehensive list of the latter should be done. Second,
OECD countries should prohibit their banks, financial institutions
and firms to locate any operation and to have any subsidiaries in
these heavens. Tax agreements should be made to restrict them to
countries having minimum tax rates on companies and on
households.
In order to discourage dividend payments, France introduced in
2013 an additional taxation on distributed profits (at a 3% rate).
This is in fact arguable, since paid dividends are taxed at the share-
holders’ level via social contributions and the income tax, while
non distributed profits escape taxation, and will be taxed, at best,
when they are sold, although they may actually escape (see below).
Interest payments are deductible from the CIT, which does not
hit borrowed capital. This is consistent with the view according to
which the CIT is a “tax on shareholders”. This helps indebted
companies to reduce their CIT payments. This encourages ficti-
tious under-capitalisation and allows risky financial packages such
as LBOs. In 2012, France decided to re-introduce 25% of net finan-
cial company payments in the CIT base, for firms where they are
higher than 3 million euros. In 2013, the Government planned to
introduce a new tax based on the EBITDA, with a view to raise it
overtime, replacing a number of small taxes. This new tax had the
advantage of bearing on interest payments and royalties transfers,
therefore of combating tax optimisation. It also bears on capital
depreciation, which can be seen as a drawback (by weighing on the
industry and discouraging investment) or as an advantage (by
discouraging capital/labour substitution). The Government aban-
doned this project in front of companies’ opposition.
The French tax rate is high, even if it is partly offset by more
favourable depreciation rules. VAT and social security contribu-
tions hit labour, EBITDA taxation hit capital; corporate taxation
hits non-borrowed capital. In a mass unemployment situation, the
objective should be to cut labour rather than capital taxation.
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contributions rather than on corporate income tax cuts. 
From that perspective, the reform of local business taxation is
debatable. The “taxe professionnelle” was initially based on the
payroll, productive capital and land property. The “labour” base
was abolished in 2003 and turned into a capital tax. The 2010
reform cut taxation by 5 billion, but this applied mainly to the
‘capital’ base, thereby promoting capital/labour substitution and
capital-intensive firms. Conversely, the reform has the advantage
of encouraging industry. A contribution based on companies’
value added (CVAE) was introduced, and will possibly be increased
in the future to replace employers’ social contributions, which will
allow weighing less on capital and more on labour. 
In early 2014, the French government organised the “Assises de
la fiscalité des entreprises”. Firms requested a massive CIT rate cut
(targeting a rate of 25%). They requested the abolition of the C3S
(a tax weighing on companies’ turnover and financing non-
employees pensions), of all taxes based on the payroll (transporta-
tion tax, wage tax, apprenticeship tax, housing tax) and of many
small taxes (financing public operators, professional organisations
or organisations with ecological or behavioural objectives). But it is
fair that firms contribute to their employees’ transportation costs;
the payroll tax replaces VAT for the sectors which are not subject to
it; behavioural taxation is often justified. After the Assises, the
Government announced the progressive abolition of the C3S
(from 2015 to 2017), which will cost 5.8 billion, the abolition of
the CIT surcharge in 2016 (a 2.3 billion cost) and the objective of
cutting the CIT rate from 33.3% to 28% in 2020. On the whole,
this will cut company taxation by 10 billion before 2017.
In the recent past, the French strategy was to maintain a high CIT
rate but to maintain also, and even extend, tax expenditure meas-
ures to encourage companies to invest and to create jobs in France.
Thus, France had introduced a generous Research Tax Credit,
followed by the Tax Credit for competitiveness and employment.
France had chosen tax incentives, rather than neutral taxation. The
strategy which seems to prevail now is to cut the CIT nominal rate
so as to take an active role in European tax competition.
Henri Sterdyniak1628. Households’ taxation
Broadly speaking, households’ direct taxation amounted to
14.85% of GDP in 2012. This includes the CSG-CRDS (5.1% of
GDP), non-contributory employers’ social contributions (4,4%),
the income tax (2.9%), the residency tax (0.8%), property taxes
(0.75%), taxes on inheritance and donation (0.45%), the wealth
tax (ISF, 0.25%), the tax on transactions (0.2%). 
The income tax and the wealth tax (ISF) are the only progressive
taxes, the only taxes accounting for households’ total incomes and
characteristics. In France, their weight is low: by nature, they should
be strongly progressive. The French specificity is the coexistence of
an income tax, very targeted but with a small weight, of a propor-
tional CSG (Contribution sociale generalisée), and employers’ social
contributions without any ceiling and progressive (because of low-
wage exemptions). In addition, the poorer families are entitled to
the PPE (Prime pour l’emploi), the RSA (Revenu de Solidarité Active) and
housing benefitfs. On the whole, the French system is highly redis-
tributive (Table 4 and Table 17), which makes it difficult to improve,
but this redistributiveness is obtained in a complicated way.
Table 17. Taxation and redistribution, family two children, in 2013
In euros per month
SMIC 4 SMIC 10 SMIC
Total employer labour cost 1 685 8 227 20 595
Contributive employers contributions (3)  330 1 318 3 318
Employers contributions health-family (2)  297 1 189 2 975
Low-wage contribution exemption (5) 372
Gross wages  (1) 1 430 5720 14 302
Contributive employees contributions (4) 197 789 1836
CSG (6) 112 450 1 124
RSA/housing benefit/family benefit  (7) 371/280/129/60 129 129
Income tax (8) 0 235 1 846
Disposable income 1961 4375 9625
Saving rate 0% 10% 20%
Added value tax (9) 327 656 1 284
Tax-benefits *  (10) -476 2401 7100
Net tax rates ** (11) -41,1% 39,2% 46,0%
*  (10) =(2)+(6)+(8)+(9)-(5)-(7) 
** (11)=(10)/((1)+(2)-(4)-(5))
Source: Author's calculations.
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The French taxation and benefit system is family-based. The
French Society recognizes the right of individuals to be married (or
to sign a PACS, a solidarity civil pact), to found a family and pool
resources. The living standard of a family is assessed by dividing its
overall resources by a number of tax shares (the family quotient
approximates the number of consumption units, as estimated by
OECD or INSEE). The family quotient system ensures family hori-
zontal equity: two families of different composition, but with the
same living standard are subject to the same tax rate. Similarly, the
RSA provides approximately the same living standard to the
poorest families, regardless of their composition.
Thus, the French taxation system includes a conjugal quotient
(QC), as a compulsory element of the family quotient (QF). Some
(such as Landais et al., 2011) blame the QC for treating women
wages as an extra income. But this cannot be related to legislation,
especially as the couples of the same sex, who are PACSed, are also
entitled to the QC. Landais et al. (2011) claim that the QC subsidise
couples of unequal incomes, but the QC like the QF consider that
family members pool their resources. In our view, this approach is
closer to reality, than the approach according to which each parent
would keep their own wages for themselves, letting children live
only on social benefits, the only case who could justify income tax
individualization. Our approach on family solidarity is also norma-
tive: parents should ensure their children have the same standard of
living than themselves; this is the basis of child maintenance (after
a divorce). A single earner with 5,000 euros per month does not
have the same living standard as a married person with the same
earnings, three young children, and a spouse who does not work:
there is no reason why taxation should be the same in the two cases.
Questioning the family quotient would violate the principle
according to which: “each citizen contributes to public expendi-
ture according to his contributory capacities”, unless it was
enacted that married persons do not pool their resources and that
parents have no duty to care for their children. Children would be
expected to live on family benefits: this would require a substantial
increase in family benefits, reaching 580 euros per child (and at
least 350 euros) at 35% of the median income (at the poverty
threshold) (Sterdyniak, 2011).
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pation rate (Table 18). The marginal tax rate of women could be
cut only through increasing single-earner families’ taxation, but
the latter are generally poorest. Denying the working spouse the
right to account a share for its inactive spouse in its taxed income,
required that the inactive spouse is entitled to the RSA, regardless
of their spouse’s income. But in this case the marginal tax rate of
an inactive spouse, who takes a job, would be 38% (the withdrawal
rate of the RSA), the same level than the current maximum income
tax rates, 36.9% (90% * 41%) or 40.5 (90 * 45%). If joint taxation of
spouses increases the marginal tax rate of married women who
earn less than their husband, the QF has an opposite effect. An
individualized tax system, not accounting for children and with a
tax credit for inactive spouses, will not necessarily lead ex post to
lower marginal tax rates (for the opposite view, see OECD, 2013).
An individualized tax system will be necessarily less satisfactory
from a redistributive perspective than a family-based system as
families with children, single-earner families, families with
unequal spouses earnings, would be over-taxed. 
Table 18. Participation, 25-55 year-olds, in 2008
In %
 Men Women Gap
Gap, 
in full-time 
equivalent
Fertility rate
Finlande 91.2 85.9 5.3 8.1 1.75
Sweden 93.1 87.5 5.6 10.4 1.75
Denmark 93.4 86.3 7.1 11.4 1.75
France 94.5 83.2 11.3 18.2 2.0
Austria 93.0 81.7 11.3 20.9 1.4
United States 90.5 75.8 14.7 19.7 2.1
Germany 92.9 80.5 12.4 21.1 1.4
United Kingdom 91.7 78.3 13.4 23.5       1.65
Belgium 92.2 78.7 13.5 24.0 1.65
Spain 92.6 74.7 27.9 24.0 1.3
Ireland 91.6 71.9 19.7 28.8 1.85
Netherlands 93.8 81.6 12.2 29.0 1.65
Italy 91.0 65.2 25.8 32.9 1.3
Japon 96.3 70.4 24.9 32.9 1.2
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics (2010).
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children. A ceiling of 2400 euros for the first two children was
amounting approximately to the exemption at 35% of the median
income ((580-30) * 12 * 41) = 2700 euro) and was therefore not too
high. The Ayrault government decreased the ceiling down to
1500 euros, without any specific justification. But the additional
half-share starting from the third child is a tax expenditure, a
support to large families which could be questioned (see below). 
Refusing the QF principle would not allow social policy to assess
the living standard of families for the RSA, for housing allowances,
and other means-tested benefits. According to Landais et al. (2011),
individualisation corresponds historically the Republican ideal
according to which there is no intrusion of the political sphere in
the individual sphere.9 But this view forgets about the point that
getting married (or PACSed) is an individual right, guaranteed by
the Declaration des droits de l’homme. This view brings us back to the
early 20th century, with the right parties fighting against progres-
sive taxation, judged to be an awful intrusion in individual private
lives. This does not explain how solidarity benefits can be calcu-
lated without political intrusion in the individual sphere.
8.2. The concept of income
Two taxpayers earning the same incomes should pay the same
tax. Some economists claim that labour income, costly in time and
effort should be less taxed (but should pensioners and the unem-
ployed be then over-taxed?). Others claims that capital incomes
should be less taxed, since they come from income savings already
taxed (or from capital already subject to inheritance taxation), but
the point is to tax the new incomes of the current period. So we
advocate a basic principle: everyone should contribute to public
expenditure according to their contributory capacities, i.e.
according to their total incomes. We will compare capital and
labour incomes taxation using an economic definition of incomes
and taxes (excluding contributive social contributions). We will
compare here only the maximum tax rates, those applying on
highest incomes.
9. « L’individualisation correspond historiquement à l’idéal républicain de non-intrusion du
politique dans la shpère individuelle ».
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highest wages, the nominal tax rate is now 41% above 71,000
euros per tax share, 45% beyond 150,000 euros, and temporally
48% above 250,000 euros, 49% above 1 million. However, the
CSG-CRDS and the non-contributive social contributions must be
added to calculate an economic tax rate. On the other hand,
contributive social contributions are deferred wages and should
not be included in the tax rate. Thus, the marginal tax rate of 45%
corresponds to an economic rate of 61.4%. These rates are high in
comparison with neighbour countries, some of which have a
higher maximum income tax rate but have a ceiling on social secu-
rity contributions (Table 19). Only Belgium and Sweden have a
higher maximum tax rate than France. At the SMIC level, using the
same conventions, and accounting for employers’ social security
contributions exemptions, the Prime pour l’emploi and housing
benefits, the tax rate of a single person is negative by 6.8%. 
In 2014, the French government had also introduced a tax rate
of 50%, on the share of wages exceeding 1 million euro (i.e an
economic tax rate of 72.5%). This was justified by the need to
combat the rise in wage inequalities in companies, to fight again
exorbitant wages for some managers, sportsmen/women and
financial traders. However, this tax rate was set only for two years.
Table 19. Maximum labour income tax rates in 2013
Income tax
Social contributions (heath-family)
Total
Employers Employees
Germany         47.5 0 0 47.5
Austria  50 0 0 50
Belgium    50 + 3.7 18.4 3.55 63
Spain 30.5 + 21.5 0 0 52
France 45 + 8 22.8 0 61.4
Italy 43 + 2.6 0 0 45.6
Netherlands 52 0 0 52
United Kingdom 45 0 0 45
Sweden 25 + 31.7 16.8 0 62.9
United States 35 + 6.85 0 0 41.85
Japon 40 +10 0.15 0 50.15
Source: Author's calculations based on OECD: Taxing wages (2014).
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incomes (Table 20), since they are not subject to employers’ family
and health contributions, and no social levies. In the past,
pensioners paid no social contributions. It was considered useless
to raise contributions on benefits. It was simpler to set directly
pensions benefits at a satisfactory level. The introduction of the
CSG and its subsequent increases, allowed to shift part of the
contributions paid by the economically active to pensions and
wealth incomes. The process was entirely done for supplementary
pensions, but not entirely for the pensions general system (there
remains a gap of 0.9%). This gap will probably be filled one day to
finance old-age care expenditure. Conversely, pensioners have to
pay a supplementary health insurance of around 1200 euros per
year (i.e. 6% of the pensioners average income), while the cost is
around 480 euros for an employee (2.4% of the average income),
often covered to a large extent by the employer. The risk is for
retirees that the shift continues from family/health contributions
and CSG, as the MEDEF wishes, with some employees’ trade
unions apparently willing to accept. But pensioners will not
benefit from purchasing power gains in retirement, and under-
going reforms already tend to lower the relative level of pensions.
Should this be pursued? 
In 2013, the left-wing government introduced a major reform:
taxing capital income gains at the income tax schedule, there was
already a specific levy deducted at source on some of these gains.
The purpose may be to show that all incomes are taxed similarly,
Table 20. Economic tax rates for a 45% nominal tax rate 
Economic tax rates, 2014
Wages 61.4
Pensions 51.1
Interest received 116.4
Property tax revenues 62.4
Implicit rent 10.0
Real estate gains 5/40.3
Dividends 62.0
Capital gains taxed 66.8/60.6
Capital gains untaxed 34.43
Source: Author's calculations.
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the latter are taxed. 
Interest incomes gains are taxed at 24% up to 2 000 euros; at the
income tax schedule from that level. But an interest rate of 4%,
with a 2% inflation imply a real income of 2%. The 24% levy corre-
sponds to an economic rate of 79%; the income tax taxation at
45% leads to an economic taxation of 116.4%. This rate is high,
but depends on the rate of inflation. 
Dividends are part of companies’ profits, which have already
been taxed at the CIT, at the rate of 34.43% (and currently also at a
3% tax rate). This is why dividends benefit from a 40% rebate in
the income tax. Taking into account the CSG, Social security
contributions and CIT, the economic rate is 62%, for an income
tax rate of 45%. 
Taxed capital gains are theoretically the counterpart of non-
distributed profits having been taxed at the CIT. They are now
subject to the income tax with an allowance depending on the
detention length: 50% after 2 years, 65% after 8 years. Let us
assume that capital gains are 10% of the capital (8% representing
actual profitability and 2% inflation), then the economic tax rate is
66.8% after 5 years and 60.6% after 8 years. 
Non-taxed capital gains escape taxation at the households’
level. But in theory they have been taxed at the CIT; their
economic tax rate is 34.43%. 
Our calculations may be questioned: the CIT effective rate
would not be 34.3%, accounting for companies’ tax avoidance
possibilities. In fact, in 2006, the year before the crisis, CIT on non-
financial corporations collected 42 billion euros, for 68 billion of
net dividend payments, 139 billion of non-distributed profits and
132 billion of fixed capital consumption, i.e. an effective tax rate of
35.9% (the rate is increased due to companies making losses). 
Rental property incomes are subject to a property tax
(amounting on average to 10% of the rent), the CSG-CRDS, social
contributions and the income tax. The income tax rate of 45%
therefore translates into an economic rate of 62.4%. 
Real estate gains are now subject to a taxation at the income tax
of 19%, after an allowance (6% per year from 5 to 21 years; 4% in
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taxation to the CSG/CRDS/Social contributions after a rebate
(1.65% per year from 5 to 21 years; 1.6% the year 22, 9% per year
after so that taxation is zero at the end of 30 years). Here also, the
reasons for such a complicated system cannot be easily explained.
Let us consider a person who buys a house at 100, and sells it
10 years later; let us assume that meanwhile housing prices rose by
8% per annum and annual inflation by 2%. The economic gain is
79. The taxable gain is 81 for the income tax and 106 for the CSG;
the paid tax is 31.9, i.e. an economic tax rate of 40.3%.
Implicit rents (the rents the owner would earn from renting his
home) are not subject to income tax or social contributions.
Because of the property tax, the economic tax rate is 10%. 
Capital gains on the main residence are not taxable. In fact,
households often sell their main residence to buy a new one, and
so it is difficult to tax the capital gains needed for the new acquisi-
tion. Households pay transfer taxes at a 5% rate on the amount of
their acquisition. 
All in all, the economic rates are considerably higher than
nominal rates (table 20). Interest payments, property rent incomes,
dividends and capital gains are taxed at high rates. 
It is difficult to consider reforms which would increase further
capital incomes tax rates. As concerns interest incomes, one could
decide to tax only real interest incomes, by allowing to deduct
capital depreciation induced by inflation; in this case, social secu-
rity contributions should be maintained at 15.5% (as a counterpart
of health and family social contributions on labour income). The
economic taxation rate, corresponding to the nominal 45% rate,
would thus be 58.2%. 
Capital gains are not necessarily equal to non-distributed profits.
It is difficult to tax unrealised gains, which may vanish in the event
of a stock market crash. The best system would be for companies to
distribute a “avoir fiscal” (tax credit) to their shareholders,
amounting to the actually paid CIT. Shareholders would then be
imposed at the income tax and social contributions, on the basis of:
“dividends + accrued capital gains adjusted for inflation”, possibly
with measures being introduced to ensure that all capital gains are
taxed (see below). The economic taxation rate would also be 58.2%. 
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principle should be stated: financial institutions should be respon-
sible of convince savers about the advantages of the products they
sell; but the State should not give tax incentives to any financial
product. So PEA (equity assets contracts) and life insurance
contracts should be subject to ordinary taxation. Today, a wealthy
shareholder can place his assets in an ad hoc company which
receives its dividends, uses companies’ equity assets as a guarantee
to obtain loans from his bank, which provides the money he needs
to live. Thus the wealthy shareholder does not declare incomes and
when may bequeath the shares of this company to his children,
who will pay no taxes on capital gains. So it would it be fair to tax
unrealized capital gains for transfers by donation or inheritance. 
Implicit rents, and non-taxation of capital gains on the main
residence, are the other black hole of taxation. It is not really fair
that two families earning the same incomes pay the same tax,
although one inherited an apartment and the other one must pay a
rent: their contributory capacities are very different. It would be
desirable to introduce gradually a taxation of implicit rents10. In
counterpart, mortgage interest payments could become deductible
from the taxable income, which would support young people who
are building patrimonial assets at the expense of people already
having patrimonial assets. As concerns housing gains; inflation
should not be deductible except on the main residence and gains
on the main residence should be subject to taxation (at the excep-
tion of gains reinvested in buying the main residence). 
8.3. Abolishing all tax expenditures?
The French system includes many tax expenditures schemes,
amounting to 34 billion euros as concerns income taxation, i.e.
near 60% of income taxation revenues. They are detrimental to tax
progressivity; many have no economic and social justification;
some have been introduced to satisfy pressure groups (such as tax
cuts on journalists’ incomes, tax exemptions in PEA). Abolishing
these schemes seems to be an obvious reform to be done. 
10. Implicit rents amount to ca. 150 billion euro in 2010. A 15.5% tax rate would raise
15 billion euros (accounting for some unavoidable undervaluation).
The great tax reform, a French myth 171However, some of these schemes allow to account for house-
holds’ contributory capacity. This is the case for the quotient
familial, which only account for the households’ size to assess their
living standard. Similarly, it is legitimate to allow the deduction of
alimony, donations to charity organisations, child-care expendi-
ture, care expenditure dependent persons specific charges.
Some other tax expenditures are justified for social reasons. They
could not be removed without introducing replacement schemes:
this is the case for additional tax shares for large families or for
invalids. It would not be justifiable to tax family benefits which are
already far from ensuring parity of livings standards between fami-
lies and individuals without children (see Sterdyniak, 2011). 
Others follow a taxation rationale. This is the case for the 40%
rebate on dividends, for the 10% rebate on wage earnings for
employees’ professional expenses (which is excessive but avoids to
have to tackle numerous requests for taxation to real costs, which
offsets the possibilities of self-employed to shift part of their
personal expenses in professional expenses), et consequently of
the capped rebate for pensioners’ incomes.
Some tax expenditures should be replaced by subsidies: tax
rebates for historical monuments maintenance, for energy savings
works, aid to overseas territories. Some refundable tax credits (like
the Prime pour l’emploi) are in fact already subsidies.
The current government has already abolished the taw exemp-
tion for overtime work. The total amount of tax reductions a
household may benefit from tax exemptions schemes is capped to
10 000 euros. It is however less effective to cap tax reductions than
to look at each tax expenditure and decide whether they should be
maintained or removed.
At most, abolishing unjustified tax expenditures would raise
around 8 billion euros: 2.5 billion on pensioners, 1 billion on indi-
vidual employers, 3 billion on financial savings (PEA, life
insurance, employee participation in company profits), 1 billion
on rental or productive investment. But the beneficiaries of its
measures will oppose such moves.  
In its electoral programme, somewhat inspired by Landais,
Piketty and Saez (2011), François Hollande mentioned the
introduction a more simple income taxation, unifying the CSG
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taxation remain to be defined (see Allègre, Cornilleau and Sterdy-
niak, 2007, and Sterdyniak, 2012). Such a reform would oblige to
rethink the French system and open the field of all possibilities in
the democratic debate. Should the family characteristic of French
taxation be removed or extended? Should redistributiveness be
reduced or increased? 
The search for ‘simplification’ may be worrying: can a progressive
taxation system account for households’ composition? In France,
the tax system exempts the poorest and already taxes the richest
much more heavily than in other developed countries. It is an illu-
sion to believe that the reform could make it even more progressive.
According to its proponents, a simple and unified system would
lead all French citizens to feel imposed, but does this mean that
poorest households (the unemployed, pensioners, wage-earners
below the SMIC) who currently do not pay income tax would
suffer from the reform?
This reform would allow removing all tax expenditures at once,
but difficulties would quickly appear: many tax expenditures
would have to be maintained or replaced by grants. 
One of the objectives of the reform is to tax capital incomes like
labour incomes. But this is not so easy, once it is acknowledged that
several elements need to be taken into account: non-contributory
social contributions paid by employers, social security levies paid
on capital incomes, CIT already paid, distinction between real and
nominal interest rates. It would very rapidly appear that capital
incomes are often already more heavily taxed than labour incomes.
In our view, it would be safer to improve gradually the existing
tax system by abolishing unfair tax expenditures than to pursue
the myth of implementing a great reform. Besides, we do not find
it necessary to shift towards a withholding tax paid directly by
companies: taxation may keep a “citizen” characteristic, be paid by
taxpayers, who see the effective tax burden. 
Local taxation is high in France. Local taxes are archaic and less
progressive than national taxes. They are also more unequal
because the rich pay little in rich municipalities and the poor pay a
lot in poor municipalities. Both in terms of economic efficiency
and social fairness, France should reverse recent developments
The great tax reform, a French myth 173which lead to reduce the income tax burden and increase local
taxes. Decentralization tends to increase local spending, which
could widen local disparities. It would be desirable to reduce the
residential tax, create a supplement to the income tax, the reve-
nues of which would be redistributed to local communities
according to their needs (population, numbers of children,
number of people in difficulty).
8.4. Is there a need for an ISF? 
The ISF (‘Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune’, wealth tax) is justified
for five reasons. First, the wealthiest benefit particularly from the
social organization; it is only fair that they contribute more than
others to its costs. Wealth distribution is more unequal than income
distribution: between the 1st and the 9th deciles, the ratio is 4.2 for
income, 205 for wealth.11 Thus, wealth taxation is more redistribu-
tive than income taxation. The French ISF does not tax professional
property; therefore, it encourages entrepreneurs and their families
to invest in their company and to remain committed to it. The ISF
may oblige some owners of non – or under-occupied real estates, to
sell or rent them. Finally, the ISF may oblige some financial portfo-
lios holders to sell securities, hence to realize capital gains.
Since the 2012 reform, the ISF rates range from 0.5% to 1.5%.
The ISF remains heavy for interest, dividends, property income,
and taxed capital gains earners, but not for the owners of their resi-
dence, or for the beneficiaries of non-taxed capital gains (Table 21). 
The 2012 reform introduced a cap for all taxes paid by an ISF
taxpayer at 75% of its income. But the tax assessment remains
questionable (neither CIT nor health and family social contribu-
tions are taken into account) as well as the assessment of incomes
(interests are not adjusted for inflation, implicit rents and unreal-
ised capital gains are not taken into account). However, firms’
owners can no longer deduct their professional debt from their
professional wealth. The incomes taken into account should have
included capitalized interests and a share of unrealised capital
gains, but the Constitutional Council denied this inclusion. Tax
evasion remains possible for the richest. 
11. 2010 figures, according to INSEE Première, n° 1380, novembre 2011.
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and inheritance taxation. In Europe, only Luxembourg, Switzer-
land, France and Greece have kept a wealth tax. The weight of
inheritance taxation is very low except in Belgium and in France.
Should France come in line with other countries? No, but the risk
of tax evasion makes it more difficult to tax the richest. Two cases
should however be distinguished: as concerns financial wealth, tax
evasion reduced tax revenues in France but has minor economic
consequences; as concerns professional property, this may imply a
firm’s closing down and the loss of productive capital. So profes-
sional property is exempted in France from the ISF and from a part
of inheritance rights when heirs continue to manage the firm.
These schemes may be considered to be contrary to equity, but this
is better than nothing and this is not bad to encourage sometimes
productive capital. 
France should take retaliatory measures against its citizens
leaving abroad for tax reasons. In 2011, the Government had rein-
troduced an exit tax, a tax on unrealised capital gains for people
leaving France. However, France could be censured by the EU
Court of Justice, in the name of the freedom of establishment prin-
ciple. A measure could be to tax all French citizens at the world
level, following the US model. To retain their right to vote, French
citizens living abroad should make a tax statement in France and
pay a tax equal to the difference between taxes due to be paid in
France and those paid abroad. It would be manageable to do so, if
it would apply only from a certain level of income/wealth and in
countries with low taxation rates on income or wealth. 
Table 21. Marginal tax rates in 2013
In %
Sans ISF ISF à 0.50% ISF à 1% ISF à 1.5%
Interests 116.4 141.4 166.4 191.4
Rents * 62.4 70.7 79.1 87.5
Imputed rents * 10.0 18.4 26.6 34.8
Dividends ** 62.0 68.2 74.4 80.6
Capital gains taxed ** 60.4 66.6 72.8 79.0
Capital gains not taxed ** 34.4 40.7 46.9 53.1
*  6% profitability.
** 8% profitability.
Source: Author's calculation.
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France helps poorest households via a complicated system
involving the RSA (Revenu de solidarité active, a family-based
minimum income), the PPE (la Prime pour l’emploi, an individual-
ized benefit to encourage people to work), housing allowances
(family-based) and means-tested family benefits (school allowance,
family complement for large poor families). Since 2000, govern-
ments, encouraged by many economists (see for instance Laroque
and Salanié, 2000), are convinced that the gap is too small between
unskilled workers’ wages and assistance incomes, which would
explain the high unemployment rate level of unskilled workers.
They try to increase this gap by subsidising low-wage work (the
PPE, the RSA-Activity, as an incentive to create jobs. 
Despite Martin Hirsch’s efforts, the RSA does not include the
PPE and housing allowances. The RSA has a basic element: the RSA-
basis (RSA socle). This basic element depends on the family compo-
sition and is reduced by 38 (resp. 100) euros for 100 euros of labour
(resp. other) incomes. Thus a family with a low-wage worker is
entitled to the RSA-Activity. The RSA allowance is paid monthly on
the basis of a quarterly income statement; the RSA-basis depends in
principle on the efforts made to find a job. The PPE is paid auto-
matically on the basis of the income tax assessment, with a one-
year delay. The RSA is deductible from the PPE, so that a household
not claiming for the RSA receives automatically the PPE.
The system aims to ensure a minimum income to the poorest
while preserving their work incentive. So the RSA-basis (499 euros
per month for a single person) is significantly below the pensioners’
minimum income (792 euros). As can be seen from Tables 22 and
23, the RSA provides an income of about 40% of the median income
(i.e. below the poverty threshold at 60% of the median income). A
single person will be lifted out of poverty for wage earnings at 0.5
SMIC; a couple with two children needs to earn 1.5 minimum wage.
In total, the marginal gain rate is in the order of 50% for a single
person (Table 24). The rate is very low for a couple, between 1 and
1.5 SMIC, which may be a disincentive for the spouse of a
minimum-wage earner to take a job (Table 25). Before the RSA-
activity was introduced, the first job was discouraged.      
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In euros par month (2013)
RSA 0.5 SMIC SMIC 1.5 SMIC
Wages 0 548 1,097 1,646
RSA 415 207 – –
PPE – – 80 –
Housing benefit * 301 246 49 0
Income tax -102
Total 716 1,001 1,226 1,544
% median income 42.5 59.4 72.7 91.6
*The rent is estimated at 400 euros.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 23. The case of a family with 2 children
In euros par month (2013)
RSA Single wage-earner Two wage-earners
0.5 SMIC SMIC 1.5 SMIC 1.5*SMIC 2*SMIC
Wages 0 548 1,097 1,646 1,646 2,194
RSA 856 522 312 103 – –
PPE –  – – – 126 166
Family benefits 48 127 + 48 127 + 48 127 + 48 127 + 48 127 + 48
Housing benefits * 473 473 369 209 211 54
Total 1,377 1,718 1,953 2,133 2,158 2,589
 % median income 38.9 48.5 55.2 60.3 61.0 73.2
PPE ** 93 13
Total 1,734 2,043
*The rent is estimated at 500 euros. Children are 7 and 10 year-old. ** If they do not claim for RSA.
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 24. The gain from employment. Single
In euros  (% of net wages)
RSA to 0.5 SMIC 285 (52%)
0.5 SMIC to SMIC 225 (41%)
RSA to SMIC    510 (46.5%)
SMIC to 1.5 SMIC 318 (58%)
Source: Author's calculations.
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— The non-take-up rate of the RSA-activity remains high
(68%). Low-wage workers refuse to be subject to a social
monitoring in order to get a relatively small benefit. Due to
the stigmatisation effect, RSA recipients do not wish to be
confused with RSA-base recipients. The PPE is paid automati-
cally, without monitoring, but with a delay of one year.
— The RSA provides an allowance of around 110 euros per child
for families with 1 or 2 children at the SMIC level. This
allowance fills a hole in the French system. However, unem-
ployed workers’ families are not entitled to it. 110 euros
should be paid in the form of a family complement to all
poor families with 1 or 2 children (those with 3 children and
more benefiting already from a family supplement and from
more generous family benefits). 
— The RSA, like all family benefits is indexed on prices only.
RSA recipients may see their relative situation deteriorate
over time.
— A scheme similar to disability allowances in Scandinavian
countries, allocated on medical, economic and social criteria
ensuring people who have no chance to get a job (tempo-
rarily or permanently) a more satisfactory income, similar to
the retirees minimum income, is missing in France.
— Young (below 25) people are not entitled to the RSA,
although many of them have difficulties of getting into the
labour market.
Table 25. The gain from employment. Couple two children
En euros
Avec recours au RSA Sans recours au RSA
          First active
RSA to 0.5 SMIC   341 (62%)
0.5 SMIC to SMIC   235 (43%) 16 (2%)
RSA to SMIC      576 (52.5%)     357 (32.5% )
SMIC to 1.5 SMIC   180 (33%) 309 (56%)
         Second active. First active at the SMIC
Inactif to 0.5 SMIC   205 (37%) 424 (77%)
Inactif to 1 SMIC   636 (62%) 855 (78%)
Source: Author's calculations.
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on the RSA, while we may wish a more generous benefit for
these families, for three reasons: RSA recipients with children
fulfil a social role, as parents, which the RSA recipients
without children do not fulfil. RSA-recipients’ children are
not responsible for the lack of resources of their parents and
have the right to a higher living standard than the one
ensured by the Society to RSA recipients without children,
who are partly responsible for their situation. The allowance
should allow parents to raise their children in satisfactory
conditions. 
In 2013, a parliamentary report (Sirugue, 2013) had proposed
the introduction of an Activity Premium (Prime d’Activité, PA)
which would replace the RSA-activity and the PPE. But as the RSA-
base would remain, very low-wage families would have to claim for
two allowances: the RSA-base and the PA. The system would have
been complicated for them. The Sirugue report proposes to extend
the right to the PA to below 25 young people, which is justified,
but propose a reform at constant costs, without even proposing to
recover the savings currently made by the current non-take up of
the RSA. So, extending entitlement to below 25-year olds would be
paid by existing RSA and PPE recipients. The PA’s scale was arbi-
trary, with a slope and a peak at 0.7 SMIC, which have no
justification. The marginal tax rates remain low in some places;
high in others. There are no strong improvements over the existing
system. Overall, the families’ situation was not improved. The risk
was that the PA suffers the same rate of non-take up as the RSA and
that many families lose the PPE without wanting to ask for the PA.
In 2014, the government announced the PPE and the RSA will
be merged, without specifying how the new scheme would be
designed. In our view, the system should be simplified by replacing
the PPE by an increase in the SMIC, if needed offset by a job subsi-
dies; a family supplement of around 100 euros per child in poor
families, employed or unemployed, with 1 or 2 children; the RSA
should be maintained, but its role would be reduced and the non-
take up would have less consequences for families with children.
Finally, an insertion allowance should be introduced, of the
amount of the RSA, for young people looking for a job, which
should allow them to begin to accumulate retirement rights. 
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The crisis led to a sharp deterioration of public finances in
almost all EU MS. In 2013, the public deficit reached 2.9% of GDP
in the euro area, while public debt had risen from 66.5% of GDP in
2007 to 93% in 2013. However, the deficit in euro MS was smaller
than in the United States (9.3% of GDP), the United Kingdom
(6.3% of GDP) or Japan (8.3%) of GDP. There is a structural
primary surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP in the euro area (even using
the Commission's estimates). 
European countries face a double dilemma. First, they need to
choose a macroeconomic strategy. From a Keynesian perspective,
large public deficits should be maintained as long as the unemploy-
ment rate does not fall significantly. The euro area lost 8.5 percent
of GDP due to the financial crisis; recovering this GDP loss would
be enough to bring public deficits to a sustainable level. The objec-
tive should not be a balanced budget, but the real “public finances
golden rule”, i.e. a balances budget net of investment expenditure,
which allows in France a structural deficit of 2.4% of GDP. 
Instead, the strategy advocated by the IMF, the OECD and the
European Commission is to reduce public deficits very rapidly. The
risk is for the euro area economy to remain in stagnation for a long
period of time; fiscal austerity weighs on demand; tax revenues
decrease; public deficits and debt ratios hardly improve. In view of
the threat of financial markets and ratings agencies, European
countries have chosen the second strategy and this has kept
Europe in depression. 
The second point is to choose between spending cuts and tax
increases. International institutions warn against tax increases
(especially direct taxes) which would be detrimental to firms’
competitiveness and would be a disincentive for households to
work, save, and invest. International institutions advocate drastic
cuts in public and social expenditure, denying any economic and
social usefulness in these expenditures. Only VAT, which weighs
on consumption, could be increased. Countries should continue to
cut company taxation, so as to promote employment. Thus, this
strategy implies the continuation of tax competition. The risk is
that it has a strong depressive impact, since it cuts spending which
have a strong impact on demand and that it undermines the Euro-
pean social model. 
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social model, therefore a high level of public and social expenditure,
relying on its comparative advantages (free and high quality educa-
tion and health for all, public infrastructure, social benefits) to keep
the European economies competitive. In this context, MS should
tax financial transactions, should increase taxation of financial
incomes, capital gains, high incomes and wealth (the rise of which
is one of the causes of the crisis), and should introduce a confisca-
tory tax rate on exorbitant incomes. Taxation should encourage
firms and banks to have a behaviour favourable to production. It
should support investment rather than financial activities and divi-
dends distribution. It should encourage energy savings rather than
job destruction. At the EU level, this strategy requires tax harmoni-
sation, letting each country the possibility to tax domestic firms
and residents, banning unfair competition, setting minimum tax
rates for firms, high incomes and wealth, prohibiting banks and
firms to have subsidiaries in tax havens, organizing the rise in
ecological taxation. Production and consumption modes will need
to be deeply modified in the coming years under the ecological
constraints. The consumption model where new needs are
constantly generated by large companies’ strategies will have to be
changed. Ecological constraints should not translate into higher
prices without any counterpart, so that the efforts do not weigh on
the poorest; Europe should move to a sober and less unequal
society. This strategy should be implemented at the EU level, but
who may promote this strategy in Europe?
10. What strategy for a tax reform in France? 
In 2015, four strategies can be considered
A strategy focusing on increasing taxation for the richest and
multinational firms. This was the French strategy from mid-2012
to mid-2014. This strategy required strong measures against tax
evasion, since France was already one of the countries with the
highest taxation on the richest. This strategy would have also
required to combat all schemes allowing tax evasion (which is
difficult to do for an isolated country).
A strategy focusing on company tax cuts in order to improve
the competitiveness and attractiveness of the French economy.
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create jobs, which would offset the initial fall in tax revenues.
Initially, taxes paid by employees and households would need to
be increased; French households would have to accept a certain fall
in their living standards in order to let French Firms become more
competitive. This strategy raises two issues: the negative impact on
demand it would have in the short-term and its social acceptance.
Moreover, this is a non-cooperative strategy at the European level.
This is the strategy chosen by the Valls Government.
A rationalization strategy, targeting the abolition of tax and
social expenditures, which would require to abandon tax interven-
tionism, and is satisfactory in some cases (savings taxation), less in
some others. The gains of such a strategy are probably overesti-
mated. 
An ecological strategy raising over time environmental taxa-
tion. But its impact on firms’ competitiveness is likely to be heavy
if this strategy is not part of a European strategy.  
Hence, the economic and social gains which may be expected
from a tax reform should not be overestimated. In our view, five
axes should however be considered in priority: 
— to reaffirm the principle according to which all households’
incomes must be subject to income taxation; taxation
should to strictly enforce the principle according to which:
“everyone should contribute to public expenditure
according to their contributory capacities”. These capacities
should be assessed on a family basis.
— to reaffirm the principle according to which all labour
incomes must pay social security contributions, all capital
incomes should pay social security levies;
— to split tax expenditures into three categories: those deter-
mining the contributory capacity of households (which
should be maintained and no longer be considered as tax
expenditures); economic or social subsidies (which should be
transformed into explicit subsidies);  the other expenditures
should be removed.
— to increase progressively environmental taxation and taxa-
tion on financial activities, to maintain capital taxation, to
reduce labour taxation. 
Henri Sterdyniak182— to combat tax optimization and tax tourism implemented by
companies and the wealthiest. This requires tax harmonisa-
tion at the world or EU levels, but in this area, France should
take the lead and make proposals, and if necessary, make
decisions alone. 
Implementing a tax reform is far from being easy.
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Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla1861. Introduction
Italy has recently started to speed up the process of fiscal and
structural reforms in response to European Commission require-
ments and internal policy willingness to achieve better
macroeconomic performance. The importance of structural
reforms is well known and, in the last few years, has been a
constant in the economic policy recommendations of interna-
tional economic institutions, particularly in European countries
(OECD, 2013). The onset of the recent Great Recession has focused
policy and economic debates on a faster and deeper adoption of
structural and fiscal reforms to achieve higher sustainable growth,
higher levels of employment and a consolidated fiscal situation
with a balanced public budget and a lower level of public debt. In
this context, the aim of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) – also
known as the fiscal compact – is to increase the resilience of the
European Monetary Union in the face of a crisis, through the appli-
cation of stringent general criteria for budget deficits, structural
deficits and the debt-to-GDP ratio. This requires European coun-
tries with low potential growth and high public debt to introduce
definitive reforms to their economic systems in order to improve
economic performance and meet the TSCG criteria.
The golden rule of the fiscal compact is ensuring budgetary
discipline among European Union (EU) governments. The goal is
for each country belonging to the fiscal compact to reduce the
debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 per cent in the long run. This fiscal
moderation has been accompanied by widespread implementation
of structural reforms in the EU periphery. Nahtigal and Bugaric
(2012), De Grauwe (2011) and Whelan (2012) discuss the danger of
recessionary and deflationary effects. The main sources of doubt
are related to: a) the long run expansionary effects of an austerity
paradigm; b) evidence of the relationship between debt-levels and
a growth regime; c) under-estimation of the deflationary and
recessionary effects of a wide-ranging one-size-fits-all application
of the fiscal compact on fragile countries in Europe.
Roubini and Mihm (2010) and Krugman (2012) argue that EU
policy switched too rapidly to austerity after the onset of the crisis,
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2012. In this context, Creel et al. (2012) and Creel et al. (2013)
propose a counter-factual exercise using a VAR and DSGE metho-
dology to rank several automatic fiscal rules and find the TSCG
golden rule to be the worst performing instrument in relation to
output gap and inflation rate. On the other hand, international
institutions have contributed to the debate on quantitative assess-
ment of fiscal and structural reforms providing a quite uniform
consensus on their effects. In the case of Italy the OECD recom-
mendations for structural reform (OECD, 2014) include a set of
labour market, education system and tax structure improvements.1
In general, given the fiscal consolidation requirements, one can
rank these structural reforms based on the criteria of their perfor-
mance and harmfulness. Cournède et al. (2013a) and Cournède
et al. (2013b) suggest that reforms should start with the implemen-
tation of changes to subsidies, pensions, property taxes and
personal income taxes, and that reforms to education, childcare,
family expenditure, social security contributions, public invest-
ment and consumption taxes should be implemented only if
absolutely necessary. In other words, the OECD countries should
use the least harmful instruments to achieve their short-, medium-
and long-run consolidation goals while Japan and the US are
forced to impose more harmful reforms given their starting macro-
economic imbalances and long-run equity and growth needs. Italy
is positioned in the best group for short-term equity and growth.
The OECD study identifies various levers that Italy can use to
achieve short- and medium-run goals: subsidies, pensions, other
property taxes, unemployment benefits, personal income,
corporate income taxes, environmental taxes, recurrent taxes,
taxes on immovable property, and other government in kind
consumption. The question of how heterogeneous growth patterns
1. They include: 1) the rebalancing of protection, from jobs to workers’ income, through a
decrease in workers’ job protection under certain types of contracts, and improvements to the
social safety net; 2) increased equity and efficiency in education in order to get better value for
money from the education system and improve the chances of the low-skilled; 3) increasing the
efficiency of the tax structure by simplifying the tax code, fighting tax evasion and, when the
fiscal situation permits, reducing the tax wedge on low-wage labour; 4) reducing the barriers to
competition through stronger law enforcement at all levels of government, reduced public
ownership and shorter waiting times in civil courts; 5) reducing the risk of persistent
unemployment and accelerating return to work through enhanced active labour market
policies.
Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla188in the euro area are shaped by fiscal policy measures compared to
structural reforms is crucial and requires quantitative assessment
of the interaction between these two policy instruments.
Bouthevillain and Dufrénot (2013) argue that best practice is not a
one-size-fits-all approach to growth-friendly fiscal consolidation.2
In general, the main structural changes advocated in the
literature are labour and product market reforms, and their
outcomes can depend on the time span and institutional
framework. These reforms usually are modelled such that they
imply an increase in the economic efficiency or a reduction in the
bargaining power of economic agents and, therefore, affect real
wages and relative prices in the economy. Barnes et al. (2011)
evaluate the impact of policy reforms in terms of GDP per capita,
in a review of a range of empirical studies conducted mostly by the
OECD. They find that the largest long run per capita GDP gains
seem to come from reforms to education, strengthening of
competition in product markets, reductions in the level and
duration of unemployment benefits, tax wedge cuts and less strict
employment protection legislation. Overall, one-fifth of this long-
run impact comes from product market deregulation, and one-fifth
from reforms to the average tax wedge. Other significant gains
come from increased human capital and lower unemployment
benefits. Their review suggests that countries can be grouped
according to their policy priorities. For example, in Italy the labour
tax wedge could be reduced to the average OECD level to achieve
an impact on GDP per capita equal to 8.4 per cent. Hobza and
Mourre (2010) provide some stylised and illustrative results for the
broad benefits of some types of policy measures envisaged by the
European Commission’s so-called Europe 2020 programme for EU
countries, using the macroeconomic model QUEST III, DG ECFIN.
They demonstrate the long-run effects of fiscal consolidation – on
its own and in combination with structural reforms – and propose
various scenarios. The structural reform scenarios suggest that
progress in implementing structural reforms under the main
2. Emerging European countries are more sensitive than the most advanced countries to direct
taxation measures and indirect taxation could have more harmful effects on growth rates in
these countries. Increased human capital expenditure stimulates growth in low-growth
countries, while welfare and sovereign spending are efficient for economies that are growing
rapidly.
The interaction between the labour tax wedge and structural reforms in Italy 189priority areas of Europe 2020 could generate significant gains in
terms of increasing output and employment.3 While the long-run
consequences of structural reforms have been investigated
extensively, the results of short-run analyses could be misleading.
Cacciatore et al. (2012) explore the short-term effects of labour and
product market reforms by applying a dynamic general
equilibrium model with endogenous producer entry and labour
market search, and matching frictions. They find that it takes time
– typically two years – for reforms to pay off. This is partly because
their benefits materialise gradually through the processes of firm
entry and increased hiring whereas reform-driven layoffs are
immediate. Also, although all reforms stimulate GDP in the short
run, some, such as job protection reforms and product market
reforms, result in temporary increases in unemployment.4
Implementing labour and product market reforms simultane-
ously helps to minimise such transition costs. Gomes et al. (2011)
find that the effects of individual reforms are more or less additive
by using EAGLE, a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium
model. Bouis and Duval (2011) examine the impact on potential
GDP over a 5 to 10-year horizon of structural reforms in product
and labour markets, relying on the existing OECD empirical
studies.5 Both types of reforms raise productivity growth, although
the effects are estimated to be smaller for labour market than
product market reforms. In particular, for Italy, the estimated
multifactor productivity gains from product market reform are
found to be around 3 per cent and 7 per cent over a 5-year and
3. In particular, GDP could increase from around 1.3 per cent up to 6.8 per cent depending on
the boldness of the reform plan. The contribution to GDP of product market reforms would
increase from 0.9 per cent to 3.3 per cent, while the contribution of labour market reforms
would increase from 0.4 per cent to 2.9 per cent. Product market reforms could have a negative
impact on the labour market of between -0.1 per cent and 0.1 per cent, while labour market
reforms could have a positive impact of 0.6 per cent up to 4.3 per cent. The extent of economic
benefits is conditional on the extent of the policy efforts (which needs to be very high for the
most ambitious scenarios).
4. Cacciatore et al. (2012) argue that structural reforms can affect payoffs depending on
whether the country is a member of a monetary union or not. Within a monetary union
expectations about lower prices could increase real interest rates and decrease consumption and
output in the short-run.
5. The authors state that the analysis implicitly assumes homogeneous marginal effects of
reforms on GDP across different countries, time periods and magnitudes of reforms and, in
some cases, assumes economy-wide impacts of reforms based on sector-level estimates. They
assume also that the underlying OECD studies do a better job at estimating the long-run as
opposed to the short-run effects of reforms.
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protection legislation are around 0.5 per cent over a 10-year
horizon. The estimated long run increase in employment rates from
labour tax wedge cuts is close to 2 percentage points for Italy.6
Using the European Commission’s QUEST III model for R&D,
adapted to Italy, Annicchiarico et al. (2012) find that structural
reforms are likely to result in sizeable output, consumption,
employment and net foreign assets gains. However, these increases
may be affected by fiscal consolidation intensity. The analysis
covers a product and a labour market reform that includes lower
price and wage markups and a shift from labour to consumption
taxation. The authors find that under a fiscal consolidation package
equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP, the effects of structural changes
may be mitigated. However, the positive effects of structural
reforms support fiscal consolidation via a decreased public debt-to-
GDP ratio in the ex ante budget-neutral scenarios. The average
annual output growth rate gain over a 10-year time horizon is
found to be equal to 0.6 per cent under the assumption that Italy
manages to halve the gap with the EU best performers in several
intervention areas, in five years. Reducing the gap by one-third
would imply an average annual gain of 0.4 per cent, while fully
closing the gap would require increased average growth of up to 1
per cent. This result is very close to our scenario where product
market reform under unbalanced budget gives an output increase of
1.25 percentage points while, when supported by public consump-
tion, it could give more than 2 percent (see section 4 and
appendix A). In a closely related paper, Lusinyan and Muir (2013)
use the International Monetary Fund’s Global Integrated Monetary
and Fiscal model (GIMF) to analyse the role of structural and fiscal
reforms in Italy aimed at strengthening competition in the product
market and making the labour market more efficient supported by
growth-friendly fiscal reforms. They find positive effects on GDP in
the long run from both product and labour market reforms, and
payoffs from their simultaneous implementation. In considering
fiscal reforms, they take account, in a deficit-neutral way, of a
6. In general, the potential overall increase in GDP for the average OECD country gained by
undertaking the full range of reforms to the labour and product markets, could be close to
10 per cent over a 10-year horizon, indicating the ample room for structural reforms to offset
permanent GDP losses resulting from the recent crisis.
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spending. In particular, they allow for a shift from direct to indirect
taxes (lowering both labour and corporate taxes, offset by broa-
dening the VAT base) and a shift from lump-sum transfers to
productive, well-targeted infrastructure investment. Increasing
competition in the tradable and non-tradable sectors could increase
output by 4.0 per cent in 5 years and 7.7 per cent in the long run.
The reduction in labour taxes initially raises GDP relative to the
baseline by 0.5 per cent, and by up to 2 per cent in the long run. By
combining fiscal reforms with product and labour market reforms,
real GDP in Italy could increase by about 8.5 per cent after 5 years
and almost 22 per cent in the long run.7 Lusinyan and Muir (2013)
find also that these effects would be stronger if the remaining euro
area economies were to carry out contemporaneous similar reforms.
Forni et al. (2010b) assess the effects of increasing competition in
the service sector in Italy which, based on cross-country compari-
sons, is the OECD country with the highest markups in the non-
manufacturing industries. They propose a two-region (Italy and the
rest of the euro area) dynamic general equilibrium model allowing
for monopolistic competition in the labour, manufacturing and
service markets. They simulate the macroeconomic and spillover
effects of increasing the level of competition in the Italian services
sector, and find that decreasing service sector markups to the levels
of the rest of the euro area increases Italian GDP by 11 per cent in
the long run. Moreover they find, as in our paper, that labour
market reform is less growth friendly than product market as it
impacts only on some sectors of the economy. Forni et al. (2010a)
evaluate fiscal policy consolidation via different fiscal coverage
adjustments. First, given a certain level of Italian public debt, they
find that a labor, capital and consumption tax cut gives positive
and higher results than a reduction in public consumption and
employment that has instead negative impacts on the economy.
Then, in order to achieve a consolidation of 10 percent of debt-to-
GDP ratio in five years, they state that the best fiscal mix is given by
a decrease in public consumption, employment and in particular in
public transfers, together with a generalized tax cut, because this
would maximise the reduction of distortion and increase GDP
7. The effect of product market reform is amplified by the productivity-enhancing effects of
higher government spending on infrastructure.
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show that transfers are the most growth friendly instrument to be
used to cut the labour tax wedge. Our paper is close to the above-
mentioned literature and focuses on the specific Italian fiscal
dilemma related to the best growth friendly policy and the interac-
tion effect between labor tax wedge and structural reform. The
Italian specificities and structural and keynesian macroeconomic
policies are taken into account to provide a systematic analysis of
the fiscal policy outcomes.
As argued in Malinvaud (2000), the economic policy debate has
a theoretical counterpart which consists of two strands: macro-
economic policy and structural reform. Macroeconomic policy is
related to the demand side of the economy, while structural reform
refers to institutional changes. In some sense, they affect the
supply-side of the economy since permanent institutional changes
would affect the behaviour of the economy over the business cycle,
or the structural long-run equilibrium levels. Thus, DSGE models are a
good compromise to investigate macroeconomic and structural
policies since they can represent institutional (market) frictions
affecting the business cycle, demand shock transmission and long-
run structural equilibrium levels simultaneously. Our paper
contributes to this strand of the literature; we perform an analysis
of mixed structural and macroeconomic policies within a balanced
budget framework. For example, we allow for fiscal reforms to cut
the labour tax wedge (that is both structural and macroeconomic),
together with a simultaneous reduction in union monopolistic
power via a decrease in real wages (structural) and also an expan-
sion in public goods expenditure and public investment plans
(macroeconomic). In particular, we are interested in comparing the
fiscal balancing of a labour tax wedge cut, realised through a cut in
public spending and transfers or a shift to indirect or property
taxes. We examine a series of taxation mixes combined with
structural reforms to the labour and product markets. We analyse
the extra payoffs that may accrue from simultaneous structural
and fiscal reforms. Unlike other studies on Italy, both fiscal and
structural reforms are here implemented in a budget-neutral
scenario. Fiscal reforms include cuts to taxes affecting labour costs,
that is, firms’ social security contributions (SSC), the regional tax
on productive activities (IRAP), and personal income tax (IRPEF).
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in IRAP rate produces the highest payoff in terms of real GDP in
the long run, while a cut in SSC results in the highest output in the
short run. Similarly to Coenen et al. (2007), who focus on a reduc-
tion of public transfers to households to offset the tax revenue
reduction from a labour tax wedge cut, we find that reducing firms'
labour costs (IRAP plus SSC) has more notable effects on output in
the long run than reducing the wedge component entering the
households' decision problem, i.e. labour income tax (IRPEF).8
However, unlike Coenen et al. (2007), we focus only on labour
income tax for households, excluding households' SSC; on the
other hand, we consider also the cost of IRAP together with the
firms' SSCs.
In relation to structural changes, product market reforms
outperform labour market reforms, in both the short and the long
run. However, only labour market reforms lead to a permanent
reduction in the unemployment rate. Moreover, the contempora-
neous combination of cuts to the IRPEF, SSC and IRAP and
structural reforms shows that, in accordance with a balanced
budget, it would be preferable to increase public spending.
There are several points to bear in mind to interpret our results.
First, the level or growth of GDP (alone) is not a satisfactory metric
to evaluate economic policy. A welfare analysis is needed to
achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of
policies on the several agent/sectors of the economy. Also, the
analysis presented here is an aggregate analysis. Despite their
complexity, by construction, DSGE models comprise a collection
of heterogeneous representative agents, which means we have a
multitude of agents represented by a single actor. This implies that
we ignore progressive taxation and the distribution of wealth and
income and concentrate on an average representation of the
economic system. Second, our quantitative assessment exploits a
stylised representation of the fiscal side of the economy: for
8. Coenen et al. (2007) consider four alternative scenarios for the euro area: a reduction in the
consumption tax, a reduction in the sum of the tax on labour income and households' social
security contributions, a reduction in the firms' social security contributions, the reduction of
the overall tax wedge, i.e. a combination of the three single scenarios. The experiments are
designed to lower the euro area tax wedge to levels prevailing in the United States. In all cases
the reductions in tax revenue are offset by a reduction in public transfers to households.
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allowances which underestimates life cycle effects. Third, our
results refer to a small open economy context, meaning that we
ignore adjustments in the rest of the EU. Taking account of these
points might change our results by weakening the fiscal and
structural policy effects due to international spillover. However,
the focus of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment
based on analysing the interactions among labour tax wedge
reduction, structural reform and macroeconomic demand policy,
to show that in a such complex environment a macroeconomic
demand policy plays a prominent role. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we briefly
describe the model and the areas of policy intervention; section 3
discusses the calibration and experimental setup; section 4 and
section 5 present the simulation results and sensitivity analysis;
section 6 summarises the results of the public investment growth
scenario; and section 7 concludes.
2. The model
In this section we briefly describe the model focusing on the
policy areas of intervention. The reference framework is a new-
Keynesian medium-scale DSGE model. We apply the Prometeia
DSGE model for the Italian economy (Catalano, 2014 and
Catalano and Pezzolla, 2014), and incorporate various tax rates
including the household labour income, indirect, and labour
wedge taxation (Figure). Structural reforms are modelled such that
they imply a reduction in price and wage markups. Fiscal reforms
include cuts to taxes affecting labour costs, that is, social contribu-
tions (SSC), the regional tax on productive activities (IRAP), and
personal income tax (IRPEF). All reforms are implemented in a
budget neutral scenario: in order to keep the public deficit
constant in the face of the reduced revenues resulting from labour
tax wedge cuts, we consider alternative scenarios allowing for a
reduction in government spending, a cut in general transfers,9 and
a tax shift from labour to consumption (through an increase in the
9. The lump-sum nature of the transfers implies that households cannot change or alter them
by changing their behaviour. They represent unconditional cash transfers meaning that they are
general transfers delivered to households, with no limitations or exceptions.
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TASI i.e. house services tax rate).10
2.1. Households and firms
Households are divided into two groups: workers and entrepre-
neurs. The former rents job services and the latter rents capital
goods to an intermediate firm sector. Both groups save and
consume. Working households are further subdivided into impa-
tient and patient or, respectively, negative and positive financial
net savers.11 Both consume non-durable and durable goods, invest
in housing services, offer labour services to an intermediate sector
and earn profits from the firm sectors. Patient households save and
invest in housing and financial deposit services provided by the
banking sector. Impatient households borrow from banks against
their housing stock. Constrained households cannot finance their
desired level of consumption and are more dependent on current
Figure. Structure of the model
10. Catalano and Pezzolla (2014) and Table A10 provide the results of alternative experiments
without a balanced budget constraint.
11. The distinction between patient (unconstrained) and impatient (constrained) households
allows us to account for the importance of financial factors in macroeconomic fluctuations. The
presence of credit constrained agents and the “financial accelerator” may enhance the
amplitude of business cycles depending on the source of the shocks. As Iacoviello (2005) states,
the reasons for this choice are practical and substantial: “practical because, empirically, a large
proportion of borrowing is secured by real estate; substantial because, although housing markets
seem to play a role in business fluctuations, the channels by which they affect the economy are
far from being understood”.
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shock that affects their disposable income, even if the shock has no
cyclical effect on their borrowing capacity. Similarly, entrepreneur
households decide upon their capital investment goods and
borrow from the banking sector.
An intermediate sector sells output to the monopolistic
competitive retailer sector, which differentiates this output into
multiple goods and sells them on final markets. The public sector
levies taxes, buys public goods and provides unemployment and
transfer payments to working households. Since working house-
holds and retailers are monopolistic competitive sectors, they set
wages and prices respectively following a markup rule that creates
a (double) wedge between final real wages and the marginal rate of
substitution.12 This allows us to explore labour and product
market structural reforms through the reduction in wage and price
markups.
2.2. Government
Government consumes an amount of domestic goods Gt at price
Pt
ch and purchases capital investment goods iktg at prices qktg. Public
capital evolves according to the following equation
(1)
where δ g is a constant depreciation rate and iktg is assumed to
follow an exogenous process iktg = (1 – ρg)ikgss + ρg ikgt-1 + εtk, with ρg
denoting the persistence parameter and ikgss  the steady- state value
of public capital investment. Then, government rents capital
services ktg to the intermediate capital goods firms at price Pktg,
gaining the following profits
(2)
which can be used to reduce government debt. Other government
revenues are given by the exogenous tax rates imposed on labour,
consumption, return on capital for entrepreneur households, SSC
12. The working household sector has monopolistic power which allows it to earn a surplus
share. However, this creates a friction, which allows us to account for a positive level of
unemployment and an unemployment related Phillips-curve as in Galı´ (2011). This means that
wage inflation is inversely affected by the unemployment gap, i.e. a positive deviation from its
natural level. Therefore, wage stickiness (Calvo pricing) could affect the allocation of labour,
increasing unemployment also in the short-run.
1= (1 ) ,
g g g g
t t tK ik Kδ −+ −
1=
g g g g g
t t t t tPk K qk ikπ − −
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τ irpef , τ vat , τ capital , τ ssc , τ tasi and τ irap , respectively. Government
borrows Bt from financial intermediaries at a rate Rt to finance its
expenditure on Gt, which is adjusted in order to set the public
deficit-to-GDP ratio to its long-run (target) level.13 Public debt
stock evolves according to the following equation:
(3)
where Tt denotes total transfers to unconstrained and constrained
households.
Finally, the public expenditure reaction function is given by:
(4)
where pktg  kgt-1 are rent revenues on public capital stock, qktg iktg,
investment costs, τ irap,t Pkt kt-1, taxation on capital, τ tasi,t Pdvt,t Ht-1,
taxation on housing, τ irap,t (Pwt Yt – Pkt Kt-1), IRAP taxation on
wholesaler profits, τ ssc,t Ldt Wt, employee social contribution
revenue, τ irpef,t Wt Lt , τ vat (Pt Ct + Pcht Cnt + Pcdt Itd ), labour income
and consumption taxation, Tt and Ut b total transfers and unem-
ployment benefits.
2.3. Taxes and tax payers
Taxes have different degrees of distortion that imply diverse
efficiency gains from tax reforms, which need to be clarified.
Distortionary taxes imply large effects on GDP in response to
economic shocks, and the higher the distortion, the larger the
effect.14
13. In the scenario described in the following sections we interchange public spending with
indirect taxations (VAT and TASI) or transfers.
14. Given that optimal taxation means distributing distortions over time in order to maximize
welfare (Lucas and Stokey, 1983), a future research objective is a comprehensive analysis that
explores the redistributive consequences of the revenue-neutral tax reforms we analyse in this
paper.
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IRPEF is the Italian individual income tax that is paid on several
kinds of income earned both in Italy and abroad. In the model, we
focus only on IRPEF levied on labour income that is paid by
working households and affects their labour/leisure choice. This
kind of taxation creates a wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the real wage; thus, households require a higher
wage to provide the same supply of labour that would be induced
in the absence of this taxation. Therefore, a reduction in the IRPEF
tax rate is expected to cause an increase in disposable income that
will lead to higher consumption and saving, thereby stimulating
the incentive to invest and to increase labour supply.
SSC are taxes paid by both workers and employers which are
levied on the income received by the worker from the employer as
a result of their employment relationship. In the model, SSC are
defined as taxation on employed labour income levied only on the
intermediate goods producers (employer). The higher the SSC rate,
the higher the cost of labour for the employer. Therefore, a reduc-
tion in SSC is expected to induce an increase in demand for labour
with positive effects on aggregate demand. It should be noted that
this could trigger an adverse reallocation of capital investment as
relative prices will change accordingly.
IRAP is the regional business tax levied on the value of produc-
tion generated by business activities developed in Italian regions.
In our model, it is paid by entrepreneur households that accumu-
late and rent physical capital, and by wholesalers that produce
intermediate goods and services. IRAP can be considered a business
tax on value added, which does not allow for deduction of labour
costs. The IRAP tax base is computed by subtracting the cost of
capital from the revenue from sales. Therefore, an IRAP tax rate
increase would be particularly harmful to businesses making a loss
rather than a profit (Manzo and Monteduro, 2011). Also, it affects
demand for input factors: a reduction in the IRAP rate will induce a
bias towards capital, while an increase in this rate will stimulate
demand for labour.
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To balance the budget and cover the revenue losses stemming
from a cut in the labour tax wedge, we allow for different fiscal
coverage: an increase in VAT rate; an increase in TASI; a reduction
in government consumption; a decrease in public transfers.
However, raising distorting taxation or reducing government
consumption or transfers can offset some of the growth effects
induced by a decrease in the labour tax wedge.15 The channels
through which this effect occurs may be different depending on
the labour tax wedge component (IRPEF, SSC, IRAP) that is being
reduced, and the fiscal coverage chosen to balance the budget.
VAT is a value added tax which, in Italy, is paid only by the final
consumer; companies can generally deduct VAT paid in the inter-
mediate production stages. VAT is levied on sales of goods and/or
services within the Italian territory. In our model, VAT affects
households' purchasing power relative to consumption of durable
and non-durable goods, thereby conditioning households'
consumption-leisure choices.
TASI is a tax on house services paid on real estate in Italy. In our
model, TASI only affects owners, i.e. (patient and impatient)
households, and their consumption-investment decisions. This
effect is particularly noticeable for constrained households that
have a high marginal propensity to consume. This implies a
different consumption behaviour for impatient and patient house-
holds following fiscal shocks, especially when there is a tax shift
from labour to property that discourages housing investment.16
A decrease in (unproductive) government consumption reduces
the amount of resource government absorb from the economy
and, given the large spending multiplier, almost completely offsets
the positive effects of the labour tax wedge cut on GDP.
15. It is worth noting that although a shift in tax from labour to consumption is often
advocated to provide a work incentive and to increase supply and demand for labour, it also
implies important distributive consequences that need to be taken into account. For instance,
Pestel and Sommer (2013) find that people on low-incomes, and pensioners (who have a smaller
income tax and social security contributions burden) are typically damaged by such a tax shift,
with employees and unemployed workers being the main beneficiaries.
16. Following Carroll et al. (2014), in a future analysis, we could introduce different degrees of
impatience across households with heterogeneous time preference rates, to account for
inequality in the distribution of wealth.
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affected. Therefore, reducing transfers to households will affect
aggregate demand, but to a lesser extent than government
consumption, given that the fiscal burden implied by their reduc-
tion will be damaging to only a part of the economy, namely
(patient and impatient) households. Transfers could be considered
aggregated pensions and social income provided directly from the
public sector to sustain aggregate demand. In particular, a reduc-
tion in transfers will mainly influence the decisions of constrained
(impatient) households without free access to the credit market to
finance their housing investment, whereas the consumption
smoothing behaviour of unconstrained households will continue
to sustain aggregate demand.
3. Calibration and experimental design
In this section we describe the calibration of the parameters of
interest and the design of the experiment. All policy changes are
assumed to be permanent. Also, we assume all measures are fully
credible from the start, meaning that the announced reform path
is believed to be immediately and fully anticipated.17 The general
calibration follows Catalano (2014) and Catalano and Pezzolla
(2014). As we show below, we build several reform scenarios
concerning both fiscal and structural policy areas. The public
sector is calibrated to be at 40 per cent of GDP,18 public expendi-
ture on goods and services is set at 21 percent and public debt is
132 per cent in terms of the GDP ratio. We set marginal and mean
tax rates for VAT, IRPEF, TASI and SSC at 14.5 per cent, 21 per cent,
0.8 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. Markup on the product
market is set at 20 per cent, close to the values in Forni et al.
(2010b).19 Labour markup is equal to 20 per cent, setting the elas-
ticity of substitution accordingly. We calibrate the price and wage
17. For all shocks, the speed of reforms is set such that the time of convergence to the final
value is 2 years. Thus, we assume a realistic process of institutional adaptation to fiscal and
structural reforms.
18. The percentage includes transfers to households, unemployment benefits and expenditure
of goods and services.
19. Based on the estimates in Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) for sectoral markups, we set
the Italian price markup according to the aggregate value for Manufacturing and Construction,
which is higher than the 18 per cent value estimated for the euro area.
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the minimum size experiment performed in Forni et al. (2010b) on
price markup.
3.1. Fiscal reform scenarios
To take account of the effects of a labour tax wedge cut we allow
for a decrease in IRPEF, SSC and IRAP. For each fiscal instrument,
we consider a tax cut such that the decrease in the relative fiscal
revenue is equal to 1 per cent of nominal GDP. The simulation
exercises are modelled such that the public budget is balanced and
kept constant; therefore, in each experiment we allow for alterna-
tive fiscal adjustments/coverage: a reduction in public spending, a
cut in public transfers, an increase in the VAT or TASI rate, against
each labour tax wedge component simulated.20 Also, in order to
detect the likely payoffs stemming from a fiscal reform package, we
analyse the effects of simultaneous cuts to IRPEF, IRAP and SSC.21
Table 1 shows the percentage changes in tax rates.
3.2. Structural reform scenarios
Structural reforms aim at enhancing competition through short-
and long-run increases in output, employment and investment.
Rigidities in the product and labour markets imply that both prices
and wages are higher than they would be in more competitive
markets. This means that prices and wages may include a markup
over marginal costs and over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, respectively. Therefore, the
simulation experiments take into account a 2 percentage point
reduction in markups. Lower price markups would lead to an
increase in competition and to a sizeable positive effect on GDP,
and a lower wage markup would reduce union bargaining power
and, hence, real wages, increasing flexibility in the labour market
and generating a smaller, but not irrelevant increase in output.
Similar to our treatment of fiscal reforms, we analyse the
interactions between labour and product market reforms,
combining them in a scenario with simultaneous markup changes.
20. See section 2.5.
21. The size of the shock to each single tax rate is such that each instrument is simultaneously
responsible for one-third of the total percentage change in GDP (1 percentage point).
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reforms
We consider a scenario that involves a broad simulation exer-
cise that includes simultaneous tax wedge cuts and structural
reforms. The purpose is to evaluate the interactions among policy
measures and their likely dynamic tradeoffs.
4. Results
In this section we present the results of our scenarios for fiscal
reforms aimed at reducing labour costs, and structural reforms to
both labour and product markets in a budget-neutral scenario.
These reforms may contribute to reducing the competitiveness gap
with the best EU performers, and restoring the sustainability of
public finances. We enrich the analysis by taking account also of
the likely payoffs stemming from a combination of structural
reforms to the labour and product markets, and evaluation of the
macroeconomic implications of tax relief on labour associated
with structural reforms. We collect all GDP multipliers in Table A1;
in Tables A2 and A3 we show the response of the variables of
interest to labour tax wedge and structural reforms respectively, for
the given set of fiscal coverages.22
Fiscal reforms. In this section we describe the impact of a
labour tax wedge cut via a decrease in IRPEF, SSC and IRAP tax
rates. Regardless of the type of fiscal coverage,23 we find a degree of
dynamic tradeoff between the tax rates affecting labour costs: a
reduction in social contributions produces the highest payoff in
terms of real GDP in the short run, while a cut in IRAP produces
Table 1. Fiscal reform scenarios
Experiments
Fiscal reforms Tax rate Singletax change
Simultaneous
tax change
IRPEF -2.7 pp -0.9 pp
Labour tax wedge cut SSC -2.7 pp -0.9 pp
IRAP -1.8 pp -0.6 pp
22. In tables A2 and A3 the rows show the variables and the columns show the fiscal coverages
that are transposed, as opposed to table A1.
23. See section 2.5.
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goods producers and entrepreneur households have incentives to
foster labour demand and employment but also investment in
capital goods, whose effect via the capital accumulation process
takes time. Given initial adverse effects on capital investment, a
cut in IRAP seems to provide an initial cost in terms of GDP
compared to the other tax wedge components (Table A1). A perma-
nent decrease in the IRPEF tax rate causes an increase in disposable
income that leads to a rise in consumption, investment and hence
real GDP (Table A2). A cut in the SSC, which produces the highest
short-run increase in output, like IRPEF, positively affects labour
demand and disposable income, but also improves competitive-
ness and exports because the reduced labour costs allow a
reduction in prices.
The best long-term performance is associated with a reduction
in public transfers in order to offset the decrease in fiscal revenues
from a reduction in each labour tax wedge component (Table A1,
columns c1, c5, c9). This effect is due to the consumption
smoothing behaviour of unconstrained households (and the rela-
tive low percentage of constrained households in the economy),
which allows for a smaller reduction in aggregate demand given a
contemporaneous increase in labour demand by firms. Thus, a
public transfer performs better than other coverage in the long
run, but VAT coverage represents the best compromise between
the short- and long-run scenarios (Table A1, columns c3, c7, c11).
Indeed, a tax shift from labour to consumption, results in an
increase in disposable income, consumption – and the relative tax
base – thus, offsetting the negative impact stemming from an
increase in the VAT rate. The performance of the TASI is similarly
to the VAT in the long run, but with some relevant costs in the
short run in terms of real estate investment.24 Increasing taxation
will affect expected housing values, leading to a sharp decrease on
impact in demand for housing investment.
In order to appreciate the impact of the fiscal reform package,
we can consider a permanent reduction in the overall labour tax
24. The huge impact of a TASI tax increase on GDP is due to the lack of adjustment cost that in
the current version of the paper is not included into the model. If it was included the same
impact would have been spread over several time periods.
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As expected, we observe a positive impact on labour demand and
employment. In general, we find positive effects on GDP in the
long-run, but public expenditure adjustment constrains the labour
tax wedge cut effects (0.2 against 0.5 for TASI and VAT, and 0.9 for
public transfer adjustment) via long run crowding-out of invest-
ment and consumption (see Table A1 columns c13-c16.).
Structural reforms. The purpose of product market reforms is
to increase competition and stimulate growth, employment and
productivity; labour market reforms aim mainly at increasing
labour market flexibility and stimulating labour demand. We find
that output increases especially under product market reforms,
which perform better than labour market reforms in both the short
and the long run (Table A1 c21-c24 vs c17-c20), irrespective of the
type of fiscal coverage. However, only labour market reforms lead
to a permanent contraction in the unemployment rate.26 Our
results show that a permanent reduction in price markups leads to
an increase in exports and hence in domestic production and
employment (Table A3). Labour market reforms imply a perma-
nent reduction in the wage markup, which would lead to a fall in
real wages and increased demand for labour. The reduction in
prices resulting from labour market reforms, brought about by a
decrease in marginal costs, is less intense compared to product
market reforms, therefore, the positive effects on exports and
consumption are more muted although not negligible, under
labour market reforms.27
Thanks to structural reform payoffs, fiscal coverage adjustment
to balance the budget works in the opposite direction to the labour
tax wedge cut scenario: depending on the type of fiscal adjustment
chosen the benefits stemming from structural reforms allow for
either a reduction in the VAT and TASI rate (rather than an
increase in the fiscal burden) or an increase in government
25. See section 3.1 for details on the design of the experiment.
26. Our model incorporates the labor market as in Galı´ (2011). This explains unemployment in
the long run as a frictional outcome due mainly to monopolistic labour union power. Therefore
a reduction in labour wage mark-up allows to reduce supply and increase labour demand. When
other shocks hit the economy the unemployment remains constant in the long run.
27. The small impact of labour market reforms is confirmed in the empirical literature (e.g.,
Barnes et al., 2011; Bouis and Duval, 2011). 
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exploitation of the expansive side of public expenditure/transfers
or of a cut in VAT or TASI. For both product and labour market
reforms it is public spending that boosts the economy in the long
run. In the short-run, the largest gains in terms of GDP come from
product market reforms under a TASI fiscal coverage (Table A1,
column c24). This effect depends on the price reduction, which, on
the one side, reduces real estate values, but on the other side boosts
the economy via a larger cut to housing taxation which enhances
housing investment accumulation.
With respect to the public debt-to-GDP ratio, product market
reforms perform better since they reduce the public debt-to-GDP
ratio by about four times compared with labour market reforms
(2.4 vs 0.7 percentage points in Table A3). Indeed, the reduction in
prices would reduce the cost of final goods to consumers and yield
higher real wages, which would cause a rise in disposable income
in the long run. This would strengthen consumption and invest-
ment, which would increase more by around 2 percentage points
(Table A3) under public spending and transfer coverage, and by
around 6 percentage points under TASI coverage. Increased
demand for goods would stimulate production and induce firms to
employ more labour and capital. In the short run, labour demand
increases more than labour supply (which grows because the
income effect is dominated by the substitution effect stemming
from the increased opportunity cost of leisure), thus, reducing the
unemployment rate. Capital becomes relatively cheaper and firms
increase capital investment. In the long run, output improves by
around 2 percentage points with public spending coverage
(Table A1 c22). Demand for capital also increases; thus, invest-
ments are permanently higher (by 1.5 per cent with TASI coverage,
Table A3). Overall, real GDP improves in the short run and stabi-
lises at the 0.5-0.6 per cent higher level in the long run.
Implementing simultaneous product and labour market
reforms could imply some extra payoffs in both the short and long
runs. The combination of structural reforms would prevent real
wages from declining permanently, as they would do under labour
market reforms only. If we combine labour and product market
reforms, we can see that the effects of reforms are roughly additive
(Table A1, c25-c28).
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tural reforms with fiscal policies, product market reforms always
perform better than labour market reforms (which constrains the
expansion of aggregate demand via decreasing real wages). The
labour tax wedge package, which includes simultaneous IRPEF, SSC
and IRAP cuts (without structural reforms) points to transfer reduc-
tion as the best scenario in terms of GDP growth from the first
quarter onwards (Table A1, column c13). The combination of
contemporaneous IRPEF, SSC and IRAP cuts with structural
reforms (Table A1, column c34) shows that, except for the first two
quarters after the shock, it is always preferable to adjust public
spending because its increase (due to the structural reform gains)
provides benefits from higher multipliers than those from a reduc-
tion in taxation, while transfers interact poorly with structural
reforms and, although positive, provide the worst coverage. As in
the structural reform case, the interaction between structural and
fiscal reforms are additive as shown in the results.28
5. Sensitivity analysis
Table A10 presents the results of fiscal and structural reforms in
the case of an unbalanced budget which implies an endogenous
adjustment to public debt. Note that, in this scenario, a labour tax
wedge cut – IRPEF, SSC, IRAP – implies higher medium-run costs in
terms of GDP, but higher gains in the long run compared to the
balanced case. Conversely, structural reforms – LM and PM – in the
presence of an unbalanced budget lead to higher short- and
medium-run benefits, but lower gains in the long run. The same
holds for an increase in government (productive) investment.29
Unbalanced fiscal shocks partially affect the fiscal consolidation,
28. In the model (see Catalano and Pezzolla, 2014) we have the unit labour cost (clup, VAT
gross) defined as
(5)
 
where mrs is the marginal rate of substitution, mpl is the marginal labour productivity and
markupw markupp are respectively wage and price mark-ups. The right hand side of the equation
is the labor tax wedge. It is straightforward that first order effects of simultaneous structural and
fiscal reforms are additive.
29. For further details on the effects of a government investment increase see section 6.
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consequent fiscal room is used to increase public goods demand.
In the remaining part of this section we assess the sensitivity of
the baseline results to the following specifications (robustness
checks): a) different degree of nominal price and wage rigidity;30
b) higher percentage of liquidity-constrained households;31
c) tightening of credit conditions.32 We distinguish the most
significant effects through calibration frameworks, comparing
them with baseline.
With respect to specification a), we analyse the effect of the
shocks in the presence of lower price rigidity compared to the base-
line. Price rigidity implies that prices do not adjust either
continuously or fully to changes in demand or costs. This means
that the probability of prices changing is not constant, and not all
firms can adjust to the optimal price immediately. The proportion
of prices not resetting is a measure of nominal rigidity. Because
firms set prices as a markup over a weighted average of expected
future marginal costs, the announcement of a labour tax wedge cut
in the presence of lower price rigidity would imply a higher output
response in the short run, given the increased proportion of reopti-
mising firms. The more sensitive variables to lower price rigidity
are labour demand, capital investment and production. The effects
on short-run GDP are larger for SSC and IRAP cuts under TASI fiscal
coverage (Table A4, c8 and c12 Year 1). Therefore, a reduction in
the unit cost of labour (via a reduction in SSC or IRAP) leads to a
higher response of output as the price adjustment spreads over the
final markets and allows for higher aggregate demand in the short
run. Surprisingly, a lower nominal price rigidity decreases the
output response to a price markup shock since a reduction in
wholesaler profits induced by a faster real cost increase leads to
lower demand in the labour and capital markets. When rigidity
enters the wage determination mechanism (Table A5), imperfect
adjustments to employment and the real wage can affect the short-
30. We change the values of parameters ζp and χw  in the model to 0.7 from 0.8 and 0.5
respectively, see Catalano (2014).
31. We change the value of parameter μa from 20 to 40 per cent, see Catalano and Pezzolla
(2014).
32. We change the values of parameters μμ and μ2 from 0.3 and 0.1 to 0.1 and 0.033; see
Catalano (2014) and Catalano and Pezzolla (2014).
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costs decrease due to a smaller labour wedge, the boost in labour
demand will lead to a lower wage in the short run. Due to higher
nominal rigidity, unions decrease wages slowly, maintaining
higher available income. Regarding structural reforms, the increase
in real wages due to a faster price markup reduction allows for
higher demand and boosts growth. In the face of a positive shock
induced by structural reforms to the labour markets, if wage
rigidity is higher than the baseline, the employment adjustment
will be slower.
Specification b) allows for a higher number of impatient house-
holds in the economy. The higher the percentage of constrained
households, the more sensitive the economy to income shocks. If
there is a positive shock increasing house prices (e.g., generated by
a shock to the marginal rate of substitution between housing and
consumption for all households), debtor borrowing capacity
increases, allowing households to spend more and invest more.
Therefore, the net effect on demand is positive, and acts as a
powerful amplification mechanism. However, a higher proportion
of impatient households does not seem to affect the labour wedge
cost. Structural reforms interact with a higher financial constraint
on the household sector, in particular in the case of product
market reform (Table A6). In the short run, transfers and public
spending seem to respond quickly due to lower availability of
income and consequently lower aggregate demand. A reduction in
prices leads to devaluation of housing stock and, therefore, also
borrowing capacity. In the case of transfers and public spending
(Table A6, c21 c22), the negative effects are larger because of lower
available income for constrained households, which causes a
decrease in aggregate demand and output.
Specification c) is obtained via lower loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
for both households and entrepreneurs. Their demand for loans is
more sensitive to income and net worth shocks in countries with
higher LTV ratios, given the collateral-based financial accelerator
mechanism.33 A positive shock boosting household demand for
housing, or firm demand for capital investment, would lead to an
increase in households' borrowing capacity. Clearly, the higher the
33. See Catalano (2014) and Catalano and Pezzolla (2014).
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the other hand, lower LTV ratios render the collateral constraint
more binding and reduce the impact of (positive or negative)
shocks to household income. Tables A7 and A8 show that lower
LTV ratios induce a slight reduction in the short-run output
response to fiscal and structural changes. In particular, a higher
financial constraint on working households seems to affect struc-
tural reforms covered by public transfers since lower available
income reduces aggregate demand, thus, decreasing the impact of
structural reforms on the labour market (Table A7 c17). Finally,
structural reforms on the labour market implemented during a
financial recession particularly affecting the entrepreneur sector,
could slightly decrease the positive effects on GDP with respect to
the baseline case (Table A8 c17-c28) except for the case of product
market reforms that have a positive impact.
6. Government investment
All the experiments described in the previous sections are based
on an economy with constant public capital stock, while the
private sector accumulates capital given economic market incen-
tives. In this section we investigate what would happen if the
policymaker expands the productive capacity of the economy in
the long run, by increasing public investment. We assess the inter-
actions between the increase in public investment and the above-
mentioned fiscal and structural reforms. We expect a greater
benefit to the economy in the long run, at the cost of lower growth
in the short term. In fact, the simulations indicate that the positive
effect of a wedge cut is enhanced in the presence of a permanent
increase in public investment equal to 1 per cent of GDP: this
alone has an effect similar to the effect of structural reform to the
product market (Table A9). The full package of reforms in the
presence of increased public investment shows a strong interaction
with adjustment to public spending to balance the budget: the
cumulative effect on GDP increases by more than 2 percentage
points compared to the full package of reforms in the baseline case
(Table A9 c2, c6-. . . -c30, c34). Although at the expense of a slight
initial cost due to a tightening of budget coverage, an increase in
public investment would ensure higher long-run growth and lead
Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla210to an increased chance of spending or increased chance of a reduc-
tion in the tax burden on indirect taxes.
7. Conclusions
Reduction in the labour tax wedge and implementation of
structural reforms are two crucial instruments for boosting growth
and achieving long-run fiscal consolidation goals. In this paper we
analyse the effects of both structural reforms, via a reduction in
prices and wage markups, and a labour tax wedge cut via a reduc-
tion to the IRPEF and IRAP and SSC tax rates. Our findings indicate
that a cut in IRAP is the best tax wedge component to stimulate
long-run GDP growth. In all the experiments we propose, the
decrease in fiscal revenues coming from the tax wedge cut was
offset by the use of different fiscal instruments, namely, a public
spending cut, a reduction in public transfers and a shift from a
labour to a consumption or property tax rate. We found that in the
absence of structural reforms, the reduction in public transfers to
households to cover a labour wedge cut is the best instrument to
ensure higher GDP growth under the balanced budget constraint.
Conversely, in the presence of both a labour tax wedge cut and
structural reforms in the product market, the best instrument is
public spending, which allows exploitation of the positive effects
of simultaneous fiscal and structural reforms. We provide some
additional robustness checks regarding the degree of nominal
rigidity in the economy and the availability of credit to economic
agents with the aim of showing how fiscal policy might be affected
by contemporaneous financial distress. There is evidence of a nega-
tive impact from the interaction of fiscal reform to the labour
wedge with transfers, and aggregate demand. We also consider the
role of increasing public investment in order to measure the inter-
action mechanism between fiscal policy instruments and growing
capital stock due to an expansionary public policy. Except for an
initial cost in terms of growth, public investment causes wide-
spread improvements to GDP growth, enhancing the positive
effects from increased public expenditure on goods and services.
The picture that emerges from these various model specifications
indicates that the baseline results are fairly robust to changes in the
parameters considered and the economic conditions. The simula-
tion exercises show that structural reforms could provide large
The interaction between the labour tax wedge and structural reforms in Italy 211payoffs in terms of growth and employment. In particular public
spending is shown to be a useful instrument if used in combina-
tion with product market reforms. Among the other options, we
recommend stimulating public investment, because this could
magnify the effects of structural reforms in Italy. Finally, in order
to alleviate the short-run costs of a public investment increase, it
could be useful to simultaneously reduce the labour tax wedge
components.
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Table A1. Fiscal and structural reforms
(GDP percentage deviation from steady state, Baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - 0.24 0.37 0.43 0.48 0.72 0.83 0.91 0.97 c1
Pub. Spend. - 0.34 -0.09 -0.18 -0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.12 0.15 c2
VAT + 0.64 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.44 0.47 c3
TASI + -1.74 -0.83 -0.48 -0.29 0.24 0.32 0.41 0.46 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - 0.32 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.60 0.63 c5
Pub. Spend. - 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.09 c6
VAT + 0.45 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.27 c7
TASI + -0.51 -0.05 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.27 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.08 0.34 0.42 0.47 0.64 0.75 0.96 1.11 c9
Pub. Spend. - -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.15 0.36 0.53 c10
VAT + 0.30 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.59 0.74 c11
TASI + -1.42 -0.53 -0.21 -0.09 0.26 0.34 0.57 0.73 c12
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.21 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.64 0.70 0.81 0.89 c13
Pub. Spend. - 0.16 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.24 c14
VAT + 0.46 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.42 0.48 c15
TASI + -1.20 -0.46 -0.19 -0.08 0.25 0.28 0.40 0.48 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.57 c17
Pub. Spend. + 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.61 c18
VAT - 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.34 0.42 0.47 0.50 c19
TASI - 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.51 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.77 1.49 1.61 1.54 1.19 1.03 1.24 1.37 c21
Pub. Spend. + 0.91 2.53 2.74 2.58 1.86 1.57 1.88 2.12 c22
VAT - 0.08 1.36 1.64 1.66 1.41 1.19 1.47 1.67 c23
TASI - 4.56 3.25 2.65 2.29 1.33 1.33 1.54 1.69 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.88 1.62 1.76 1.73 1.49 1.37 1.61 1.77 c25
Pub. Spend. + 1.03 2.67 2.93 2.82 2.29 2.07 2.45 2.74 c26
VAT - 0.14 1.45 1.77 1.84 1.77 1.62 1.95 2.18 c27
TASI - 4.90 3.53 2.95 2.61 1.75 1.78 2.03 2.21 c28
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.32 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.93 1.04 1.18 1.29 c29
Pub. Spend. + 0.27 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.48 0.59 0.74 0.85 c30
VAT - 0.52 0.39 0.42 0.47 0.66 0.76 0.89 0.99 c31
TASI - -0.88 -0.20 0.08 0.22 0.65 0.72 0.88 0.98 c32
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP+LM
+PM
Pub. Transf. + 1.07 1.89 2.10 2.11 2.01 1.93 2.27 2.50 c33
Pub. Spend. + 1.19 2.66 2.90 2.82 2.35 2.16 2.62 2.97 c34
VAT - 0.61 1.77 2.08 2.16 2.09 1.96 2.37 2.66 c35
TASI - 3.70 3.07 2.76 2.53 1.99 2.05 2.43 2.68 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage changes after fiscal and/or structural reforms. Labour tax wedge includes
IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by employers), and IRAP (regional tax on
productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup); PM: product market reform (reduc-
tion in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform. All experiments assume a balanced
budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock, include: public spending or transfer
adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal coverage change.
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(deviation from steady state)
Public Spending VAT TASI Public Transfers
Variable Year (IQ) IRPEF SSC IRAP IRPEF SSC IRAP IRPEF SSC IRAP IRPEF SSC IRAP
O
ut
p
ut
1 0.34 0.25 -0.12 0.64 0.45 0.30 -1.74 -0.51 -1.42 0.24 0.32 0.08
3 -0.03 0.17 0.08 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.72 0.58 0.64
5 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.40 0.23 0.40 0.32 0.18 0.34 0.83 0.54 0.75
10 0.12 0.08 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.59 0.41 0.24 0.57 0.91 0.60 0.96
20 0.15 0.09 0.53 0.47 0.27 0.74 0.46 0.27 0.73 0.97 0.63 1.11
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
1 0.27 0.19 0.10 0.31 0.15 -0.04 0.22 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.11
3 1.20 0.77 0.61 0.04 0.27 -0.18 1.16 0.78 0.58 0.49 0.36 0.06
5 1.26 0.75 0.76 0.24 0.18 0.01 1.21 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.36 0.28
10 1.30 0.76 1.03 0.35 0.20 0.40 1.32 0.77 1.04 0.84 0.45 0.70
20 1.34 0.77 1.26 0.41 0.24 0.72 1.42 0.82 1.32 0.97 0.53 1.03
In
ve
st
m
en
t
1 2.26 1.57 1.09 2.85 1.90 1.79 -10.97 -3.81 -8.72 0.26 0.33 -0.43
3 1.05 0.79 2.10 1.46 0.94 2.38 -1.92 -0.91 -0.01 1.15 0.88 2.17
5 1.09 0.58 1.89 1.38 0.74 2.12 -1.84 -1.16 -0.21 1.22 0.66 1.99
10 1.05 0.60 1.72 1.30 0.74 1.90 -1.79 -1.03 -0.11 1.09 0.63 1.76
20 1.03 0.59 1.57 1.25 0.72 1.70 -1.80 -1.03 -0.14 1.01 0.58 1.56
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t
1 0.55 0.42 -0.17 0.99 0.72 0.48 -2.69 -0.76 -2.18 0.38 0.51 0.15
3 0.17 0.39 0.14 0.52 0.55 0.38 0.64 0.54 0.47 1.15 0.93 0.88
5 0.36 0.20 0.05 0.62 0.35 0.26 0.73 0.39 0.35 1.25 0.78 0.77
10 0.35 0.21 0.05 0.60 0.35 0.22 0.73 0.42 0.32 1.20 0.76 0.68
20 0.35 0.21 0.04 0.59 0.34 0.18 0.71 0.41 0.26 1.16 0.74 0.60
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 1 -0.28 -0.65 -0.10 -0.54 -0.84 -0.56 2.51 0.38 1.67 0.33 -0.42 0.03
3 0.13 -0.34 -0.23 0.12 -0.33 -0.22 0.01 -0.37 -0.29 0.14 -0.31 -0.19
5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
10 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
1 -0.39 -0.28 0.17 -0.76 -0.52 -0.34 2.11 0.64 1.74 -0.29 -0.36 -0.09
3 0.21 -0.10 0.05 -0.30 -0.33 -0.31 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.76 -0.62 -0.68
5 0.07 0.02 -0.04 -0.40 -0.23 -0.40 -0.20 -0.12 -0.26 -0.87 -0.59 -0.79
10 0.04 0.01 -0.27 -0.44 -0.26 -0.61 -0.30 -0.18 -0.53 -0.96 -0.65 -1.03
20 0.01 0.00 -0.47 -0.48 -0.28 -0.78 -0.36 -0.21 -0.71 -1.03 -0.69 -1.20
Note: The values indicate percentage changes after fiscal reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income
tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). All
experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock, include:
public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal coverage
change.
Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla216Table A3. Impact of structural reforms
(deviation from steady state)
Public Spending VAT TASI Public Transfers
Variable
Year
(IQ) LM PM
LM+ 
PM LM PM
LM+ 
PM LM PM
LM+ 
PM LM PM
LM+ 
PM
O
ut
p
ut
1 0.12 0.91 1.03 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.31 4.56 4.90 0.14 0.77 0.88
3 0.40 1.86 2.29 0.34 1.41 1.77 0.40 1.33 1.75 0.43 1.19 1.49
5 0.49 1.57 2.07 0.42 1.19 1.62 0.44 1.33 1.78 0.49 1.03 1.37
10 0.56 1.88 2.45 0.47 1.47 1.95 0.47 1.54 2.03 0.53 1.24 1.61
20 0.61 2.12 2.74 0.50 1.67 2.18 0.51 1.69 2.21 0.57 1.37 1.77
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
1 0.03 -0.11 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.11
3 0.18 -0.02 0.17 0.41 1.55 1.99 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.17 0.58 0.91
5 0.25 0.29 0.54 0.55 1.34 1.90 0.24 0.35 0.60 0.26 0.71 1.10
10 0.34 0.71 1.05 0.66 1.93 2.60 0.33 0.67 1.01 0.37 1.08 1.54
20 0.42 1.03 1.45 0.74 2.35 3.11 0.39 0.93 1.33 0.44 1.37 1.89
In
ve
st
m
en
t
1 0.28 1.66 1.96 0.20 -0.10 0.11 1.85 26.31 28.23 -0.22 2.31 2.84
3 0.60 3.62 4.27 0.54 3.08 3.65 1.57 6.11 7.76 0.58 3.68 4.27
5 0.62 2.46 3.09 0.54 2.19 2.74 1.55 5.91 7.50 0.61 2.28 2.87
10 0.55 2.15 2.72 0.47 1.86 2.35 1.48 6.04 7.57 0.55 2.10 2.64
20 0.50 1.93 2.44 0.42 1.60 2.03 1.48 6.01 7.54 0.50 1.92 2.43
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t
1 0.18 1.53 1.72 0.10 0.27 0.37 0.49 7.21 7.73 0.22 1.32 1.51
3 0.64 2.28 2.96 0.56 1.92 2.51 0.61 1.43 2.07 0.66 1.46 1.96
5 0.72 1.45 2.18 0.65 1.18 1.84 0.64 1.05 1.70 0.71 0.81 1.34
10 0.71 1.46 2.18 0.63 1.16 1.80 0.60 1.02 1.64 0.68 0.78 1.29
20 0.71 1.45 2.16 0.63 1.11 1.74 0.59 0.96 1.57 0.66 0.71 1.20
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 1 -0.27 -0.89 -1.16 -0.21 -0.01 -0.23 -0.51 -5.88 -6.45 -0.17 -1.01 -1.34
3 -0.97 -0.37 -1.37 -0.96 -0.38 -1.38 -0.96 -0.15 -1.14 -0.96 -0.41 -1.43
5 -1.05 0.04 -1.01 -1.05 0.05 -0.99 -1.05 0.03 -1.01 -1.05 0.06 -0.99
10 -1.05 -0.01 -1.06 -1.04 0.00 -1.05 -1.04 0.00 -1.05 -1.04 0.00 -1.05
20 -1.05 -0.01 -1.05 -1.04 0.00 -1.04 -1.04 0.00 -1.04 -1.04 0.00 -1.04
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
1 -0.13 -0.97 -1.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.38 -5.33 -5.71 -0.17 -0.79 -0.92
3 -0.44 -2.06 -2.52 -0.34 -1.43 -1.78 -0.43 -1.42 -1.86 -0.47 -1.24 -1.53
5 -0.53 -1.76 -2.29 -0.42 -1.21 -1.63 -0.48 -1.50 -1.97 -0.53 -1.10 -1.43
10 -0.61 -2.12 -2.72 -0.48 -1.52 -1.99 -0.52 -1.74 -2.26 -0.58 -1.32 -1.69
20 -0.68 -2.39 -3.05 -0.52 -1.73 -2.24 -0.56 -1.90 -2.46 -0.62 -1.47 -1.87
Note: The values indicate percentage changes after structural reforms. LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage
markup); PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market
reform. All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any
shock, include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run
fiscal coverage change.
The interaction between the labour tax wedge and structural reforms in Italy 217Table A4. Fiscal and structural reforms with a lower price rigidity
(GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.13 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 c2
VAT + -0.15 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 c3
TASI + 0.53 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 c5
Pub. Spend. - 0.15 0.30 0.28 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 c6
VAT + 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7
TASI + 0.53 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 c9
Pub. Spend. - 0.19 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 c10
VAT + 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 c11
TASI + 0.63 0.36 0.24 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 c12
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 c13
Pub. Spend. - 0.06 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 c14
VAT + -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 c15
TASI + 0.55 0.32 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.13 -0.42 -0.52 -0.50 -0.27 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 c17
Pub. Spend. + -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 c18
VAT - -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 c19
TASI - -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 c21
Pub. Spend. + -0.12 -1.07 -1.21 -1.10 -0.46 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 c22
VAT - 0.22 -0.42 -0.58 -0.60 -0.34 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 c23
TASI - -2.06 -1.33 -1.00 -0.79 -0.18 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.14 -0.43 -0.51 -0.49 -0.26 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 c25
Pub. Spend. + -0.14 -1.06 -1.20 -1.08 -0.45 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 c26
VAT - 0.20 -0.40 -0.56 -0.58 -0.32 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 c27
TASI - -2.11 -1.35 -1.00 -0.79 -0.17 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 c28
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 c29
Pub. Spend. + 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00 c30
VAT - -0.05 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 c31
TASI - 0.51 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 c32
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP+LM
+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.09 -0.34 -0.42 -0.41 -0.23 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 c33
Pub. Spend. + -0.08 -0.84 -0.96 -0.87 -0.38 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 c34
VAT - 0.17 -0.33 -0.47 -0.49 -0.29 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 c35
TASI - -1.55 -1.02 -0.78 -0.62 -0.16 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla218Table A5. Fiscal and structural reforms with a higher wage rigidity
(GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.00 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 c2
VAT + 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 c3
TASI + -0.20 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.00 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.00 c5
Pub. Spend. - 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.01 c6
VAT + 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.01 0.00 c7
TASI + 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.07 0.01 0.00 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 c9
Pub. Spend. - 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.01 c10
VAT + 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.00 c11
TASI + 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.00 c12
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 c13
Pub. Spend. - 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.00 c14
VAT + 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.00 c15
TASI + 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.00 c17
Pub. Spend. + -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 c18
VAT - -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 c19
TASI - -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 c21
Pub. Spend. + 0.08 0.24 0.37 0.46 0.42 0.06 0.03 0.01 c22
VAT - 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.00 c23
TASI - 0.64 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.01 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 c25
Pub. Spend. + 0.07 0.21 0.32 0.40 0.36 0.05 0.03 0.01 c26
VAT - 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.03 0.01 0.00 c27
TASI - 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.28 0.04 0.02 0.01 c28
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 c29
Pub. Spend. + 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 c30
VAT - 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 c31
TASI - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 c32
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP+LM
+PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.13 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.02 0.01 c33
Pub. Spend. + 0.10 0.25 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.11 0.04 0.01 c34
VAT - 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.08 0.02 0.01 c35
TASI - 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.38 0.07 0.03 0.01 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
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of constrained households (marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c2
VAT + -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c3
TASI + -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c5
Pub. Spend. - 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6
VAT + 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7
TASI + 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c9
Pub. Spend. - 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c10
VAT + -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c11
TASI + -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c12
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c13
Pub. Spend. - 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c14
VAT + -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c15
TASI + -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c17
Pub. Spend. + -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c18
VAT - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c19
TASI - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.05 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c21
Pub. Spend. + -0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c22
VAT - -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c23
TASI - 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c25
Pub. Spend. + -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c26
VAT - -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c27
TASI - 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 c28
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c29
Pub. Spend. + -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c30
VAT - -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c31
TASI - -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c32
IRPEF+SSC
+IRAP+LM
+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c33
Pub. Spend. + -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c34
VAT - -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c35
TASI - 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
Michele Catalano and Emilia Pezzolla220Table A7. Fiscal and structural reforms with a lower LTV ratio (households)
(marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c2
VAT + -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c3
TASI + 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c5
Pub. Spend. - -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6
VAT + -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c7
TASI + 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c9
Pub. Spend. - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c10
VAT + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c11
TASI + 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c12
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c13
Pub. Spend. - -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c14
VAT + -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c15
TASI + 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.62 -1.22 -1.32 -1.22 -0.76 -0.53 -0.70 -0.80 c17
Pub. Spend. + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c18
VAT - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c19
TASI - -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.90 1.17 1.11 0.95 0.23 -0.13 -0.06 0.21 c21
Pub. Spend. + 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c22
VAT - 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c23
TASI - -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c25
Pub. Spend. + 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c26
VAT - 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 c27
TASI - -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c28
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c29
Pub. Spend. + -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c30
VAT - -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c31
TASI - 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c32
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP+LM+
PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 c33
Pub. Spend. + 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c34
VAT - 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c35
TASI - -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
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(marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 c2
VAT + -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 c3
TASI + -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 c5
Pub. Spend. - 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 c6
VAT + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c7
TASI + -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 c9
Pub. Spend. - 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c10
VAT + 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c11
TASI + -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c12
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP
Pub. Transf. - -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 c13
Pub.Spend. - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c14
VAT + 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c15
TASI + -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.64 -1.30 -1.40 -1.30 -0.84 -0.62 -0.79 -0.90 c17
Pub. Spend. + 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c18
VAT - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c19
TASI - -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + 0.86 1.05 0.98 0.82 0.09 -0.25 -0.17 0.12 c21
Pub. Spend. + -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 c22
VAT - 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 c23
TASI - -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 c25
Pub. Spend. + -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 c26
VAT - 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 c27
TASI - -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 c28
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 c29
Pub. Spend. + 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c30
VAT - 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c31
TASI - -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 c32
IRPEF+SSC
+ IRAP+LM
+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 c33
Pub. Spend. + -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 c34
VAT - 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 c35
TASI - -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
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(marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year Column
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Pub. Transf. - -0.15 0.29 0.42 0.53 0.94 1.13 1.28 1.14 c1
Pub. Spend. - -0.27 -0.86 -0.22 0.17 0.74 0.98 1.58 2.11 c2
VAT + 1.64 -0.12 0.25 0.47 0.86 1.08 1.46 1.62 c3
TASI + -7.21 1.65 1.49 1.22 0.88 1.15 1.48 1.62 c4
SSC
Pub. Transf. - -0.15 0.20 0.37 0.46 0.83 1.01 1.14 0.99 c5
Pub. Spend. - -0.46 -0.30 0.10 0.30 0.58 0.97 1.58 2.11 c6
VAT + 1.34 0.24 0.44 0.54 0.75 1.07 1.46 1.62 c7
TASI + -5.06 1.36 1.17 0.92 0.78 1.14 1.48 1.63 c8
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - -0.15 0.19 0.36 0.45 0.81 0.98 1.10 0.96 c9
Pub. Spend. - -1.15 -0.32 0.12 0.35 0.64 0.98 1.57 2.09 c10
VAT + 1.06 0.06 0.41 0.57 0.79 1.07 1.43 1.58 c11
TASI + -6.50 1.79 1.45 1.11 0.79 1.13 1.45 1.59 c12
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP
Pub. Transf. - -0.15 0.19 0.36 0.46 0.82 1.00 1.13 0.98 c13
Pub. Spend. - -0.61 -0.50 0.00 0.27 0.65 0.97 1.58 2.10 c14
VAT + 1.34 0.06 0.36 0.52 0.80 1.07 1.45 1.60 c15
TASI + -6.20 1.57 1.36 1.08 0.81 1.13 1.47 1.61 c16
LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.15 0.19 0.36 0.46 0.83 1.01 1.14 0.99 c17
Pub. Spend. + -0.45 -0.34 -0.19 -0.05 0.54 0.97 1.64 2.24 c18
VAT - 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.33 0.76 1.09 1.53 1.72 c19
TASI - -2.02 -0.61 -0.09 0.13 0.86 1.15 1.56 1.75 c20
PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.13 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.78 0.96 1.10 0.95 c21
Pub. Spend. + -0.40 -0.18 -0.03 0.09 0.55 0.94 1.61 2.21 c22
VAT - 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.34 0.73 1.05 1.48 1.69 c23
TASI - -1.88 -0.48 0.01 0.19 0.80 1.10 1.53 1.73 c24
LM+PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.13 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.78 0.95 1.09 0.95 c25
Pub. Spend. + -0.40 -0.18 -0.03 0.09 0.55 0.94 1.61 2.21 c26
VAT - 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.34 0.73 1.05 1.48 1.68 c27
TASI - -1.89 -0.48 0.00 0.19 0.80 1.10 1.53 1.74 c28
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP+LM
Pub. Transf. + -0.15 0.19 0.36 0.45 0.82 0.99 1.13 0.98 c29
Pub. Spend. + -0.46 -0.35 -0.20 -0.05 0.54 0.96 1.63 2.23 c30
VAT - 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.75 1.08 1.52 1.71 c31
TASI - -2.01 -0.59 -0.07 0.14 0.86 1.13 1.54 1.73 c32
IRPEF+SSC+ 
IRAP+LM+
PM
Pub. Transf. + -0.13 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.77 0.94 1.08 0.94 c33
Pub. Spend. + -0.40 -0.19 -0.04 0.08 0.55 0.93 1.60 2.20 c34
VAT - 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.33 0.72 1.04 1.47 1.68 c35
TASI - -1.89 -0.47 0.02 0.20 0.79 1.09 1.51 1.71 c36
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after fiscal and/or structural
reforms. Labour tax wedge includes IRPEF (labour income tax), SSC (social security contributions paid only by
employers), and IRAP (regional tax on productive activities). LM: labour market reform (reduction in wage markup);
PM: product market reform (reduction in price markup); LM+PM simultaneous labour and product market reform.
All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after any shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
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(marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Coverage ∆ LP
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year
Colum
n
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
Increase in government investment (1 pp of Gdp)
PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT
Pub.Transf. + -0.12 0.34 0.51 0.60 0.98 1.16 1.31 1.17 c37
Pub.Spend + -0.45 -0.33 -0.19 -0.05 0.53 0.96 1.64 2.24 c38
VAT - 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.76 1.09 1.53 1.72 c39
TASI - -2.01 -0.60 -0.08 0.13 0.86 1.15 1.56 1.74 c40
Note: The values indicate GDP percentage deviations from the baseline in Table A1 after an increase in public invest-
ment. All experiments assume a balanced budget scenario. Fiscal coverages to balance the budget, after the shock,
include: public spending or transfer adjustment; VAT or TASI (house services tax) adjustment. ∆LP: long-run fiscal
coverage change.
Table A10. Fiscal and structural reforms: balanced vs unbalanced budget
(marginal GDP percentage deviation from baseline)
Reform Budget
1st year 3rd   year
5th   
year
10th 
year
20th 
year
IQ IIQ IIIQ IVQ IQ IQ IQ IQ
IRPEF
Balanced 0.34 -0.09 -0.18 -0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.12 0.15
Unbalanced 1.25 0.06 -0.67 -1.17 -1.90 -0.65 0.37 0.72
SSC
Balanced 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.09
Unbalanced 0.94 0.31 -0.12 -0.43 -0.94 -0.29 0.23 0.42
IRAP
Balanced -0.12 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.15 0.36 0.53
Unbalanced 0.70 0.12 -0.30 -0.60 -1.06 -0.23 0.52 0.86
LM
Balanced 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.61
Unbalanced -0.12 0.32 0.61 0.82 1.06 0.64 0.45 0.41
PM
Balanced 0.91 2.53 2.74 2.58 1.86 1.57 1.88 2.12
Unbalanced -0.47 2.76 4.35 5.17 4.70 1.91 1.38 1.25
PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT
Balanced -0.45 -0.33 -0.19 -0.05 0.53 0.96 1.64 2.24
Unbalanced -2.50 5.02 9.82 11.80 4.00 1.46 0.41 0.31
Note: Balanced budget implies public spending adjustment as fiscal coverage in both the short and the long run (for
further details, see Table A1); unbalanced budget implies a public debt adjustment in both the short and the long
run, and only a transitory government spending adjustment.
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Since ancient times the primary objective of taxation has been
to collect revenue in order to finance state provision of essential
public services. At the same time, enlightened by advances in
public sector economics, current taxation policies are designed to
strike the difficult balance between achieving minimal
disincentives to undertake productive activities and maximum
social fairness.
In this context, corporate taxation is a key part of the taxation
system that directly affects current and future business decisions of
the private sector. Corporate taxes impact capital and labour costs
and, hence, not just current production and hiring decisions, but
also the net present value of future production, which motivates
corporate investment. Corporate taxation policy has been used as
an instrument to both fine-tune investment and output fluctua-
tions over the business cycle, and spur long-term economic growth
and national welfare. In the last few decades, the importance of
optimally designed, growth-friendly taxation policies has been
further emphasised by the enhanced international mobility of
capital in search of a lower tax burden and modest production
costs to ensure competitiveness. Policy options, which reignite the
engine of economic growth in Europe, generating welfare and
internal demand, offer the only viable exit from the financial and
debt crisis, as suggested by Onofri and Tsenova (2014).
This paper evaluates the empirical significance of corporate
taxation policies on the macroeconomic dynamics of Italy and, on
that basis, assesses the likely transmission and economic impact of
future policy changes in that area. We study closely the case of Italy
since it is the third largest euro area economy and because its rela-
tively high public debt, subdued economic growth and stringent
governance rules set out in the Fiscal Compact, impose critical
trade-offs on fiscal policy-making aimed at escaping from the
global economic crisis. Also, since Italy's corporate tax system has
frequently changed over the past twenty years, this country would
seem to have been actively using corporate taxation reforms to
steer its economy. This provides valuable historical evidence on the
efficiency of corporate taxation as a policy instrument. We also aim
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to further reduce or abolish some corporate taxes.
To this end, we consider in great detail both the structure of the
corporate taxation system in Italy and its numerous reforms, and
scrupulously measure their impact on the user cost of capital to
labour in the period 1996Q1-2012Q4. We construct our own
measure of user cost and its components in order to distinguish the
impact of the taxation system, inclusive of tax rates and temporary
incentives, from other underlying factors such as monetary policy
and relative price movements. We estimate the investment
channel in the transmission of taxation policies to examine the
link between the user cost of capital to labour within the context of
a theoretically motivated Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
that contains a full set of other factors such as demand realisations,
expectations and uncertainty. We use the model to conduct coun-
terfactual historical analysis. Finally, we apply Prometeia's
quarterly macro-economic model for the Italian economy, esti-
mated on detailed sectorally disaggregated data and incorporating
the investment channel, to evaluate the transmission and overall
impact on economic activity of recent policy proposals to reduce
corporate taxes in Italy. We compare and contrast those policies
with a corresponding increase in public spending which provides a
perspective on the advantages and limits of using the corporate tax
system as tool to fine-tune the business cycle and stimulate long-
term economic growth.
The paper builds on the micro-founded theoretical literature
(e.g. Jorgenson, 1996, Devereux and Griffith, 1998, Jorgenson and
Yun, 2012), which regards the user cost of capital to labour as
being at the core of taxation and monetary policy transmission
over the business cycle and over the longer-term. It also widens the
scope and policy relevant discourse compared to other valuable
efforts to analyse the direct consequences of tax reforms in Italy
such as Bontempi et al. (1995), Bontempi et al. (2010), Bordignon et
al. (2001), Bresciani et al. (2003), Bernasconi et al. (2005) and
Caiumi et al. (2013). Whereas several empirical studies had failed
to demonstrate the existence of an econometric link between the
user cost of capital and investment at macro level, see Guiso et al.
(2002), we prove successful in that direction. Furthermore, our
econometric estimation incorporates demand expectations, fore-
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supply and demand factors, which confirms previous applied
studies such as Bloom (2000), Antonietti et al. (2015), Guthrie
(2012) and Tsenova (2014), of the importance of these elements for
financial and real sector decision-making.
The results of the analysis provide evidence of a significant link
between the user cost of capital to labour and corporate invest-
ment. Changes in the taxation system seem to be the main
determinant of variation in the capital to labour cost, leaving a
very limited role for other considered factors such as monetary
policy and relative prices. The cost of capital to labour has been
displaying a downward trend as result of a gradual reduction in
corporate tax rates and/or bases. Cyclical fluctuations around that
trend can be attributed mostly to temporary fiscal incentives.
According to the econometric model of investment, reductions
in the user cost of capital relative to labour have a significant and
positive effect on corporate investment in both the short- and the
longer-term. We also find an influence of Keynesian type demand
factors such as aggregate demand, demand expectations and
uncertainty. Historically, temporary tax incentives seem to have
made an important contribution to boosting investment and
economic activity during downturns. Reductions in tax rates and/
or tax bases appear to bring about permanent alleviation of user
cost and stimulus to economic activity.
The outcome of the macroeconomic assessment of policy
proposals to further reduce corporate tax rates in Italy show that
decreasing the regional tax on corporate activity (IRAP) would be
more beneficial than comparable decline in the corporate income
tax (IRES). This is because the macroeconomic model incorporates
not only the investment channel in the transmission of tax policy,
but also other endogenous links with impact on labour demand.
Bearing in mind that in the case of IRAP tax reduction would
diminish both the user cost of capital and labour, which stimulates
investment, as well as employment. Instead, IRES would encourage
certain degree of substitution between capital and labour, damp-
ening labour demand and, consequently, economic activity. An
alternative equivalent increase in public investment could produce
overwhelmingly stronger improvement in economic activity
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overs on corporate investment and debt sustainability.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an over-
view on the evolution of corporate tax legislation in Italy; Section
3 presents the methodology, data and parameterisation; Section 4
reports the empirical results for measuring the user cost of capital
to labour and its underlying components, based on estimation of a
full econometric model that includes the determinants of invest-
ment demand, to assess the impact of past tax policies and future
tax proposals; Section 6 concludes.
2. Italy's corporate tax system
This section provides an overview of the structure of corporate
taxation in Italy and its evolution through time. Starting in the
early 1990s, the Italian tax system has undergone a number of
more or less substantial reforms, delivering ample basis for analysis
and comparisons. The longer-term goals of the Italian government
are common to all market-based economies:  
— reducing the tax burden on private agents to spur economic
activity and future government revenue; 
— minimising distortions from corporate income accounting
giving preference to debt funding over equity financing; 
— encouraging investment in productive activities as opposed
to consumption and accumulation of financial or real estate
wealth; 
— supporting investment in sectors of strategic importance for
the country's long-term competitiveness and welfare. 
Moving towards those complex and sometimes conflicting
goals involves difficult trade-offs and decisions. Over the short-
term governments try to minimise economic volatility by
providing temporary incentives to support the execution of invest-
ment plans during downturns, thereby reigniting economic
growth. The recent global economic crisis and the size of Italy's
and the euro area's public debt has further narrowed the feasible
options for fiscal and economic policy manoeuvre.
When trying to quantify the impact of Italy's numerous tax
reforms on the various components of the user cost of capital and
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order to apply the theoretical formulas on user cost described in the
next section, it is important to gain a deep understanding of the
frequency of tax reforms and their legal basis, as well as the key
changes they bring to parameters and user cost formation such as
different tax rates, composition of the tax bases, depreciation rates,
social security contributions, temporary and permanent allowances.
We start our review at the beginning of 1996, two years before
one of the most important and comprehensive reforms in Italy
entered into force. This reform is known as “Visco's reform” after
Vincenzo Visco, the Minister of Finance responsible for its design
and implementation. Prior to this reform, the corporate tax system
consisted mainly of a corporation tax – Imposta sul Reddito delle
Persone Giuridiche (IRPEG) and a local income tax – Imposta Locale
sui Redditi (ILOR). Both taxes were levied on corporate profit at a
national uniform rate with ILOR non-deductible from the tax base.
Two more taxes applied: a tax on business net worth – Imposta
Patrimoniale, and a local property tax – Imposta Comunale sugli
Immobili (ICI). The health care system was financed by social
contributions paid by both employers and employees.
Tax incentives were provided to encourage new investment in
capital. The first such measure was introduced in 1994, drafted by
Italy's Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti, and known as “Tremonti
law”.2 The new rules granted firms special deductions from taxable
income IRPEG for a period of three years, namely from the begin-
ning of 1994 to the end of 1996. For each fiscal year, the special
deductions were computed as 50% of the cost of new investment
that exceeded the average of the cost of new investment made
during the previous five fiscal years. These investment tax incen-
tives applied in addition to the normal depreciation allowances,
with the result that, for income tax purposes, the investor was able
to write off more than the cost of the investment and, thus, effec-
tively reduce corporate income tax.
In the face of this tax system structure, Visco's reform had
several objectives. Firstly, it aimed at reducing Italy's corporate tax
burden to be closer to that in other European countries, through
2. D.L. 357/1994 became Law 489/1994.
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Regionale sulle Attivita Produttive (IRAP), which substituted for a
number of taxes such as ILOR, Patrimoniale, payroll contributions
to finance the health system and other minor taxes. The IRAP
could be considered a net income type of value added tax levied at
source.3 IRAP had a broad base, and applied to the value added
produced by companies, i.e. profit inclusive of interest payments
and labour costs. Outlay for capital goods was deducted from the
tax base in line with normal income tax depreciation rules. Due to
its broad tax base, IRAP, in theory, did not produce distortions in
the choice between capital and labour. However, in practice, in
cases where tax depreciation exceeded economic depreciation,
capital could be favoured over labour. Another consequence of the
broad base was that the statutory rate was significantly lower, i.e.
4.25% on average with sectoral differentiation.4
Secondly, the reform introduced a Dual Income Tax (DIT),5
which, along with IRAP, aimed at reducing the historical bias
towards debt-financing. This bias generally occurs because interest
payments are typically deductible from the tax base, which
encourages enterprises to finance their operations with debt rather
than equity (see Graham, 1996 and 2000). On the other hand,
there were perhaps other objective reasons, rooted in the structure
of the financial system in Europe in which, traditionally, banking
institutions, rather than stock markets, provide the bulk of finan-
cial intermediation to companies.
The DIT only affected corporate income – the “duality” refer-
ring to the different returns on capital. Business income was split
into two parts, to which different tax rates were applied: a standard
37% rate on capital income minus “ordinary income” (i.e. return
after-tax on new equity and retained earnings); the tax rate on
“ordinary income” was 19%. To determine “ordinary income”, the
Ministry of Finance set an annual “normal return” on the basis of
the market interest rate. To cap potential revenue losses for the
3. When IRAP was introduced, academic debate was in favour of it, but there were few
examples of its application in practice.
4. The rate was 2.5% for the agricultural sector and 5.4% for the banking and financial
intermediation sector.
5. D. lgs. 18.12.1997, n. 466.
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further than an effective average tax rate of 27%.6
Implementation of the IRAP and the DIT resulted in a reduced
tax burden on firms in general, and particularly on those wishing
to increase their capitalisation. These taxes also contributed to
reducing the gap between the cost of capital from debt-financing
and from own equity.
To reinforce the incentives to invest, the government decided
to expand the definition of “ordinary income” coverage.7 Addi-
tional incentives broadened the tax base to which the 19% tax rate
applied, and corresponded to the volume of investment financed
by equity in 1999 and 2000. At the same time the minimum effec-
tive tax rate floor was reduced from 27% to 19%.
Visco's reform was in place for just a few years, as in the second
half of 2001 the new government changed the structure of the
corporate tax system substantially, and especially the DIT, which
first was limited before being abolished in 2004.8 Other fiscal
incentives were introduced in 2001 (from 2001Q2 to 2002Q4) and
in 2009 (from 2009Q3 to 2010Q2). These provisions were referred
to as “Tremonti-bis”9 and “Tremonti-ter”10 since they reproduced
similar provision introduced previously, namely in 1994.
In part to offset the effect of abolition of the DIT, a thin capital-
isation scheme was implemented in 2004, according to which
companies excessively financed by debt could deduct interest rate
payments only up to a certain upper threshold. At the same time,
the statutory corporate income tax rate was reduced 11 to 33%, as
the new philosophy was to decrease corporate tax generally
without distinguishing among different sources of finance. Corpo-
rate tax was renamed into Imposta sul Reddito delle Società (IRES).
Another reform introduced in 2008,12 imposed a further reduc-
tion in the statutory tax rates: from 33% to 27.5% for IRES and
from 4.25% to 3.9% for IRAP. These tax policies were motivated
6. For further details on “Visco's reform” see Caiumi et al. (2013).
7. D.L. 63/1999 became law 133/1999.
8. D.lgs. 12.12.2003, n. 344.
9. L. 383/2001. Translated from Latin would mean “Tremonti II”.
10. D.L. 78/2009 became law 102/2009, translated as “Tremonti III”.
11. Already reduced from 37% to 36% in 2001.
12. L. 24.12.2007, n. 244.
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favourable treatment of investment activity and global capital
mobility. In order to induce more neutrality amongst financing
means further to the thin capitalisation scheme, accelerated and
anticipated capital depreciation allowances were abolished and
interest deductibility from the base rate was additionally restricted.
The reform package “Salva Italia” was introduced in December
2011 in the wake of the European debt crisis and currently is still in
force. It is one of three exceptional budget adjustment packages
enacted to reduce the public deficit and reassure financial markets.
It provided Aid for Economic Growth (ACE), i.e. Aiuto alla Crescita
Economica, following the example of the UK's Allowance for Corpo-
rate Equity, which is a fiscal measure aimed at stimulating
companies' capitalisation and designed to favour entrepreneurship
and economic growth. According to the ACE scheme, taxable
income is split into two parts: ordinary, exempt from tax, and
extraordinary, taxed at the normal IRES tax rate. The ordinary
return is calculated by applying to new equities a notional rate, set
annually by the Minister of Finance, which in the period 2011-
2013 was 3%. In 2014 the notional rate increased to 4%. Although
ACE is similar to DIT, it is designed to have a stronger impact on
reducing the tax burden because it eliminates double taxation on
business income.
Over the years, IRAP has achieved many of its original goals,
such as expansion of the tax base, reduction of average tax rates,
equalised treatment of companies with different sources of funding,
facilitation of tax compliance, fair burden-sharing between
employers and employees and, as Bird (2006) concludes, “IRAP
appears to be the closest approximation to a good local business tax
that now exists”. However, IRAP has been criticised by entrepre-
neurs and especially self-employed people, because in practice it is
not purely value added. For example, some companies might be
running zero profit or a small loss while simultaneously owing a
IRAP tax payment, because the tax base includes both labour costs
plus profit (or loss). Also, self-employed individuals are responsible
for paying both the employer's and the employee's shares.
Pressure to reduce or even abolish IRAP has been recurrent over
the last ten years. Several modifications to the implementation of
IRAP have been made over the years. In 2008, 10% of IRAP was
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employees, firms were allowed to deduct from the IRAP tax base all
social contributions plus a fixed amount of 4,600 euro per
employee. The 2011 “Salva Italia” law provided for deductions
from the amount of IRAP paid on labour costs. To encourage the
employment of women and young people, firms were allowed to
deduct from the IRAP tax base 6.000 euro for each newly employed
woman or young person (under 35 years) on a permanent contract.
To sum up, in analysing the Italian tax system we provide a
detailed chronology of permanent and temporary tax changes and
their diverse and time-varying parameters, that impact on the user
costs of capital and labour. The various incentives have been
substantial bringing in shocks of different magnitude not only to
the corporate tax rates, but also to the tax basis and the formation
of the user cost of capital and labour. In addition, there were
temporary incentives at nearly a business cycle frequency. These
changes are likely to result in important quantitative effects on
user cost through time and across types of companies, e.g.
financed by equity or debt.
On the structure of taxation, two conclusions can be drawn.
First, after the reforms implemented between 1998 and 2001, which
significantly reduced corporate taxation, subsequent interventions
have been less drastic. Second, the main target of recurrent reforms
has been the reduction of tax on self-financed companies in
particular. In the following sections, we provide a quantitative
assessment of how corporate taxation has shaped the user cost of
capital and labour and how this has affected investment.
3. Methodology and data
According to the theoretical literature, taxation policies affect
business investment through their impact on the user cost of
capital and labour. This section explains our theoretical founda-
tion, and our application of theory to the data. We focus
particularly on quantifying the impact of the complex structure of
the Italian tax system and its frequent reforms – initially on user
costs and, consequently, on investment and macroeconomic
activity. Our aim is to evaluate the user cost of capital to labour
and its subcomponents, estimate the sensitivity of investment to
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simulation to assess the overall transmission of tax policies.
3.1. Determinants of the user cost of capital to labour
The foundations of the user cost of capital and the unit labour
cost are neoclassical in character and represent the minimum
return required by profit-maximising firms from one unit of
investment and labour. Formal models on the user cost of capital
and investment decisions by Dale Jorgenson unifying the classical
and Keynesian strands of the literature date back to 1963. More
recent extensions and representations of these models include
Jorgenson (1996), Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Jorgenson and
Yun (2012). The marginal labour cost and the importance of user
cost of capital to labour have Keynesian origin. They are derived
from the problem of a firm minimising relative capital to labour
costs faced with fixed demand.
The user cost of capital represent the optimal solution to the
problem of a firm maximising its present discounted value of
current and future profit, subject to the capital accumulation equa-
tion and production function. As a result, the user cost of capital Uk
can be defined as:
where τ is the statutory corporate tax rate; p and q denote output
and investment prices respectively; π is the producer's inflation
rate; r is the market interest rate; F is the present value of deprecia-
tion allowances per unit of investment, i.e. the discounted sum of
depreciation allowances; and δ is the economic depreciation rate.
The user cost of capital Uk increases with the opportunity cost of
holding capital rather than buying government bonds or lending
to others at the rate r and the relative price of investment to output
q/p. It decreases with the present value of the fiscal depreciation
allowances F. The effect of τ on the user cost of capital is positive,
but depends also on the interaction with the present value F and, if
more detailed tax systems are considered (see below), the effect
could be indeterminate. In this simple definition and in the
extreme case of F equal to 1, taxation will be neutral with respect to
the user cost of capital.
( )(1 )
=
(1 )
k t t t t t t
t
t t
q r F
U
p
π δ τ
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−
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various tax policies. To do this, we modify the above formula to
account for changes in the rules on accelerated fiscal depreciation
allowances (F), different treatment of investment financing and
temporary fiscal incentives for purchasing investments in Italy.
With respect to the depreciation rate F, the law defines different
depreciation rates for different assets and industries.
The user cost of capital is affected also by the way firms finance
their investment, through equity or through debt. Taking this into
account, we develop two different formulations for the user cost of
capital – where firms are financed by debt, and where firms are
financed by equity.13
In a rational expectations framework with complete financial
markets and no market imperfection the Modigliani-Miller hypoth-
esis would hold and companies' choice of funding would be
irrelevant for their production decisions. However, financial
markets imperfections and other frictions do exist, which could
drive a wedge between the financing alternatives. Corporate taxa-
tion is one theoretical imperfection, which generally gives
preference to debt finance and could discourage companies to
resort to capital markets to fund their production and investment
projects. At macro-level the volume and depth of the domestic
financial markets could be unsatisfactory. Entrepreneurs in need of
risky venture capital might face discouraging liquidity premium on
the capital markets, leading to lower innovation and economic
growth. By trying to equalise the treatment of the two types of
funding, tax reforms try to encourage large eligible companies to
access the capital markets. However, many companies for structural
reasons do not have such choice and depend on bank loans, e.g.
small and medium size enterprises. The results of the tax reform
would depend on the financial choices actually available to compa-
nies and therefore is a priori ambiguous, see Bordington et al. (1999).
In the equity financing case, from the start of our period of
analysis, 1996, to 1997, the formula can be modified as follows:
(1)
13. Note that we do not take into account personal capital income taxation.
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on corporate income IRPEG τg, the local tax rate on corporate
income ILOR τi and the tax rate on the net wealth of firms τk. In
principle, τi and τg reduce the opportunity costs of financing
investment. In 1996 the value of those parameters was 37% for τg,
16.2% for τi and 0.75% for τk.
In the same period, firms predominantly financed by debt were
also able to deduct their interest rate costs. This led to a modifica-
tion of their user cost of capital.
(2)
After Visco's reform in 1998, which introduced the new corpo-
rate taxes, IRAP and DIT, the user cost of capital for equity-
financed firms became:
(3)
where τr is the statutory tax rate on value added IRAP, τgg is the tax
rate applied to new capital – new subscriptions capital and retained
earnings set at 19%, and τ* is the return on ordinary income.
In the case of debt-financing the user cost of capital is:
(4)
In the last period of the analysis, the user cost of capital,
currently in force, is affected by the introduction of the ACE:14
(5)
Comparing Equation (3) and Equation (5), we see that the intro-
duction of ACE acted to lower the user cost of capital. 
Marginal unit labour costs are derived from the first order
conditions of a cost-minimisation problem facing a firm under
perfect competition. The marginal labour costs Uι represent a rela-
tionship between real wages, augmented by the social
contribution, to the price of output. In the case of labour costs
being completely deductible from the tax base, the definition is:
(6)
14. We have not considered the 10% deduction of IRAP from IRES tax base.
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tax and s is the social contribution rate. Note that ideally the
labour cost should take into account the anticipated values of its
determinants during the entire lifetime of the equipment.
However, because expectations of those variables are very difficult
to measure in practice, we choose to stick to their observational
equivalents.
After introduction of IRAP, corporate taxes influence the
marginal labour cost because labour costs are not fully deductible:
where cs is the amount of social contribution excluding health
system payroll contributions; ci denotes the contribution for
workers' sick pay, occupational accidents and the bonuses paid by
employers. Deductibility of social costs and other allowances
directly affects the marginal labour costs. For example, before the
“Salva Italia” tax reform the formula was:
(7)
After the reform it was:
(8)
where α1 is the share of permanent employees in total number of
employees and α2 is the share of women and young people with
permanent contracts in the total number of permanent contracts.
The relative cost of capital to labour is determined by the ratio
between the user cost of capital and the unit labour cost, i.e.
.
As indicators for user costs we use the respective time-series data
and taxation parameters provided for in the corporate tax legisla-
tion reviewed above.
3.2. Determinants of investment dynamics: theory and econometric 
modelling
According to the neoclassical theoretical literature the demand
for business investment is influenced primarily by the current and
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Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 239expected costs of production. In addition, in the Keynesian litera-
ture aggregate demand factors also play an important role. New-
Keynesian models with financial markets imperfections (e.g.
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) suggest that information asymmetries
and credit rationing could give rise to an external financing
premium and that indicators such as internal cash-flow (pre-tax
profits) should also be considered. Furthermore, there is a growing
micro-economic literature with Keynesian flavour on the impact of
uncertainty on investment. When optimal investment decisions
are irreversible and inertial, then expectations and volatility of
product demand have significant influence (for details see Guthrie,
2012 and Bloom, 2000).
Empirical studies usually try to encompass and test the relative
importance of the factors suggested by the different strands of the
theoretical literature (e.g. Angeloni et al., 2003, Guiso et al., 2002
and Antonietti et al., 2014). They often find it difficult to validate
the importance of the user costs of capital and labour for invest-
ment and macroeconomic performance. This highlights the need
for further careful econometric investigation of the transmission of
tax policies to the wider economy.
Even though the virtues of incorporating demand expectations
and ex-ante uncertainty in economic models are well-understood
in theory, in practice they are difficult to quantify. Their best meas-
ures are extracted from surveys of professional forecasters and the
financial markets (e.g. sovereign debt spreads and term premia).
Surveys measuring economic attitudes and confidence are increas-
ingly used to identify the degrees of pessimism and optimism,
which are important amplification mechanisms or independent
sources of economic fluctuations. Indicators of subjective expecta-
tions and ex ante uncertainty have been derived from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters, following the methodologies proposed by
Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Giordani and Söderlind (2003) and
Tsenova (2015).
We evaluate and test the link between investment and the user
cost of capital to labour in the context of a range of other determi-
nants. For this purpose, we employ both a VECM for investment
applying Johansen's cointegration method, and the Engle-Granger
two stage estimation method. First, we identify the long-run equi-
librium relationship of corporate investment using several
Manuel Bonucchi, Monica Ferrari, Stefania Tomasini, Tsvetomira Tsenova240variables traditionally suggested by theory, such as ratio of capital
to labour costs, and aggregate demand. We test the residual of the
regression for non-stationarity. Second, we model the short-term
convergence dynamics of investment in relation to the same
factors and additional exogenous variables characterising demand
expectations and uncertainty.
To establish the presence of a long-run equilibrium relation
between investment I, user cost
and aggregate demand C, and the parameters of this relation-
ship, we estimate Equation (10). This equation incorporates a
constant and a linear deterministic trend.
(9)
(10)
where X represents the additional measures of expectations, disa-
greement and uncertainty, to augment the traditional benchmark
equation, and  represents the order of lags, where .
Given that the dependent and independent variables are I(1)
processes, the presence of a cointegration relationship between
them would produce a stationary I(0) error term, i.e. temporary
deviation from equilibrium. Alternatively, there might be a
spurious relationship between the variables producing non-
stationary persistent errors zt. In order to test this possibility we
assess the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression in which the first
difference of the residual Δzt is regressed on its own lag and its
lagged difference, Equation (11).
εt (11)
The relationships are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) in order to identify and test the role of expectations and
uncertainty factors on investment over and above the impact of
fundamentals, rather than imposing a priori structural links via full
information methods. We evaluate the stability of the coefficients
through rolling regressions.
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applying Johansen's maximum likelihood cointegration method-
ology. The nature of the cointegration process is diagnosed
through Trace and Lambda tests.
3.3. Macroeconomic simulation
The transmission of tax policies is further investigated incorpo-
rating investment dynamics and its determinants using the
Prometeia empirical macroeconomic model. Taking into account
the latest data and parameter estimates, we use the model to eval-
uate the overall macroeconomic effect of tax system reforms over
the years. We conduct a forward-looking comparative analysis on
the transmission of permanent changes in the corporate income
tax rate (IRES) and regional tax rate on corporate activity (IRAP). In
addition, we compare and contrast their transmission to other
shocks on investment, such as public investment and uncertainty.
The Prometeia empirical macroeconomic model is a large-scale
multi-sectoral quarterly model evaluated and used to produce
Prometeia forecasts. Over the years, it has been elaborated to keep
abreast of econometric theory and forecasting practice. The details
of institutional forecast models are rarely published in their
entirety, but the model's complexity can be deduced from Ferrari et
al. (1992), which provides a detailed account of the structure of an
early predecessor.
The model has prevailing New-Keynesian features, incorpo-
rating detailed sectoral disaggregation for the Italian economy,
inclusive of nearly 1,000 structural equations, of which 150 are
stochastic in nature. It can be used to investigate both cyclical and
structural factors in the short- and medium-term. It incorporates
financial, monetary and real sectors, inclusive of government,
services, manufacturing, construction and agriculture. The model
takes account of detailed public sector revenues and expenditure
such as income taxes on households and firms, deposit and bond
interest, housing and land, indirect taxes (VAT and fuel excise
duties), social contributions, interest payments, goods and service
expenditures, wages, pensions, health care and public investments.
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The study utilises public data from the National Accounts ESA
95 statistics provided by Istat, and financial statistics compiled by
Banca d'Italia. The period of analysis spans the available time-series
data from 1996Q1 to 2012Q4.
Investment I is defined as gross fixed capital formation of the
economy and includes machinery equipment, transport equip-
ment and intangibles. Due to data limitations, we cannot
distinguish among investment by the different sectors of the
economy. Aggregate demand C is measured as household
consumption plus exports of goods and services. The macro-
economic simulations also take account of investment in fixed
capital (construction), distinguishing between the public and
private sectors. Public investment is approximated by the time
series on public investment in construction. According to data
with annual frequency, investment in construction comprises
predominant part of public investment and therefore constitutes a
good proxy for this economic concept.
To estimate the user costs of capital and labour, output prices p
are captured by the time series on producer prices of manufac-
turing goods, the investment price q is measured by the deflator on
investment in machinery, equipment and transport, and w is
wages before taxes in the private sector. In the formula for the user
cost of capital we use a depreciation rate of 12% per year, which
corresponds to the average of several depreciation rates for
machinery and equipment, and is close to the standard applied in
other studies (see Bontempi et al., 1995). For equity-financed
investment we use the interest rate on corporate bonds, while for
debt-financed investment we use the average interest rate on
corporate loans. The separate measures for the user cost of capital
for companies financed by equity and companies financed by debt
are aggregated on the basis of a simple average due to lack of reli-
able statistics on their respective share.
In the analysis incorporating demand expectations and uncer-
tainty, we use sovereign bond yield data for the spread between the
10-year government bond yields for Italy and Germany, RtLong(IT–DE),
the Italian business climate survey and the corresponding aggre-
gate indicator based on an EC survey ySe IT, and proxies for euro area
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ECB's Survey of Professional Forecasters. More precisely, we take
short-term expectations on the output growth gap in the euro area
e Euro, i.e. the difference between the short-term (one-year-
forward) and long-term (five-years-forward) point forecasts of
output growth in the euro area; disagreement (uncertainty) about
short-term forecasts for the unemployment rate in the euro area,
measured by the distance between the 95th and 5th percentile of
the cross-sectional distribution of point forecasts, φ e(95%–5%)Euro. In
the macroeconomic simulations, we use also disaggregated data for
some sectors, e.g. employment, output, marginal labour cost, user
cost of capital in the sectors agriculture, industry, construction,
private services and public services.
4. Empirical results
Based on the methodology already described, we assess the
historical impact of taxes on the ratio of the user cost of capital to
labour and its components. We also estimate the effect of the user
cost of capital to labour on investment dynamics in the short and
longer terms. We apply the Prometeia empirical macroeconomic
model, which incorporates the investment equation, and evaluate
the macroeconomic consequences of changes in tax policies,
comparing them to other policy interventions.
4.1. Assessing the impact of the taxation system on the user cost 
of capital to labour
We measure and analyse historical evolution of the user cost of
capital to labour and its components in order to distinguish
between a longer term tendency and cyclical fluctuations in the
variable. At the same time, we try to assess the time-varying impact
of the taxation system on the user cost of capital to labour, from
the impact of other factors such as monetary policy transmission
and relative price movements. The effect of the taxation system is
further decomposed into contributions from temporary tax incen-
tives and changes in tax rates (and/or tax bases).
The results of the evaluation, depicted in Figure 1, show that
the longer-term component in the movement of our measure of
the user cost of capital to labour has generally been declining over
yΔ
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of capital to labour is characterised by pronounced shorter-term
fluctuations. Comparison of the dynamics of its components
reveals that the user cost of capital is the major determinant. In
contrast, the user cost of labour has very limited fluctuations, but
plays an important role in dampening the upper extremes in the
levels of the user cost of capital to labour. This is because episodes
of higher capital costs coincide with modest declines in the level of
the unit labour cost. Thus, labour costs contribute to softening
extreme upward pressures on capital costs.    
The pronounced downward swings in the user cost of capital are
due to temporary corporate tax incentives, as demonstrated by the
differences in the dynamics of Uk and Uk excluding tax incentives,
see Figure 2. Tax incentives seem to have achieved substantial
ante-cyclical reductions in corporate costs with potentially stimu-
lating effect on economic activity. The effects of some incentive
programmes are more pronounced than others. For example, in
1999-2002, Tremonti's law had a larger impact on the user cost of
capital than Visco's incentives, because the latter applied only to
Figure 1. Evolution of the user cost of capital to labour
Note: U(k/ι) is the ratio of the user cost of capital to labour; U(k) is the normalised user cost of capital for 2005
value = 1; U(ι) is the normalised cost of labour for 2005 value = 1.
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Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 245firms that had undertaken new capital increase either through new
subscriptions or retained earnings.
The user cost of capital shows a pronounced declining trend
with rates of over 19% in 1997 and nearly 14% in 2012, see
Figure 2. The sliding trend in the user cost of capital could be asso-
ciated mostly with the statutory tax on corporation income, which
has been reduced progressively since the beginning of 2000.
Although the IRAP tax rate has been stable, its tax base has been
reduced through time. The difference in the dynamics of Uk
without tax incentives, and Uk without taxes, is an indication of
the contribution of tax rates on the capital costs of companies.
While before 1998 tax rates weighed heavily on user costs, there
are periods thereafter when their contribution was zero or even
negative. At the same time, real interest rates and relative prices
have contributed towards the declining trend in user costs. These
effects are due to Italy's decision to join the euro area and the
resulting downward convergence in nominal rates on government
bonds and, to lesser extent, on loans to businesses. However,
during the financial crisis, interest rates exerted pressure on user
costs in the opposite direction.
Figure 2. Evolution of user cost of capital excluding fiscal incentives and taxes
Note: U(k) and its components are reported in real absolute terms, i.e. percentages. 
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costs of capital for firms financed through equity and through debt,
see Figure 3. While before 1998 the user cost under debt financing
was lower, in the period 1998Q1-2001Q2 this tendency was
successfully reversed by IRAP, which was levied also on the interest
paid by firms, and by the equity capital incentives enacted with the
DIT. Since then, the user costs of both groups of companies have
generally been aligned. The introduction of ACE in 2012 reduced
the user cost of capital for companies financed by equity, while the
respective cost for debt-financed companies remained the same.
Altogether, taxation policies have a significant impact on the
user cost of capital to labour, we find that while, in general, tax
incentives account for cyclical fluctuations in this indicator, tax
policies affecting the tax rate and/or tax base of corporate income
tend to influence its trend. In addition, fiscal distortions on
financing decisions have been reduced considerably.
4.2. Assessment of the impact of the taxation system on investment
According to the theoretical literature, the user cost of capital to
labour is at the heart of the transmission of fiscal and monetary
Figure 3. User-cost of capital debt vs. equity-financing
Note: User cost of capital for equity-financed and debt-financed firms. U(k) and its components are reported in real
absolute terms, i.e. percentages.
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Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 247policies to the supply side of the economy. Also, the user cost of
capital and its relation to investment and capital accumulation
generate persistent fluctuations, which policy-makers have been
trying to control or at least influence. The snag is that the user cost
is difficult to measure precisely and many empirical studies fail to
provide evidence of the importance of their respective indicators
for the dynamics of investment and the macro economy in
general. In this sub-section, we test the significance of the link
between our measure of the user cost of capital to labour and
investment and try to quantify the relationship.
We evaluate an econometric model of the dynamics of invest-
ment in the longer and shorter terms. Applying the methodology
described in the previous section, we find evidence of the presence
of a significant long-term equilibrium relationship between invest-
ment I, aggregate demand C, and the user cost of capital to labour
Uk/ι. Equation (12) reports the results of the estimation. Within the
sample period, this relation is accompanied also by a slight down-
ward deterministic trend, which could represent a crude measure
of exogenous technological progress giving rise to the increased
efficiency of investment per unit of output.
It = 2.569***Ct – 0.106***Utk/
ι – 0.007***t – 20.597***+ zt R2t = 0.947    (12)
       (0.081)       (0.020)            (0.000)        (0.947)             σ z = 0.022
Corporate investment I tends to rise with improvements in
aggregate demand (both domestic and foreign) C and reductions in
the user cost of capital to labour Uk/ι. As suggested by the standard
errors which are reported in parentheses, all the coefficients are
significant at the 1% level. Investment does not seem to linger far
from its long-term equilibrium given the relatively high explana-
tory power of Equation (12) at 95% and relatively low mean root
standard error σ z of the Error Correction Term (ECT) z.
To validate the estimated long-term equilibrium relationship,
we test the hypothesis of presence of a unit root in the regression
residual applying an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, i.e. that the
coefficient γ 0 in Equation (11) is significantly different from unity.
Equation (13) summarises the OLS estimates, with standard errors
in parentheses and t – test statistics of each coefficient in bold.
εt (13)
                                          (0.1112)      (0.125)    (0.0018)
                                             -3.46            0.07
1 1= 0.388 0.009t t tz z z− −Δ − + Δ +
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statistics at -3.46, which is less than the approximate critical value
of -2.60 for a 1% confidence level and a small sample,15 we can
safely reject the hypothesis of a unit root and presence of a
spurious regression results underlying Equation 12.
The estimated long-term dynamics of investment I to our
measure of the user cost of capital to labour Uk/ι and aggregate
demand C validate the findings in the theoretical literature and
represent a rare empirical result. The predictions of the model
suggest an equilibrium notion for private investment dynamics
which could be analysed combined with actual observations, as
depicted on Figure 4. Over time, there have been short periods
when equilibrium investment has either over or under shot the
path suggested by user cost Uk/ι and aggregate demand C. However,
towards the end of the sample, i.e. after mid-2010, actual invest-
ment has persistently failed to reach its equilibrium, a feature that
is likely associated with the Great Recession and the global
economic crisis.
15. Enders (1995) pp. 223 and Hamilton (1994) pp. 763.
Figure 4. Investment dynamics: observations vs. longer-term equilibrium It
 
Note: Variables are expressed in natural logarithm. The black line indicates actual observations of investment, the
red line depicts equilibrium longer-term predictions.
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Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 249Shorter-term investment dynamics is determined by the
distance from previous period's equilibrium, changes in the user
cost, aggregate demand and a number of other potentially impor-
tant non-fundamental factors. Table 1 reports the results of the
alternative specifications.16
To evaluate the role of separate fundamentals, we estimate a
benchmark specification in which changes in investment depend
on changes in aggregate demand, user cost and the deviation of
investment from its equilibrium, see Column (1) in table 1. Based
on the estimated coefficients which are significant at the 1% confi-
dence level, investment increases with aggregate demand and the
reduction in the user cost of capital to labour, and tends to
converge gradually to its longer-term equilibrium. The high signif-
icance of the reported coefficients and the relatively good
explanatory power of the regression (R2 of 59%), indicate that
fundamental factors are central for explaining and predicting
investment.  
16. Note that to compare the explanatory power of the additional factors related to demand
expectations and uncertainty, the sample is restricted to 54 observations, i.e. 1999Q3-2012Q4.
Figure 5. Insample prediction errors on short-term investment dynamics
Note: Red line indicates prediction errors from the benchmark equation table 1 Column (1). Blue line indicates pre-
diction errors of augmented regression table 1 Column (4). 
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Long-term dynamics: 
It =  2.569***  Ct -0.106***  Utk/l -0.007***  t  -20.597*** + zt   R2 = 0.947 
                          (0.081)         (0.020)            (0.000)          (0.947)           σz  = 0.022
Short-term dynamics:
ΔIt = β Z zt-1 + β C ΔCt + β U ΔUtK/L  +  Σ   β Xn,l Xnt-l + εt   εt ∈ iid(0.σ ε )
          n=1..N
  β S
(1) 
β S
(2)
β S
(3)
β S
(4)
zt-1 -0.398*** -0.283*** -0.429*** -0427***
(0.108) (0.095) (0.103) (0.098)
ΔCt-1 1.750*** 0.741*** 0.923*** 0.795***
 (0.221) (0.278) (0.244) (0.239)
ΔUtK/L -0.82*** -0.076*** -0.026** -0.083***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Δ y^te Euro 0.006** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Δ y^t-2e Euro 0.012** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005)
Δ y^t-3e  Euro -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
φ te (95% – 5%) Euro -0.016**
(0.007)
Rt
Long(IT – DE) -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Δyt-2e IT 0.163***
(0.051)
σ  0.017  0.014  0.014  0.017
R2  0.587  0.740  0.761  0.782
R2Adj  0.563  0.702  0.726  0.749
F  24.2  19.1  21.4  24.0
ll  143.6  156.2  158.4  160.8
Note: I is investment; z is the error correction term (ECT); C is aggregate demand, consisting of household consump-
tion plus exports of goods and services; y e IT  is the level of short-term expectations reported in the Italian business
climate survey; Ut
K/l is the ratio of user cost of capital to labour;  Δ y^ e Euro is short-term expectations on the output
growth gap in the Euro area, i.e. the difference between the short-term (1 year forward) and long-term (5 years for-
ward) point forecasts on output growth in the Euro area; φ e (95% – 5%) Euro is disagreement (uncertainty) about short-
term forecasts of the unemployment rate in the euro area, measured by the distance between the 95th and the 5th
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of point forecasts; Rt
Long(IT – DE) is the spread between the 10 year gov-
ernment bond yields in Italy and Germany; the variables I, C, UK/l  and y e IT  are in natural logarithms; φ e (95% – 5%) Euro
and Rt
Long (IT – DE) are demeaned; standard errors are reported in parentheses; σ  is measured in root mean squared
errors; *** denotes 1% or less significance level, ** 5% or less significance, * 10% or less significance level; for consist-
ent comparison the sample contains 54 observations, i.e. 1999Q3-2012Q4; F – F test statistics; ll – Maximum likeli-
hood test statistics. 
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other determinants, we estimate several different specifications for
the short-term dynamics of investment, see table 1 Columns (2)-
(4). The benchmark model is augmented to include indicators of
euro area short-term output gap expectations e Euro, unemploy-
ment uncertainty φ e(95%–5%)Euro, the spread between Italian and
German long-term government bonds RLong(IT–DE) and Italian busi-
ness confidence in the short-term ye IT. These are forward looking
indicators linked to demand expectations, which might be influ-
encing investment decisions over and above the information
provided by the observed data. Evidence of the significance of
those indicators and the model specifications at the 1% signifi-
cance level show that this is indeed the case. The incorporation of
these demand expectations and uncertainty measures improves
the explanatory power of the short-term model to 74%-78% (i.e.
by 15%-18%).
All fundamental factors also remain significant, with the inclu-
sion of additional factors mostly reducing the role of aggregate
demand in the short-term, but not the user cost of capital to
labour. This is understandable since the additional factors are
mostly linked to demand expectations and uncertainty, rather
than to supply. Additional factors have become particularly impor-
tant during the global financial and economic crisis, which
explains their usefulness for improving the predictability of invest-
ment changes towards the end of the analysed period, see Figure 5.
The benchmark fundamentals model performs relatively well, but
after mid 2010 tends to over-predict short-term investment.17
For robustness, we explore the time-variation in the equilibrium
dynamics of investment, as in Equation (12), through rolling
regressions with an expanding window from 2003Q1. The results
show that the relationship between investment and its funda-
mental equilibrium determinants is relatively stable. However,
while in the latter part of the sample, the link between user cost and
investment remains relatively unchanged, the importance of aggre-
gate demand increases after 2009. Before the Great Recession there
17. Because all fiscal incentive schemes are announced as temporary, we also explored the
possibility of non-linear calendar effects on investment at the beginning and/or end of each
period by the incorporation of time dummies. However, we could not find systematic evidence
on the importance of calendar effects on investment.
yΔ
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about 1.6, while after the recession the demand coefficient tends to
rise to the estimated value of 2.7 at the end of the sample. This
suggests that the role of demand factors for explaining longer term
investment has increased over the past several years while the role
of supply factors, such as our indicator for the user cost of capital to
labour, seems to have remained largely unchanged.
4.3. Assessing the historical role of corporate tax reforms
Given the solid evidence for the significance of the relationship
between our measure of the user cost of capital to labour Uk/ι and
the investment dynamics within the overall model of fundamental
determinants of investment demand estimated in the previous
sub-section, we need to distinguish the influence among the
various underlying components of the user cost of capital to
labour. This implies discerning the impacts of taxation system
policy from that of monetary policy and relative price movements,
as well as the contribution of temporary tax incentives from
changes in tax rates and/or tax bases. We use the Prometeia macro-
economic quarterly model to evaluate the overall contribution to
economic activity within the context of complex endogenous
multi-sector inter-linkages incorporated in that large-scale model.
We conduct several counterfactual assessments on the basis of
our measure of user cost of capital to labour and its various compo-
nents, incorporating them in the estimated model of investment
demand and the Prometeia quarterly macro-econometric model.
We assess the models' predictions keeping the estimated parame-
ters fixed, for three additional scenarios: (1) assuming a constant
user cost of capital to labour, i.e. the model's predictions reflect all
factors except variation in the user cost of capital to labour; (2)
assuming a measure of user cost of capital to labour that excludes
temporary tax incentives; (3) assuming a user cost of capital to
labour that excludes the influence of taxes, i.e. includes only the
influence of monetary policy and relative price movements. The
impact of the user cost of capital to labour is quantified by the
difference between the predictions of the overall models and
scenario (1). The contribution of incentives is estimated as the
difference between the models' predictions and scenario (2). The
Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 253influence of tax rates is measured as the difference between the
predictions of scenario (2) and scenario (3).
Figure 6 shows the evolution in the contribution of the user
cost of capital to labour and its components to expected invest-
ment demand equilibrium. According to estimates based on the
econometric model of equilibrium demand, the user cost of capital
has an important influence on investment. Over the analysed
period, the contribution of the user cost of capital to labour, over
and above that of consumption and other determining factors,
ranged between +4% and -4%.18
The high user cost of capital to labour was acting to discourage
investment demand during 1997, under the influence of a rela-
tively high user cost of capital due to permanent tax rates and
expiry of the first round of Tremonti's temporary tax incentives in
1996. In 2008, the user cost of capital to labour suppressed equilib-
rium investment demand by about 1%. In most other periods, the
user cost of capital to labour mostly contributed positively to
investment demand. These positive effects were most pronounced
in periods when fiscal incentives were implemented, with contri-
Figure 6. Impact of the tax system on predicted equilibrium investment demand
18. Since the respective contributions to short-term predictions are similar, their dynamics is
not reported separately.
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during both Tremonti-bis and Tremonti-ter.
During periods of fiscal incentives, they dominated the impact
of the entire user cost of capital to labour. The first Tremonti incen-
tive plan (1994-1996) had a powerful effect on its own; its
contribution to equilibrium investment hovered at above 4%.
However, the overall impact of the user cost of capital to labour
was suppressed by the negative impact of the overall tax rates and
the unfavourable contribution of real interest rates and relative
prices. Tax rates generally depress aggregate investment, which is
consistent with the fact that taxes inevitably burden enterprises
with higher costs. However, this negative contribution to equilib-
rium investment was quite small, and reversed to modestly
encourage investment during the period of Visco's reform and the
last two quarters of the period analysed.
Evaluating the contribution of taxation system policies using
Prometeia's quarterly economic model, we find that Visco's reform
enhanced quarterly GDP by 0.15 percentage points. During
Tremonti-bis and Tremonti-ter, the tax system increased quarterly
GDP by 0.2 percentage points. During the first round of Tremonti's
incentives in 1996, quarterly GDP in Italy would have been
0.4 percentage points higher, had it not been for the negative
offsetting impact of tax rates, monetary policy and relative prices.
Figure 6 shows that there is very little impact on investment
demand from the user cost of capital to labour that could not be
attributed to the two taxation components. This leaves a very
limited role for the impact of monetary policy and relative price
movements. This finding is confirmed by simulations of the
Prometeia quarterly macro model. This is an important finding,
given the key role attributed to the user cost of capital in transmit-
ting monetary policy impulses to the real economy. It implies that
fiscal policies, inclusive of tax incentives and tax rates, represent a
more effective policy alternative to influence economic activity
over the business cycle and over the longer-term.
4.4. Assessing the impact of future corporate tax reforms
In the current context of the Great Recession, fiscal spending
constraints and international capital mobility, proposals for further
Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 255reductions in corporate taxes to support economic growth and
fiscal sustainability are frequent in policy debates. In this section,
we evaluate the macro-economic effects of two possible alternatives
in that direction – a permanent reduction in the tax rates on corpo-
rate income (IRES) and the regional tax on corporate activity (IRAP),
each at an amount equivalent to 1% of Italian GDP. We make a
standard assumption of unfunded, i.e. deficit-financed, policy
changes, in order to look into their effect independently. Alterna-
tive assumptions of funding such as increased revenues, including
government debt, or reduced expenditures in other sectors, would
have involved the evaluation of an entire fiscal package and could
have potentially altered the final quantitative results.
We assess the Prometeia empirical quarterly macroeconomic
model for Italy incorporating within its multi-sectoral structure
the investment transmission channel of taxation policy that was
estimated and explained above. The expected changes are evalu-
ated taking the model's structure and the last period of analysis as
the initial conditions.
To enable policy relevant judgements, we adjust the shocks to
be ex-ante fiscally neutral in terms of generating revenue for the
government.19 In practice, these adjustments are minor because
the two tax schemes currently are rather similar. For example, in
2013 the revenue from IRES amounted to 36 billion euro and from
IRAP to 32 billion euro, of which 10 billion euro was paid by the
government administration. However, the bases of these two taxes
are different and, consequently, so are their statutory rates. Thus,
shocks are estimated to be similar in relation to their ex-ante effect
on public deficit, namely 1% of GDP.
In both cases the user cost of capital to labour Uk/ι decreases.
However, the reduction is less substantial for IRAP because its tax
base includes both corporate profit and labour cost. Therefore, the
tax rate reduction affects both the nominator and the denomi-
nator of the user cost Uk/ι and some part of the effect is cancelled
out. For example, a 1 percentage point decline in IRAP would cause
a 0.8 percentage point decline in the user cost of capital to labour
Uk/ι, as result of a -1.4 percentage points change in the user cost of
19. Inevitably, our predictions abstract from ex-post budgetary effects of reduced taxes on
economic activity and budget revenues.
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labour Uι. A corresponding change in IRES would translate into a
1.3 percentage points decline in the user cost of capital to labour
Uk/ι, which would be due entirely to the reduction in the user cost
of capital Uk.
 According to the simulations, a decline in the statutory IRAP
rate of 1% of GDP results in a rise in Italian GDP of 0.10 percentage
points after one year and 0.59 percentage points after four years,
see table 2. Note that this is equivalent to a policy shift reducing
the statutory rate by 2.9 percentage points, from the current 3.9%
to 1%. The main drivers of the increase in economic activity are
investment and household consumption.
This policy reduces the user cost of capital to labour, exercising
upward pressure on investment demand in terms of both its equi-
librium desired investment level and its short-term adjustments.
Taking into account the endogenous inter-linkages in the macro-
model, this materialises as a 0.67 percentage points rise in invest-
ment after one year, and a 1.78 percentage points rise after four
years.
Because the policy reduces the unit cost of labour Uι by about
4 percentage points for the whole economy, increased investment
activity is accompanied also by higher demand for labour. Employ-
ment increases gradually, by 0.10 percentage points during the
first year and by 0.97 percentage points after four years. This
contributes to increased disposable income, internal demand and
Table 2. Macroeconomic effects of reduced corporate taxes  and increased public 
investment equivalent to 1% of GDP 
Changes in → ∆ IRAP ∆ IRES ∆ Public investment
Effects on ↓ After 1 year  After 4 years After 1 year After 4 years After 1 year After 4 years
∆ I 0.67 1.78 1.83 2.27 0.28 0.64
∆ Total Investment 0.38 1.36 1.08 1.33 7.38 7.0
∆GDP 0.10 0.59 0.20 0.19 1.14 1.35
∆ Consumption 0.12 0.87 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.47
∆ Employment 0.10 0.97 -0.07 -0.23 0.48 0.99
∆ Consumer prices -0.27 0.59 -0.01 -0.1 0.02 0.05
Note: Results are evaluated on the basis of the Prometeia quarterly macroeconomic model for Italy and expressed in
percentage deviation from the model’s baseline. As explained in the data sub-section I denotes investment (in
equipment, machinery and intangibles); Total Investment includes additionally public investment (in construction).
Tax policy, investment decisions and economic growth 257domestic consumption, the latter increasing by 0.12 percentage
points after one year and 0.87 percentage points after four years.
The reduced production costs exert downward pressure on
consumer prices, accumulating to a consumer price reduction of
0.59 percentage points after four years. In addition, competitive-
ness improves, which strengthens exports.
The reduction in IRAP is relatively more favourable to employ-
ment in the service sector, which increases by 1.72 percentage
points after four years. In contrast, employment in manufacturing
increases by only 0.17 percentage points after four years. The
difference in transmission is due to the higher contribution of
labour to value-added in the services sector.
Alternatively, a decline in IRES equivalent to 1% of GDP implies
a reduction in its statutory rate of 13 percentage points, from the
current 27.5% to 14.5%. Based on current historical experience,
this is a sizeable reduction. Note that a 10 percentage points cut in
IRES took 20 years to materialise with only a single case of a
5 percentage points revision in the tax rate in 2008Q1.
In this scenario, the model predicts that the decline of IRES
would be counterproductive, because it would case reduction in
labour demand by companies. Investment would still increase
with respect to the baseline, by 1.83 percentage point in the first
year and by 2.27 percentage points after four years. Compared to
the reduction in IRAP scenario, the boost to private investment is
stronger due to the larger decline in the user cost of capital (user
cost of labour being unaffected) generating stronger demand for
investment in capital. However, this produces a degree of substitu-
tion between capital and labour, resulting in a modest reduction in
employment, by 0.7 percentage points after one year and
0.23 percentage points after four years. This policy leaves dispos-
able income and consumption almost unchanged. Overall, GDP
increases, but only by about 0.2 percentage points in the first year
and thereafter. This has obvious negative implications for the
expected sustainability of public debt.
In the transmission of this policy change labour demand plays a
key role, which justifies a more detailed look into its determinants.
The Prometeia model incorporates disaggregated equations for the
determination of labour demand (i.e. employment) in 5 different
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public services. In each sector labour demand increases with
production while decreases with unit labour costs and their ratio to
capital costs. When IRES declines, the user cost of capital to labour
also declines, while its inverse increases, exercising downward pres-
sure on labour demand. Sectors with higher capital intensity such
as industry would be more affected, with higher incentive to substi-
tute labour with capital. Instead, the construction and private
services sectors with lower capital intensity and moderate sensi-
tivity to to the price of capital would experience lesser pressure.
For comparison, we evaluate a fiscal policy scenario in which
government chooses to boost the economy through an equivalent
increase in public investment of 1% of GDP, rather than a reduc-
tion in corporate taxes, to stimulate private investment demand.
In this case, the model predicts an increase in employment and
internal demand and endogenous decline in the user cost of
capital. This also encourages private investment, which increases
by 0.28 percentage points after the first year and 0.64 percentage
point after the fourth year. Potential output increases by 0.14
percentage points after one year and 1.22 percentage points after
four years. This policy has an immediate and powerful effect on
Italian GDP, which increases by 1.14 percentage points in the first
year and 1.35 percentage points after four years. The higher
economic growth generated is able to deliver budget surpluses after
three years and sustainable gradual downward convergence in
public debt.
5. Conclusion
This paper evaluates the transmission of corporate tax policies
to factor costs in production, investment and economic activity. It
contributes to the assessment of the usefulness of optimally
designed growth-friendly policies in the longer-term and over the
business cycle. The overall effects of reducing the corporate tax
burden need to be assessed in a macroeconomic equilibrium
context accounting for endogenous spillovers and feedback loops
across various sectors of the economy.
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the taxation legisla-
tion in Italy over the past two decades, and proposes indicators for
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the impact of the taxation system, including the effect of tax rates
and tax incentives and underlying factors such as monetary policy
and relative price movements. The historical and future influence
of changes to the taxation system are studied on the basis of an
estimated econometric model of the determinants of investment
demand and the Prometeia quarterly macro model.
The results of the analysis show that changes to the taxation
system have an important influence on the factor costs of produc-
tion, investment and overall economic activity. Variation in the
user cost of capital to labour is driven mostly by changes to the
taxation system, leaving a very limited role for other factors such
as monetary policy and relative prices. This variation is character-
ised by a slight downward trend and marked cyclical fluctuations.
This dynamics is dominated by the user cost of capital, but the user
cost of labour also plays an important part in dampening upward
peaks in the cost of capital. While the cyclical fluctuation in the
user cost of capital is attributable mostly to temporary fiscal incen-
tives, tax rate policies determine its trend.
The econometric analysis demonstrates that reductions in the
user cost of capital relative to labour have a significant and positive
effect on investment, both in terms of its longer-term equilibrium
and its short-term dynamics. Naturally, Keynesian type demand
factors also play a role, such as aggregate demand (in the short and
long-term), demand expectations and uncertainty (in the short-
term). Over the years, temporary tax incentives have made an
important contribution to boosting investment and economic
activity during downturns. Reductions in tax rates have had a
smaller, but permanent effect imposing a minimal burden on
economic activity.
The results of the macroeconomic assessment of further reduc-
tions in corporate tax rates in Italy shows that decreasing the
regional tax on corporate activity (IRAP) would be more beneficial
than a comparable decrease in corporate income tax (IRES). This is
because, IRAP reduces the user cost of both capital and labour,
which provides corporations with incentives not only to invest in
new capital but also to increase employment. Reducing IRES would
be counterproductive because it depresses labour demand. In this
case cutting corporate taxes would encourage a degree of substitu-
Manuel Bonucchi, Monica Ferrari, Stefania Tomasini, Tsvetomira Tsenova260tion between capital and labour, exerting downward pressure on
employment and dampening the positive overall effect on
economic activity. Although in this paper we focused on analysing
cost factors, we do not ignore the importance of demand factors,
which are shown to be very powerful. Assessment of an equivalent
increase in public investment produces an overwhelmingly greater
improvement in economic activity, with positive spillovers to
investment and debt sustainability.
Corporate taxation policy and, especially, temporary fiscal
incentives, seem to be more effective instruments for overcoming
cyclical downturns than alternative tools, such as monetary policy,
which does not appear to generate economically meaningful
counter cyclical variation in the real rates of financing for Italian
businesses. Temporary fiscal incentives generate important positive
economic effects, with long-lasting consequences for economic
dynamics and welfare. However, the gradual lowering of taxation
rates has generally reduced the tax burden on companies to rela-
tively minimal levels with valuable positive implications for
longer-term economic growth. Nevertheless, consideration of
future reductions to corporate tax rates should take account of the
general macro-economic perspective and alternative options for
achieving the economic growth and public debt sustainability
offered by the rising power of Keynesian factors, including
boosting aggregate demand and public investment.
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